Aviation – John Vincent

Current State of Aviation Safety: Data-Driven

The present day. Today. There will be Press Releases galore at this air show. I expect ambitious and upbeat predictions. More orders. More growth. More developing markets. Demands for more skilled people, more performance, more pressure for the early adoption of rapidly changing technologies.

My subject is safety. Where are we with aviation safety in the present day? There’s a sound legacy. Afterall aviation has a long tail. What we have now, and if I look at the Farnborough Airshow catalogue of ten years ago[1], is digitisation. The ambition to be data-driven. A continuing drive to exploit data of all kinds. Extracting information from ever increasing sources in aviation.

This desire for actionable safety intelligence is not new. On my desk I have a coaster celebrating the UK CAA’s MOR Scheme[2]. That’s been alive for 50 years (1976-2026). Occurrence data has been, and is being, used to construct all sorts of safety performance indicators. These indicators can be useful but it’s not always so. They are fuel for safety management systems.

I used the word “actionable” with purpose. Today, making the results of safety data analysis useable by front-line actors and responsible managers has been a challenge we wrestle. I’ve often heard it said – that’s great but what do I do about it? Too many “greens” on a chart and complacency can set in. Too many “reds” and everyone goes into panic mode.

I have been fortunate to work with a number of safety initiative. One called the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) in the US. To match its work, on this continent, I set up a European version; ECAST in 2006. The focus was on data-drive analysis. There’re safety teams for Rotorcraft and General Aviation too.

These safety initiatives came about a reactive way. Reporting in 1997, the Gore Commission, was a reaction to dilemmas that is still with us. What to do in the wake of catastrophic accidents. And more pertinent to this talk; what to do when the global accident rate curve looks flat at the same time as predictions are for a significant growth in global air traffic. Reading this report now, the predictions were horrifying. Predictions of one large aeroplane fatal accident every week by now. Luckily, commercial air transport didn’t suffer that fate.

I should NOT say “luckily”. Current safety performance is down to an enormous amount of work done by thousands of aviation professionals over a sustained period. Not only this but shocks, whether they be financial crisis, volcanic eruptions or global pandemics, have tested this industry severely.

Taking on board what was learned over the decades, safety management has developed and matured. Incorporated in aviation’s safety regulatory framework, it’s now practiced across the whole industry. Almost. We don’t just react. We now have Safety Plans. Lists of actionable tasks aimed at continuous safety improvement. On the scale mentioned earlier – we are proactive.

Let me stop. This is not a utopia. I’d say at least half the global aviation industry is struggling with the need to be proactive. So, the road we are travelling on remains a long one. We don’t just need the capability to do better; we need to maintain the will to do better.

[1] 50^th Farnborough Air Show in 2016.

[2] https://www.caa.co.uk/about-us/make-a-report-or-complaint/report-something/mor/occurrence-reporting/

The Evolution of Aviation Safety: A Historical Overview

A quick tour of the history of aviation safety. In a couple of minutes.

As powered aircraft took to the skies it quickly became apparent that, of all the means of transport, aviation was less forgiving than others. Moving at speed in four dimensions, with the necessity to take-off and land safely, has inherent risks. By no means does this mean that flying is an dangerous activity. What it does necessitate is an exercise of sound engineering, preparation, and proficiency. When these are missing, and in cases of misfortune, accidents and serious incidents happen.

In the days between the world wars, aviation moved from the military and a circus-like amusement to a viable means of public transport. Progressively, more passengers had the opportunity to experience the wonders of flight.

Today, it’s not the early days of flight I want to focus on, but we do owe the engineers and aviators of that time a great debt. Much was learned as aeronautics matured. Since the end of the second world war the production, promotion and application of standards has embedded what had been learned. This has established the way that international civil aviation works.

One simple expression of the stages we’ve been through is Prof Patrick Hudson’s[1] model. This model describes five distinct levels of cultural maturity. The steps are pathological, reactive, calculative, proactive and generative.

This model sits alongside steps in the development of technology that have been a hallmark of aviation. Different categorisations exist. AIRBUS[2] has one that’s easily understood in terms of generations of civil aircraft.

