It’s a surprisingly controversial statement. It’s particularly difficult for those working in traditionally technical specialisations to come to openly acknowledge “politics” in their work. By raising the subject, it’s almost as if one had stepped in something unpleasant.
I recall the period when a new aviation agency was being established. That’s in the dawn of this new century. EASA, the European Aviation Safety Agency came into operation in 2003, but the debate about its shape and form occupied many of the preceding years. Politicians, administrators, technocrats, and industry were vocal about the direction to take.
The impact of liberalising European civil aviation, that stated in the 1970s, was primarily a political drive. It envisaged both a commercial and social benefits. Separating the operation of aviation from the vagaries of political personalities seemed to offer a future that would be led by the customers needs.
The general acceptance that State control of businesses, like airlines and manufacturers, had a stifling effect, limiting innovation and opportunity was questioned but not so much by those with the power to make changes. Momentum pushing liberalisation was given a boost by the apparent successes of businesses, like Southwest airlines[1] in the US. Freddie Laker had a big influence in the UK[2].
In these decades of transformation aviation safety has always been heralded as a priority. Whoever is speaking, that’s the line that is taken. Safety is number one. What industry has experienced is a decades long transition from the ways and mean of trying to control safety to an approach more based on managing potential outcomes. This is characterised in a shift from mostly prescriptive rules and regulations to other more adaptive approaches.
Back to the proposition that safety is political. There are several ways to address this as an exercise of analysis. There’s a mammoth amount of historical evidence to draw upon. However, my thoughts are more to do with anecdote and lived experience.
Number one is that our institutions are shaped by political decision-making. This is to varying degrees, from year to year, but international bodies, national ministries, administration, authorities, agencies, committees, learned bodies, all depend upon political support. If they do not muster and sustain this support, they will wither and die.
Number two, change is a constant, failures happen but safety achievement depends on a consistency, dependability, and stability. Maintaining public confidence. There lies a dissonance that must be reconciled. Governments and politicians instinctively insulate themselves in such cases and so the notion of “independent” regulation is promoted.
Number three, arguments for liberalisation or intervention do not stop. The perpetual seesaw of cutting “red tape” and tightening rules and regulation may settle for a while even if these are always in movement. This can be driven by events. The proximity of fatal accidents is always a significant political driver. Domestic fatalities, where consequences are borne locally, will have much more impact than similar events 1000 miles away.
Does any of this matter? Afterall it’s a context that exists, de-facto. It’s no good saying: stop the world I want to get off.
Yes, it does matter. Accepting that safety is political helps dispel some of the myths that persist.
A prerequisite to safety success is provision of adequate resources. Constantly cutting a budget has consequences. A blind drive for efficiency that doesn’t effectively measure performance invites failure. Much as lack of planning invites failure. Reality bites.
It’s reasonable to question of investigatory or regulatory “independence” from time-to-time. The reasons for safety decision-making can be purely objective and technical. Questioning that “purity” need not be impugning politicians, administrators, or managers in their motivations. Shedding light on contextual factors can help learning and avoidance of future failures.
Accepting the perpetual political seesaw of debate can help a great deal in meeting safety goals. What this means is the importance of timing. Making a proposal to tighten a rule concerning a known deficiency can meet a stone wall. Making the same proposal after an accident, involving that deficiency, can go much better. Evidence that is compelling can change minds. This is reality.
[1] https://www.southwest.com/about-southwest/#aboutUs
[2] https://simpleflying.com/laker-airways-brief-history/
John Vincent 