Regulation – John Vincent

Digital Age Dilemma

There was a time when most of the political parties in the UK would object to mass surveillance and the State having a watchful eye on every one of its citizens. The influence of the Magna Carta, that 800-year-old document, was a keystone of thinking in this country. Although it was aimed at the privileged when first placed in front of a Monarch, it embraced the idea of liberty. It so upset the establishment that a Pope denounced it.

Ideas endure and those contained in the Magna Carta went on to inspire the framers of the constitutions and legislation in many countries. It doesn’t sound so strange in modern times that a person should be able to go about their lives without an overbearing State impinging on their liberty. Well, at least in theory.

I remember the intense debates that took place in the mid-1990s. The subject being the introduction of identity cards in the UK. Technical arguments were made of how such a measure would simplify lives in the coming digital age. Those agreements paid little attention to the erosion of fundamental rights that the centralising personal data on citizens would bring.

What’s happened now, through a process of stealth, is that people have given away vast qualities of data to international commercial entities without batting an eyelid. The legal device that has been used is a contract that few people ever read. The End User License Agreement (EULA). This detailed fine print addresses data collection and aims to protect software providers from liability.

I suspect that Conservative politicians have observed how little attention people are paying to the erosion of their rights that they feel emboldened to abandon any commitments to liberty. For some time now the Conservative mantra of has been to leave the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This is based on a gamble that most people will not have read the document. It’s a bit like the snatch and grab that the typical EULA has become.

Now, the Conservative Party has doubled down on a shift to the right of politics by inviting the prospect of mass surveillance. There’s a reasonable argument for the police to excurse powers to delve into the digital world when investigating crime. In fact, how can they not do so. However, this should be done so when there’s reasonable basis for doing so. Not everyone is a suspect of criminal activity. The law of the land still upholds the idea that guilt must be proven.

Computational tools are getting ever more powerful. I could joke that the number of articles on AI would reach to the Moon and back, but I wouldn’t be far wrong. One of the powerful software tools that’s accumulating uses is that of digital facial recognition. We’ve advanced from the days of inky fingerprints, although such prints are still valuable identifiers.

Where do we have a problem with liberty? The framers of many longstanding constitutions didn’t have to think to hard about what liberty meant in a world devoid of digital cameras. Now, any citizen’s image is going to be caught hundreds of times through the day. Maybe thousands of times. That instant image can be present on storage devices across the globe.

Who owns that image of me or you? Can it be used by anyone? Tricky questions given phones, traffic cameras, doorbells and home and business security cameras are subject to EULAs. On a superficial basis, requiring police forces to extract digital images and run them through a national database can sound like a good crime fighting idea.

The problem is where is the line drawn? Mass surveillance? Where everyone is an immediate suspect until proven not guilty? Not guilty by virtue of the calculation of an algorithm. Widespread digital camera coverage does put this in prospect. Images stored all over the world. Do we need to reframe the Magna Carta for the AI age? Now, there’s a thought.

Future of Aviation: Enhancing Safety and Resilience

The aim is clear. A safe, secure, sustainable and resilient international aviation system. I’d add to that list an ambition to continuously improve.

And that’s in the face of the challenge that was recognised 30-years ago. With an aviation system that knows how to archives a high level of safety, even incremental improvement is challenging. Factor in projected air traffic growth that’s unabating. What we know is that that continuously improving the global accident rate requires active interventions.

Since here I can only highlight the key priorities, I’ll choose three aspects of active intervention. Back to what I said earlier in my talk. Aviation is still climbing a maturity ladder. Digitisation has facilitated a growth in proactive work. Initiatives and plans identify actions aimed at solving known aviation safety problems. But the next step remains some way off. It’s that ability to anticipate safety problems before they occur. To predict.

We have the notion of safety intelligence. There are Big Data projects that are gathering large quantities of aviation safety data. Today, what might be called prognostics continues to depend on expert judgement. That’s not negative, as such. In fact, that augmented by objective and trustworthy safety intelligence is a route to the next step in maturity.