First are the “classics” of the 1950s and 60s. Next, the second generation starts down the road of more electronics. More safety critical systems. Third generation starts flying in the early 1980s when automation becomes the norm (early fly-by-wire, glass cockpits, flight management systems). The fourth generation introduces safety systems, which address the major causes of fatal accidents, namely Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) and Loss Of Control In-Flight (LOC-I). That’s the early 1990s. When I made that move from industry (design and production) to an aviation safety regulator.

Now, I’d say we are well into fifth generation aircraft, with composite structures and integrated modular avionics. In fact, we are well into speculation about what the sixth generation may look like. Machine learning, single pilot operations, hybrid powerplants, aircraft as a node on a network.

Because aviation is a learning industry, and a conservative one, the expectation is of progressive improvement in maturity throughout the aviation system and innovative technology applied to enhance safety.

This is not to say that the potential for error, missteps and recklessness don’t exist. They do. I expect continuity in a way that takes full advantage of advanced methods without scarifying the legacy of an astonishing good global aviation safety achievement.

Later, to cover a lot of ground in a short time, I’m going to condense all the above into three distinct categories. But before that, I’ll talk about the present and a vision of the future.

POST: UK Farnborough Air Show on Thursday 23rd July 2026. Time: 13:00-13:15 BST. Location: Hall 3 Stage. Session title Where Next for Aviation Safety?

[1] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0925753507000227?via%3Dihub

[2] https://d10x.airbus.com/generation-of-jets/

Perceptions of Aviation Professionals

Let’s see what aviation stereotypes look like. There’s a wide selection of free images on-line. There’s a typical view of the crew of an aircraft. It didn’t take long to find one.

I can point out the obvious gender related features of such images, but what first caught my eye were the aircraft engines. They were way to far out on the wings. I suspect our good friend artificial intelligence may have generated such a colourful image.

Now let’s go for an Air Traffic Controller. The image that came up did have plus points. It did give an impression of what a controller’s job is about, at least as much as a simple graphic image can. I did expect to see a radar screen with dots on it as part of the image. A controller sitting at a desk with buttons to press and a window to look out of sums up the basic picture.

Next my on-line search was for an aircraft mechanic. Now, I started this search with low expectations of what might come up. The picture I got was of a hanger with two large aircraft to the left and right. Standing in the middle of this scene was a man in overalls moving an aircraft engine on a trolly. Proportions were off, in that the engine diameter was half the hight of the mechanic. Yes, the stereotype of a workingman with a spanner persists.

So, what have I discovered? Not much really. Or not much that didn’t fit the title of time-honoured stereotype. Images that pigeonhole jobs as done by people who dress in a particular way and are surrounded by the equipment of their trade. Roles, age, race and gender are fixed in a traditional pattern. I do draw the conclusion that, for all the daily hype, artificial intelligence is not going to do anything original when faced with a simple question about specific job.

This isn’t good. If the latest advance in technology is locked into classical and predicable images from the archives, then it’s not so advanced at all.

Why does this matter? Well, there’s a great deal of concern about where the next generation of professional in aviation are going to come from. Our wish to fly is affected by lots of social, environmental, and economic factors. Overall, the trend over coming decades is in one direction – up. More flights, more aircraft, and the need for more people to operate the system.

If the generic images of the professional roles in aviation are stuck in the past, then that’s not going to help. It’s off-putting. There are those young people who may find the traditional professional stereotypes appealing. My guess is the majority are unlikely to think this way.

In an on-line environment where artificial intelligence regurgitates the past this technology may drive us backwards. Not for one moment does the image of a workingman with a spanner need to be demoted. What needs a touch of imagination is a portrayal of images more akin to reality. A changing reality too.

[Yes, the title image is an appropriately prompted artificial intelligence generate one provided by WordPress].

Lessons from Operational Events

For an aviation industry that takes pride in learning lessons from experience and taking timely corrective action, a series of operational events is surprising to say the least.