In my view, here’s the three categories that must be addressed now and, in the next decade.

One is a foundation stone of aviation safety work. It’s the capability and will to react in a timely manner to events. Not just accidents and serious incidents but any event that elevates aviation safety risks above acceptable levels.

Top operational risk that are likely to need immediate actions are those involving loss of control and those concerning runway incidents.

To take timely corrective action the results of investigation need to be readily available. As pointed out by the industry, across the globe, there’s much scope for improvement here. Timeliness matters.

My next category is that of systemic risks. System wide safety risks. People, organisations, processes, procedures, the human factor and human performance issues.

Much is being done to ensure the effective implementation of safety management systems (SMS). The four pillars of SMS have proven to work – safety policy, risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion.

The acceptance, elimination or mitigation of risks is not an act that begins on one day and stops on the next. Digitation can help but there’s always the dangers of the needle in a haystack or even problems sitting in plain sight.

What’s often weak is the communication of what’s discovered. Believable, understandable straightforward communication to decision makers is vital.

Thirdly, what’s ahead of us is an order of magnitude more complex than what’s gone before. And a rate of change that mindboggling.

I’m calling this emerging aviation safety risks. The question arises; are we ready for advanced leaps in technology? Hydrogen, hybrid propulsion, machine learning, quantum computing, complex airspace networks and robotics. Humans as executive manager whilst retaining control only in emergencies.

It’s a famous quote; data is the new oil. We are ushering in extremely large and complex datasets that will be essential to the workings of automated and autonomous systems. Could data be the new quicksand? This is a huge issue in dense airspace where crewed and uncrewed aircraft must share the airspace.

Another emerging aviation safety risks, that industry and regulators are starting to address is the fact that safety and security have become inseparable. In the past, these disciplines were addressed as silos. That’s no longer viable.

Another emerging aviation safety risk is that of the workforce. Aviation has attracted dedicated professionals who acquire experience and train to a high level of competence. A safety culture has been embedded. In this respect the fundamentals of aviation safety remain constant.

The rapid growth of technology is a two-edged sword. Now, there are many opportunities for future generations, but aviation may not be at the top of the list of choices, as it has been. There’s a serious aviation safety risk if serious investments are not made, people are not motivated and able to gain the competencies needed by a rapidly changing industry.

To sum up. Everything I’ve spoken of can only be addressed in partnerships. In the past, the aviation industry and its regulators have proven themselves to be imaginative, resilient and forward looking.

The challenges ahead, dare I say, are even greater. Levels of integration, interdependency and rapid technology adoption are off the charts. Yet, I believe we can continually improve global aviation safety. We can step up.

POST: Farnborough International Air Show 2026. 20-24 July 2026.

Current State of Aviation Safety: Data-Driven

The present day. Today. There will be Press Releases galore at this air show. I expect ambitious and upbeat predictions. More orders. More growth. More developing markets. Demands for more skilled people, more performance, more pressure for the early adoption of rapidly changing technologies.

My subject is safety. Where are we with aviation safety in the present day? There’s a sound legacy. Afterall aviation has a long tail. What we have now, and if I look at the Farnborough Airshow catalogue of ten years ago[1], is digitisation. The ambition to be data-driven. A continuing drive to exploit data of all kinds. Extracting information from ever increasing sources in aviation.

This desire for actionable safety intelligence is not new. On my desk I have a coaster celebrating the UK CAA’s MOR Scheme[2]. That’s been alive for 50 years (1976-2026). Occurrence data has been, and is being, used to construct all sorts of safety performance indicators. These indicators can be useful but it’s not always so. They are fuel for safety management systems.

I used the word “actionable” with purpose. Today, making the results of safety data analysis useable by front-line actors and responsible managers has been a challenge we wrestle. I’ve often heard it said – that’s great but what do I do about it? Too many “greens” on a chart and complacency can set in. Too many “reds” and everyone goes into panic mode.

I have been fortunate to work with a number of safety initiative. One called the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) in the US. To match its work, on this continent, I set up a European version; ECAST in 2006. The focus was on data-drive analysis. There’re safety teams for Rotorcraft and General Aviation too.

These safety initiatives came about a reactive way. Reporting in 1997, the Gore Commission, was a reaction to dilemmas that is still with us. What to do in the wake of catastrophic accidents. And more pertinent to this talk; what to do when the global accident rate curve looks flat at the same time as predictions are for a significant growth in global air traffic. Reading this report now, the predictions were horrifying. Predictions of one large aeroplane fatal accident every week by now. Luckily, commercial air transport didn’t suffer that fate.

I should NOT say “luckily”. Current safety performance is down to an enormous amount of work done by thousands of aviation professionals over a sustained period. Not only this but shocks, whether they be financial crisis, volcanic eruptions or global pandemics, have tested this industry severely.

Taking on board what was learned over the decades, safety management has developed and matured. Incorporated in aviation’s safety regulatory framework, it’s now practiced across the whole industry. Almost. We don’t just react. We now have Safety Plans. Lists of actionable tasks aimed at continuous safety improvement. On the scale mentioned earlier – we are proactive.

Let me stop. This is not a utopia. I’d say at least half the global aviation industry is struggling with the need to be proactive. So, the road we are travelling on remains a long one. We don’t just need the capability to do better; we need to maintain the will to do better.

[1] 50^th Farnborough Air Show in 2016.

[2] https://www.caa.co.uk/about-us/make-a-report-or-complaint/report-something/mor/occurrence-reporting/

The Evolution of Aviation Safety: A Historical Overview

A quick tour of the history of aviation safety. In a couple of minutes.

As powered aircraft took to the skies it quickly became apparent that, of all the means of transport, aviation was less forgiving than others. Moving at speed in four dimensions, with the necessity to take-off and land safely, has inherent risks. By no means does this mean that flying is an dangerous activity. What it does necessitate is an exercise of sound engineering, preparation, and proficiency. When these are missing, and in cases of misfortune, accidents and serious incidents happen.

In the days between the world wars, aviation moved from the military and a circus-like amusement to a viable means of public transport. Progressively, more passengers had the opportunity to experience the wonders of flight.

Today, it’s not the early days of flight I want to focus on, but we do owe the engineers and aviators of that time a great debt. Much was learned as aeronautics matured. Since the end of the second world war the production, promotion and application of standards has embedded what had been learned. This has established the way that international civil aviation works.

One simple expression of the stages we’ve been through is Prof Patrick Hudson’s[1] model. This model describes five distinct levels of cultural maturity. The steps are pathological, reactive, calculative, proactive and generative.

This model sits alongside steps in the development of technology that have been a hallmark of aviation. Different categorisations exist. AIRBUS[2] has one that’s easily understood in terms of generations of civil aircraft.

First are the “classics” of the 1950s and 60s. Next, the second generation starts down the road of more electronics. More safety critical systems. Third generation starts flying in the early 1980s when automation becomes the norm (early fly-by-wire, glass cockpits, flight management systems). The fourth generation introduces safety systems, which address the major causes of fatal accidents, namely Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) and Loss Of Control In-Flight (LOC-I). That’s the early 1990s. When I made that move from industry (design and production) to an aviation safety regulator.

Now, I’d say we are well into fifth generation aircraft, with composite structures and integrated modular avionics. In fact, we are well into speculation about what the sixth generation may look like. Machine learning, single pilot operations, hybrid powerplants, aircraft as a node on a network.

Because aviation is a learning industry, and a conservative one, the expectation is of progressive improvement in maturity throughout the aviation system and innovative technology applied to enhance safety.

This is not to say that the potential for error, missteps and recklessness don’t exist. They do. I expect continuity in a way that takes full advantage of advanced methods without scarifying the legacy of an astonishing good global aviation safety achievement.

Later, to cover a lot of ground in a short time, I’m going to condense all the above into three distinct categories. But before that, I’ll talk about the present and a vision of the future.