Today’s large aircraft do look much the same. The tricycle undercarriage has become universal. A set of steerable wheels at the front and a heavy set of landing gear, each side, to the rear. When parked, a nose gear collapse or inadvertent retraction on a large aircraft is not catastrophic. The aircraft can be recovered, inspected, and repaired. This undesirable event can be dangerous for anyone in the vicinity. It has the potential to be fatal. Fortunately, so far, there has been no fatalities.

For an aircraft operator such an event at an airport gate is a massive expense. Putting an in-service aircraft out of action for a considerable time.

To date, several damaging nose gear collapse (and alike) events have occurred to large aircraft[1]. Detailed analysis of these events exists and corrective actions are proposed.

One conclusion is to say that this is about people not following procedures. That is the instruction is to put a pin in one place but instead it gets put in the wrong place. So, this dramatic unintended event is written up as a maintenance error. It’s an outcome that no one intended. That’s fine. There’s no doubt that an error was made. Accepting that an error occurred is not a reason to blame. That is if there are no signs of negligence.

The trouble is the simple question – how easy was it to make that error?

Then we get into that grey area of the gap between aircraft design and operations. In a design office it may be reasonably assumed that a procedure will be followed in an almost robotic manner. No need for the people in operations to think beyond taking the same action day-after-day. This would surely become widespread practice.

As we know the actual environment of aircraft operations can be more demanding than the original equipment manufactures might imagine. Pressure to turn around an aircraft can be high, working conditions can be poor and fatigue can play a part.

There are lines of communication between the aircraft design and operations organisations, and such difficulties are regularly discussed.

Faced with an event categorised as maintenance error then what next? Redesign the aircraft? Change a procedure or require more training? Those are three of the options, there are more.

This is where the possible discussion gets reactive. Now, it would be extremely costly to redesign an aircraft for the sake of an event that is rare or for which the consequences are minor. It is possible to put numbers on each of these. The rarity, the cost, and the impact.

Modifying or rewriting a procedure, on the other hand, can be less costly and it may be quite sufficient as a corrective action. That said, any procedure that can be written can be subject to error. In fact, the original procedure may have been straightforward and well thought out.

Then there is the fall-back position. Give the people in aircraft operations more training. The assumption being that more training means less errors. It is a crude assumption because this is not a linear relationship. So many other factors come into play.

Discussions surround the above possibilities can become protracted. There’s a call for more analysis and more data. There’s the proposal for a study to be conducted. Once in that loop a year can go by as if it was a month.

There’s always the argument that highlights dozens of aircraft operators haven’t had this event occur and therefore the finger is pointed at those who have. This argument gets an outing, but it is foolish. It’s like saying – I haven’t had an accident yet, and therefore I’m safe. Foolish.

There are a lot of detailed discussions and a million and one opinions. Taking the big picture, this is a problem that is solvable[2]. What is surprising is the reoccurrence of the problem.

[1] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/aaib-special-bulletin-g-zbjb-inadvertent-nose-landing-gear-retraction-during-pre-flight-maintenance

[2] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/12/12/2019-26734/airworthiness-directives-the-boeing-company-airplanes

Future Aircraft Systems

I read that there’s lesson to learn from the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) experience that plagued Boeing. And led to fatalities. There’s a lot that has been written about the tragic saga. Much of great value.

It’s true. Aviation advances as the community learns lessons from incidents and accidents. Yes, there’s variability in the effectivity of this learning process. Occasions when oceans are written about one case and dozens of others are given an inappropriate light touch[1]. A trustworthy centralised repository of safety recommendations from published aviation accident reports is a useful tool. A point of reference. In the first months of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in Cologne, back in 2005, my team established such a database. It’s only possible to track the follow-up of key safety recommendation if there’s a well-maintained administrative system. Safety is often about the intelligent use of data.

Cockpit design, and the human factors issues involved, are without doubt one of the most critical parts of an aircraft. Society is not ready for fully autonomous passenger carrying aircraft. I believe it will happen, in decades to come but the horizon is way off. For certain types of vehicles, autonomy must be the solution given that flight control is beyond human capacities. Here’s I’m thinking mostly of hypersonic and space flight.