POST: UK Farnborough Air Show on Thursday 23rd July 2026. Time: 13:00-13:15 BST. Location: Hall 3 Stage. Session title Where Next for Aviation Safety?

[1] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0925753507000227?via%3Dihub

[2] https://d10x.airbus.com/generation-of-jets/

Public and Private Life

What’s public and what’s private? There was a mythical age of the past when the dividing line between these two was self-evident and sacrosanct. Wholy respected by every member of society. A time when an Englishman’s home was his castle. Anything that happened within it’s walls was not for prying eyes or journalistic speculation. Everyone knew their place.

Naturally, this is utter nonsense. At least described in the way I’ve put it. Times change. Those immortal two words. So, the line between what’s public and what’s private has wobbled around over the centuries. I’m not, as you might expect, saying that nothing has changed over time because a hell of a lot has changed. Now, there are factors that make the public life different from past decades. Themes run through the ages along with unyielding change.

It’s very much in the News now. The impression given is that the act of standing-up in public has risks that can be high. Not so much the traditional risks of humiliation, being ostracised or suffering abject failure but real risks to life, in a physical sense.

It would be ridiculous to say that these are more violent times. When I look out of my kitchen window, I am reminded of the English Civil War[1]. Father and son, brothers, uncles, and cousins fought on opposite sides with fatal consequences. The ruined castle on the hill to my North is a monument to that terrible bloody conflict. In the lifetime of my parents the bombs fell from the sky on innocent civilians in this land, as they do in Ukraine to this day.

The tendency to think that we are a much more civilised society in the 21^st Century is a liberal and progressive notion. We are better fed and read. There are greater comforts and the four horsemen of the apocalypse are kept at arm’s length. Not disappeared but kept in check. Although the recent experience of COVID did unsettle everyone for a while.

What we do cherish. I hope we cherish, in this country. Is the relative freedom of speech that allows debate to be conducted in public. I use the word relative because the absolutists, who have an anything goes attitude, are not what I mean. Fundamentalist often ride with the four horsemen. Words do matter.

I’m straying from my point. There’s great merit in protecting public life. In matters that are of fundamental importance individuals must be free to stand-up and say their piece. Stifling debate is like putting the heat on a pressure cooker without a safety valve.

I’ve always been struck by the civility of most people. That’s what I’ve found when knocking on doors during political campaigns of one form or another. There’s a core of decency at all levels of society. Now and then, that thread is broken. It does take a lot to paint a different picture. That’s where the proliferation of social media has changed the dynamic.

The printing press was not an evil invention. That didn’t stop it being used for evil ends. The same with social media. Printed media is subject to regulation. A system of regulation that has developed over decades. That doesn’t stop a wide range of views being expressed. The fertiliser of public life. Similar boundaries are set for broadcast media. This is civilisation.

To date, social media is the wild west. It’s become essential to public life. At the same time, it’s a grave danger to public life. When it’s used to stir-up passions that lead to violence the danger is self-evident. Social media is not sacrosanct. Regulation is essential.

[1] https://www.english-heritage.org.uk/learn/histories/the-english-civil-wars-history-and-stories/

Lessons from Operational Events

For an aviation industry that takes pride in learning lessons from experience and taking timely corrective action, a series of operational events is surprising to say the least.

Today’s large aircraft do look much the same. The tricycle undercarriage has become universal. A set of steerable wheels at the front and a heavy set of landing gear, each side, to the rear. When parked, a nose gear collapse or inadvertent retraction on a large aircraft is not catastrophic. The aircraft can be recovered, inspected, and repaired. This undesirable event can be dangerous for anyone in the vicinity. It has the potential to be fatal. Fortunately, so far, there has been no fatalities.

For an aircraft operator such an event at an airport gate is a massive expense. Putting an in-service aircraft out of action for a considerable time.

To date, several damaging nose gear collapse (and alike) events have occurred to large aircraft[1]. Detailed analysis of these events exists and corrective actions are proposed.