For a pilot to exercise responsibility for a flight there’s a need to have, at least, a basic understanding of what a machine is doing. In past times of strings and wires and clockwork instruments that understanding was ingrained knowledge gained from training and experience.

Future aircraft systems will not be easily described as functional blocks that perform well understood and dedicated functions. An autopilot, an autothrottle, autobraking, a flight management system, even an engine. Hybridisation is coming.

That does not mean a pilot must understand the inner working for a multicore microprocessor or complex software algorithm. Flight test pilots being the exception, in this case.

The design goal should always be to make safer systems. Engineering these aircraft systems is not a case of purely fitting together a set of Lego like components. The error made with the MCAS is one that ignored this fact. Interdependencies are manyfold.

Ideally, future aircraft systems, however capable and complex, should be describable, predicable, and ultimately trustworthy. These words sound so simple. One reason this is not simple is that very word – complex. The minute that there’s a massive number of possible combinations and permutations of conditions at may exit boundaries must be set. What’s a little more reassuring is that complexity if far from new in human experience[2].

Just to make the airspace of the future even more complex it’s no longer correct to think of an aircraft as alone and free to make any appropriate manoeuvre. Increasing connectivity, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence (AI) all come into the mix.

To stay safe, pilots will have to appreciate how constraints and boundaries are managed. This information must be provided transparently and preferable with options.

[1] https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/opinions/the-safety-paradox-fewer-accidents-greater-responsibility/

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wheat_and_chessboard_problem

Understanding Conspicuity

It’s a weird word. That’s if you have not come across it before. How it’s used depends a lot on the context. Conspicuity isn’t everyday langauage.

One way to picture this word is to imagine a cyclist on a busy but poorly lit road. This is a case every driver has observed, I’m sure. Let’s consider two distinct cases. One where the cyclist is wearing dark cloths and riding without lights. The other case is where the cyclist is wearing a luminous jacket and is riding with lights. No prizes for guessing which one is the most conspicuous. Not only that, but the one who is less likely to be involved in an accident.

This is a simple two-dimensional space where two vehicles, or more, share a road. Both have a right to be there. However, one road user is much more vulnerable than the other. Being noticed, being seen, is key to a rider’s safety. Not a guarantee of safety. A necessary consideration, if not a mandatory one. Both driver and rider need to see each other for there to be safe operation.

In aviation the situation gets a whole lot more complex. For a start flying objects move in three-dimensional space and at speeds that can differ dramatically. From a static ballon to a fast military jet. Yet, just like driving on the roads the most basic way of avoiding collisions is to see and avoid. Naturally, there are a whole collection of rules of the air that wrap around that requirement. These rules set-up expectations that pilots will behave in predicable ways.

As technology has developed so the reliance on see and avoid has changed. Recently, I have found this is happening on the roads too. Sensors on my new car provide an autobraking function that kicks in when approaching a slower moving vehicle ahead. There’s a tracking function that nudges the steering wheel when drifting across a white line. Both forms of safety automation can be deselected. Do they result in fewer collisions? I don’t know.

There’s another aspect of flying that is an obvious difference from life on the roads. When collisions happen those involved are not going to stay put. Gravity will do its job. If an impact is sufficiently severe then it’s highly likely that one or more aircraft will not be flyable. An incident turns quickly into a catastrophe.

Thus, in aviation it’s vital that not only does each pilot need to know where they are but they need to know about everything around them. The condition of being conspicuous is not optional. It’s best if aircraft are easy to see. Surprisingly, this is far from always being the case. Unlike the lines on the roads, paths in the air crisscross and aircraft can be above and below one another. The geometry involved can get extremely complicated.

In the 1920s, innovations in Croydon[1] led to the world’s first air traffic control system. A growing amount of air traffic meant that a means had to be found to regulate their use of the air space. This was possible because an electronic means of aircraft communication had become viable.

The subject of Electronic Conspicuity[2] has come on in leaps and bound ever since. Finding ways of sharing awareness of everyone’s situation has made aviation safer. Radar and aircraft transponders are an integral part of commercial flying. This story doesn’t stop. I could go as far as to say that this whole subject is still in its infancy. With ever more airspace users demanding access then innovations continue to be absolutely vital.

[1] https://www.flightglobal.com/ops-safety/2020/02/colourised-images-mark-centenary-of-worlds-first-control-tower/

[2] https://www.caa.co.uk/General-aviation/Aircraft-ownership-and-maintenance/Electronic-Conspicuity-devices/

Runway Incursions and Airline Safety

Firstly, condolences to the families and friends of those killed in the recent aviation accident at LaGuardia airport in New York. It’s incredibly sad that this destructive runway incident took place in the way that it did. At this stage there is a jumble of international News reports. As is often the case while attention is focused on what happened at a time when the facts have not been verified or data collected.

What is known is that Air Canada Express flight 8646 was where it was supposed to be on a runway and an airport-based fire truck was not. The resulting high-speed collision had disastrous consequences for both the aircraft and the fire truck.

The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has quickly engaged to start a detailed technical investigation. Their role is to independently piece together all the information that is available and determine a probable cause of the accident. With that to make formal safety recommendations aimed at preventing accidents and incidents.

What I can say is that the subject of Runway Incursion (RI)[1] is a long-standing aviation safety concern. So much so that it has its own accident category when it comes to aviation safety data analysis. Such tragic events are not isolated or extremely improbable.

Air Traffic Control (ATC) is tasked with separating aircraft from each other and any other vehicles. Accidents in this category have been the catalyst for advances in equipment and procedures. That said, there’s no getting away from the substantial number of human and operational factors that pervade this domain.

Unlike the design and construction of aircraft system whereby an onerous safety objective can be stamped on a technical specification. Managing air traffic on the ground is done with a high dependency on the actions of professionally trained staff.

In an internationally accepted code, a RI is defined as:

Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.

I don’t hesitate to say that’s what happened at LaGuardia. This says nothing about – why?

So, we have an indication of what happened. What’s a little unsettling is how quickly there is News reports speculation on why it happened. Initial references to someone having made a mistake or error are no helpful. This signalling tends to encourage a simplification of the circumstances of the accident into a matter of blame. That unfortunately leads to an impression that this is a rare event that can be attributed to one factor. All to often this is not the case.

The actions of professionally trained staff can be put under such work pressure as it comes to a situation where no normal person can perform adequately. It was the introduction of Safety Management Systems (SMS) that was intended to identify these scenarios and ensure that they were mitigated or eliminated.

The actions of everyone involved with this fatal aviation accident are now under investigation. Aviation is not a “a dangerous business”. However, it is a business that requires more care and attention than most. That includes the provision of adequate resources at all times.

[1] https://www.intlaviationstandards.org/Documents/OccurrenceCategoryDefinitions.pdf

Transitioning to Green Aviation

Put your hands over your ears if your mantra is – drill baby drill. If climate change is a myth, in your mind, or you take a devil may care attitude, then the mere mention of the word “green” may give you the jitters. This is not for you. Move out of the way.

For the rest of us, who live in the real world, on planet Earth, there’s a problem. A prickly, tricky, sticky, long-term global problem. One that has commanded a great deal of attention but sometimes almost to the point of boring the pants off. Transport is one of those sectors that needs attention. Progress toward the adoption of Electric Vehicles (EV) is underway. Now and then, there’s a push back, but the direction of travel is clear. An immediate reminder of the need to change is the volatility of fuel prices at the pump. An inability to control or foresee global events that push oil and gas prices one way and then the next.

Sustainable aviation is turning out to be a hard nut to crack. For ground-based vehicles the issue of power density is not as constraining as it is in aviation. Weight is one of the fundamental parameters in flight. So, current high energy batteries present a particular technical challenge.

Exploring new forms of flight propulsion is a god send for futurologists, researchers and adventurous innovators. None of the technical challenges are a quick win. The avenues for study are infinite. Well almost. Antigravity doesn’t seem to be on the cards – yet.