One conclusion is to say that this is about people not following procedures. That is the instruction is to put a pin in one place but instead it gets put in the wrong place. So, this dramatic unintended event is written up as a maintenance error. It’s an outcome that no one intended. That’s fine. There’s no doubt that an error was made. Accepting that an error occurred is not a reason to blame. That is if there are no signs of negligence.

The trouble is the simple question – how easy was it to make that error?

Then we get into that grey area of the gap between aircraft design and operations. In a design office it may be reasonably assumed that a procedure will be followed in an almost robotic manner. No need for the people in operations to think beyond taking the same action day-after-day. This would surely become widespread practice.

As we know the actual environment of aircraft operations can be more demanding than the original equipment manufactures might imagine. Pressure to turn around an aircraft can be high, working conditions can be poor and fatigue can play a part.

There are lines of communication between the aircraft design and operations organisations, and such difficulties are regularly discussed.

Faced with an event categorised as maintenance error then what next? Redesign the aircraft? Change a procedure or require more training? Those are three of the options, there are more.

This is where the possible discussion gets reactive. Now, it would be extremely costly to redesign an aircraft for the sake of an event that is rare or for which the consequences are minor. It is possible to put numbers on each of these. The rarity, the cost, and the impact.

Modifying or rewriting a procedure, on the other hand, can be less costly and it may be quite sufficient as a corrective action. That said, any procedure that can be written can be subject to error. In fact, the original procedure may have been straightforward and well thought out.

Then there is the fall-back position. Give the people in aircraft operations more training. The assumption being that more training means less errors. It is a crude assumption because this is not a linear relationship. So many other factors come into play.

Discussions surround the above possibilities can become protracted. There’s a call for more analysis and more data. There’s the proposal for a study to be conducted. Once in that loop a year can go by as if it was a month.

There’s always the argument that highlights dozens of aircraft operators haven’t had this event occur and therefore the finger is pointed at those who have. This argument gets an outing, but it is foolish. It’s like saying – I haven’t had an accident yet, and therefore I’m safe. Foolish.

There are a lot of detailed discussions and a million and one opinions. Taking the big picture, this is a problem that is solvable[2]. What is surprising is the reoccurrence of the problem.

[1] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/aaib-special-bulletin-g-zbjb-inadvertent-nose-landing-gear-retraction-during-pre-flight-maintenance

[2] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/12/12/2019-26734/airworthiness-directives-the-boeing-company-airplanes

Forgiveness: A Double-Edged Sword

The basic Sunday school Christian idea of forgiveness is fine and dandy. It’s a cornerstone of the social soup that is modern Britian. Although we like a good dose of retribution when it suites us, the core belief that we maybe forgiven as much as others might forgive us still pervades.

The above is a cultural aspect of life as our more primitive side has a tendency not to forgive. Especially when talking about people we don’t know or, for that matter, people we do know who do something deeply offensive, like betrayal.

Christianity is transactional about this subject. You must forgive if you want to be forgiven. That is practical in sustaining a cohesive society. If we wander around carrying grudges and consumed with anger all day long, then this will not end well. Here I find a crux of a problem. Although it may be admirable to forgive, if that charitable act melts away anger, then it can melt away the motivation to do something, like fix a problem.

So, how to respond to someone in public life who says unacceptable and harmful things five years ago but is now said to be a different person. Reformed. Incidentally, this said by a third party that the person concerned is a different person. Whatever that means.

Let me quote thinker Thomas Aquinas in that “evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one’s anger is deserving of praise[1]”

He really does throw the whole conundrum back at us. Since my “right reason” and your “right reason” may be completely different. My anger is my problem. That said, my anger may be shared by many people. So, who is the arbiter of society’s righteous anger?

In Britain, this is a matter where the four estates play their part. People who make laws, people that carry them out, and those who judge. With the “fourth estate” being the fickle and flighty news media. I could say those who report to the public, or pile on their opinions. This formula doesn’t add clarity. Each of the estates can, and do, take different views. The question is then, which is the most powerful arbiter? The most influential.

Here the equation has changed. Whereas a sizeable section of the news media of my childhood undertook their work with a sense of social responsibility, this section is now under attack.