I guess one of the barriers is that we have a sophisticated global aviation system that we, almost entirely, take for granted. The technology involved in transporting 200 people from a cold, grey, dull, wet Britain to a sunny warm inviting holiday destination has matured to such a point that few look at it with astonishment. That so much is provided for so little outlay.

It wasn’t that the problems of providing such air transport services were easy to solve. It’s an inheritance that has stretched over many decades. Testament to the work of a vast number of smart entrepreneurs, engineers, scientists, officials and alike.

Hydrogen fuel, or some form of hybrid propulsion does seem to be a long-term prospect.

What I see now is the excitement created by past projections is being tempered by practical reality. Wonderful strategic plans, with outlandish charts, pointed the way to a fossil fuel free utopia. Those colourful documents did good in driving forward a level of thinking. Where they offered a lesser contribution is in predicting and enabling a practical transition.

This is the time when everyone does a double take. Where the aim is a workable business cases that provides a transition in a believable, sound and rational sense. Flirting with bankruptcy has been a habit of past adventurous aviation developments. Read the turbulent story of the jumbo jet. Most agree this is not a desirable state to wish for or be in. Maybe this is the tale of the tortoise and the hare. Methodical plodding through the difficulties, incremental change, ingenuity and sheer hard headedness are needed. A couple of points to round off.

One – don’t get stuck on the repetitive nonsense that new developments can’t takes place until the regulatory structure is in place.

Two – don’t build houses on all the small airfields and lesser-known airports that may, one day, become part of a new transport system[1].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plymouth_City_Airport

The Mystery of Flight MH370

It’s ridiculous and shocking. In the modern era of civil aviation, that a large passenger aircraft can go missing and never be found. This tragic disappearance that has had experts baffled.

Mysteries, in the early days of flying, were not commonplace. They were, however, sufficiently commonplace for pulp fiction writers and amateur investigators to fill their boots. Mysteries at sea, and in the air have been a fascination for as long as there has been maritime and air transport. As our scientific and technical capabilities have increased so has our expectation that these mysteries are of the past, not the present.

Without any cause for concern, Malaysia Airlines flight MH370[1] took off 12-years ago. The aircraft disappeared from radar and has never been seen since. Parts of the aircraft have been recovered. Unfortunately, those parts provided insufficient evidence as to where the whole aircraft crashed. With what is known, this Boeing 777-200ER[2] aircraft is somewhere in the depths of the ocean. How it got there, wherever there is, and why remain unknown.

The most recent sea search for the wreckage of the aircraft has yielded no findings. Systematically searching the Indian Ocean, an organisation known as Ocean Infinity, has not advanced our understanding of what happened to flight MH370. That might be unfair, since we now know that the aircraft wreckage is not likely to be at the locations they searched.

The vast area of the Indian Ocean has an average depth of over 12,000 feet. Locating an object on the seabed is a hard task even when there’s some idea where it’s resting. To make the task even more difficult, ocean seabeds have a wide variety of geological formations. Mountains, crevasse and flat expanses.

We spend most of our time living on dry land. The reality of planet Earth is that a larger part of its surface is covered with water. That we can be thankful for given what we see of other planets.

Thus, the importance of having the mechanism for location that works anywhere and everywhere. Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) is vital in all aspects of international flight. Flight MH370 was equipped with Boeing’s FANS-1 (Future Air Navigation System). This does have a surveillance function in that it provides aircraft position reports via satellite communication (SATCOM).

[In the late-1990s, I was involved in the standards setting and regulatory approval of the airborne components of both the Boeing FANS-1 and AIRBUS FANS-A systems].

Reports of the loss of MH-370 say this aircraft system was working at the point of take-off. Official reports also say that this aircraft system was “deliberately” disabled during the flight. A mystery remains as we may never get to understand the motivation for this action.

There’s no good reason for disabling such systems unless they are presenting a hazard to the aircraft in flight. Clearly the crew need to have the ability to isolate aircraft systems in the event of an avionics bay fire or other significant failure events. Circuit breakers are provided for that purpose. Procedures and training are too.