The term “social media” has been coined for the newcomers but in a way there’s no such thing. The digital world we call social media is not the least bit interested in sustaining a cohesive society. In fact, quite the reverse. Conflict, anger, controversy, and division are sources of income potential. Not a small income either. And on a global scale.

Normally, forgiveness does not come easy. It does require a period of reflection. What’s happening in the social media world is not so much forgiveness as forgetfulness. Delete an account, stir-up a new sense of outrage, move on at the speed of lightning. No need for forgiveness because people have forgotten the last reason for anger and moved on to a new source of anger. Thomas Aquinas never had to ponder over that one.

[1] Summa Theologiae II-II:158:1.

Understanding Primary and Secondary Legislation in the UK

Clear again is the conservative politician’s propensity to trade on ignorance. Remember the slogan of the big red bus of the Brexit campaign. All the abject nonsense that was said and written in 2016. It would be extremely charitable to call these intentional inaccuracies. There’s a three-letter word that sums them up. In theory, Parliament has rules. In practice, those rules are abused. That is until miscreants are exposed. Those politicians that misled the House of Commons over parties in Downing Street during the COVID pandemic shouldn’t be forgotten.

It’s a simple question. How many people know the difference between primary and secondary legislation? As far as I know these aspects of the UK’s method of making laws is not taught in schools. I think it’s vital that people of all ages get the opportunity to explore how their democracy works. Including its inherent peculiarities.

[Here’s a national event, later in the year, which can help. It’s free and already possible to plan for UK Parliament Week in November 2026[1].]

Back to the difference between primary and secondary legislation? A tabloid newspaper editor may see that question and fall about laughing. On the basis that the subject is not widely understood, instead of explaining, they may choose to write any drivel that serves their agenda. Day after day this sleight of hand provides bold headlines and support for misleading political campaigns. Then, if the truth pops its head above the parapet cries of Fake News ripple through the right-wing media.

By the way, the sad fact about this common distortion is an erosion of trust[2]. It’s no wonder that Parliament can be seen as remote from real-life. It’s regular inhabitants a strange breed of people who go native as soon as the walk through its hallowed doors.

During the UK’s membership of the European Union (EU) it expanded. In certain specific technical areas, its “competence” grew. Member States agreed to give it new roles and responsibilities. As an example, before aviation legislation was harmonised in Europe, national legislation had to be amended to accommodate every major change that developed. In the UK, both primary and secondary legislation were applied. They are now. That consists of a UK Air Navigation Act and an Order[3]. The Act being the primary legislation and the Order being the secondary legislation. These two rules are not new as they have been part of the UK’s national aviation landscape for decades.

Above here I’ve kicked at the UK’s tabloid media. Well, they are merely doing what they have always done. There’s something in morbid consistency. What’s more disturbing are the lines being taken by a national media that might be expected to be objective. Read this short article and the predisposition shines through, and this is the BBC[4].

Sir Keir Starmer is planning a law which will mean that the UK government can adopt EU single market rules, without a normal parliamentary vote.

One, it’s the personalisation. This is the government of the day and not an individual. Two, it’s the incorrect use of the word “normal.” As I’ve stated, secondary legislation is perfectly normal. In fact, the UK’s normal regulatory structures depend upon it being in place and up-to-date.

[1] https://www.ukparliamentweek.org/en/sign-up

[2] https://fullfact.org/media/uploads/full_fact_report_121021.pdf

[3] https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/765/contents

[4] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c937jkvp3w8o

Runway Incursions and Airline Safety

Firstly, condolences to the families and friends of those killed in the recent aviation accident at LaGuardia airport in New York. It’s incredibly sad that this destructive runway incident took place in the way that it did. At this stage there is a jumble of international News reports. As is often the case while attention is focused on what happened at a time when the facts have not been verified or data collected.

What is known is that Air Canada Express flight 8646 was where it was supposed to be on a runway and an airport-based fire truck was not. The resulting high-speed collision had disastrous consequences for both the aircraft and the fire truck.