So many questions. Will the Indian Ocean search be revived again? Not for a while, I think.

[1] https://john-w-vincent.com/2024/12/20/mh370-and-mh17-a-decade-on/

[2] The ER stands for Extended Range.

Transport of Flight Delights

Air Taxies are becoming a reality. It’s not Science Fiction anymore.

The history of the “hackney carriage” is along and illustrious one. They remain firmly attached to the road. They do move with the times. From horses to combustion engines to electrified cabs[1], I wonder if London back cabs will adopt Hydrogen fuel next?

Providing safe and reliable public transport for about 8-passengers, in reasonable comfort, with a limited amount of luggage, they are a vital part of the city landscape. Ferrying people from place to place and even going south of the river (a popular saying from the people who live north of the River Thames).

In New York, “Yellow schools of taxi fishes” in a song by Joni Mitchell. Schools or sholes of taxies swimming in a sea of traffic. Frantic and colourful as they are shown in a lot of 1970s movies. A chaotic scene where the protagonist runs out into the middle of dense, barely moving traffic.

What happens when these modern convinces take to the air? If they were still with us, I’m sure Flanders and Swann[2] would have written a song about this new marvel. The distain of London buses towards black cabs is there in the lyrics. So, as air taxies take-off, as it were, will the cab drivers of the city protest or join the ranks of new flyers?

Please don’t answer that question. I’ve in mind more serious issues. The whole history of aviation safety data analysis shows us an immutable fact. Take-offs and landings are riskier than flying in at altitude. It really matters not if flying horizontally or vertically.

How does this come to be? A simple answer would be to say that the results of aviation accidents eventually end-up on the ground. Gravity does its work. Put that aside for a moment. Take-offs are optional but landings are mandatory. That’s a traditional saying that amuses non-flyers but is all too real to pilots and alike.

The act of taking a flying machine from the freedom of movement in 4-dimensions to a preselected stationary point on the ground. Those policies and plans that are published refer to Vertiports being established much as Heliports have been in the past. Some may double up. The theory is good. A pre-defined clear space that can accommodate a typical eVTOL aircraft used as an Air Taxi, with all the necessary operational and safety provisions. Surrounding areas protected from the down wash of the Air Taxi. Care to remove any foreign objects from the vertiport surface. A mini terminal to add to the cityscape.

One of the biggest variables in this brave new world of public transport is as old as the hills. It’s the local weather. Dubai can roast an aircraft with clear skies and 50C while Aberdeen can soak them in rain and impenetrable mist. Dust and wind can blow through Marseilles while deep snow and ice covers Montreal. Whilst in Lahore the air itself can be hazardous.

Terrestrial vehicles do cope. Often this means that there are different rules and regulation that take account of the local conditions and priorities. The impatience that some advocates have for a rapidly formulated globally set of harmonised rules and regulations might be misplaced. In fact, it may even impede the introduction to service of Air Taxi services.

Since I’m discussing the busy urban environment, I can presume that any accidents and incidents will be the focus of a great deal of public attention. Ultimate safety is a nice aspiration, but then reality takes hold. There will be occurrences. When they happen, city councillors are going to have their say.

Post 1: Air taxis are an exciting development in air mobility, but to get off the ground. SESAR Joint Undertaking | EUREKA- European Key solutions for vertiports and UAM

Post 2: Infrastructure Developer Highlights Timeline Convergence as eVTOL Certification and Vertiport Development Both Require Nine Months, Creating Binary Decision Point for Property Owners | citybiz

POST 3: The Air Taxi topic has become newsworthy this last week. US lawmakers push FAA certification reforms for eVTOLs:

https://aviationweek.com/aerospace/advanced-air-mobility/lawmakers-push-faa-certification-reforms-evtols

https://www.flyingmag.com/congress-faa-electric-air-taxi-certification/

Click to access Aviation-Innovation-and-Global-Competitiveness-Act-Final-Bill-Text.pdf

[1] https://www.levc.com/

[2] https://youtu.be/7yHrpPRYgYM

FLANDERS & SWANN – ‘A Transport of Delight’ – 1957.