The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has quickly engaged to start a detailed technical investigation. Their role is to independently piece together all the information that is available and determine a probable cause of the accident. With that to make formal safety recommendations aimed at preventing accidents and incidents.

What I can say is that the subject of Runway Incursion (RI)[1] is a long-standing aviation safety concern. So much so that it has its own accident category when it comes to aviation safety data analysis. Such tragic events are not isolated or extremely improbable.

Air Traffic Control (ATC) is tasked with separating aircraft from each other and any other vehicles. Accidents in this category have been the catalyst for advances in equipment and procedures. That said, there’s no getting away from the substantial number of human and operational factors that pervade this domain.

Unlike the design and construction of aircraft system whereby an onerous safety objective can be stamped on a technical specification. Managing air traffic on the ground is done with a high dependency on the actions of professionally trained staff.

In an internationally accepted code, a RI is defined as:

Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.

I don’t hesitate to say that’s what happened at LaGuardia. This says nothing about – why?

So, we have an indication of what happened. What’s a little unsettling is how quickly there is News reports speculation on why it happened. Initial references to someone having made a mistake or error are no helpful. This signalling tends to encourage a simplification of the circumstances of the accident into a matter of blame. That unfortunately leads to an impression that this is a rare event that can be attributed to one factor. All to often this is not the case.

The actions of professionally trained staff can be put under such work pressure as it comes to a situation where no normal person can perform adequately. It was the introduction of Safety Management Systems (SMS) that was intended to identify these scenarios and ensure that they were mitigated or eliminated.

The actions of everyone involved with this fatal aviation accident are now under investigation. Aviation is not a “a dangerous business”. However, it is a business that requires more care and attention than most. That includes the provision of adequate resources at all times.

[1] https://www.intlaviationstandards.org/Documents/OccurrenceCategoryDefinitions.pdf

Transitioning to Green Aviation

Put your hands over your ears if your mantra is – drill baby drill. If climate change is a myth, in your mind, or you take a devil may care attitude, then the mere mention of the word “green” may give you the jitters. This is not for you. Move out of the way.

For the rest of us, who live in the real world, on planet Earth, there’s a problem. A prickly, tricky, sticky, long-term global problem. One that has commanded a great deal of attention but sometimes almost to the point of boring the pants off. Transport is one of those sectors that needs attention. Progress toward the adoption of Electric Vehicles (EV) is underway. Now and then, there’s a push back, but the direction of travel is clear. An immediate reminder of the need to change is the volatility of fuel prices at the pump. An inability to control or foresee global events that push oil and gas prices one way and then the next.

Sustainable aviation is turning out to be a hard nut to crack. For ground-based vehicles the issue of power density is not as constraining as it is in aviation. Weight is one of the fundamental parameters in flight. So, current high energy batteries present a particular technical challenge.

Exploring new forms of flight propulsion is a god send for futurologists, researchers and adventurous innovators. None of the technical challenges are a quick win. The avenues for study are infinite. Well almost. Antigravity doesn’t seem to be on the cards – yet.

I guess one of the barriers is that we have a sophisticated global aviation system that we, almost entirely, take for granted. The technology involved in transporting 200 people from a cold, grey, dull, wet Britain to a sunny warm inviting holiday destination has matured to such a point that few look at it with astonishment. That so much is provided for so little outlay.

It wasn’t that the problems of providing such air transport services were easy to solve. It’s an inheritance that has stretched over many decades. Testament to the work of a vast number of smart entrepreneurs, engineers, scientists, officials and alike.

Hydrogen fuel, or some form of hybrid propulsion does seem to be a long-term prospect.

What I see now is the excitement created by past projections is being tempered by practical reality. Wonderful strategic plans, with outlandish charts, pointed the way to a fossil fuel free utopia. Those colourful documents did good in driving forward a level of thinking. Where they offered a lesser contribution is in predicting and enabling a practical transition.

This is the time when everyone does a double take. Where the aim is a workable business cases that provides a transition in a believable, sound and rational sense. Flirting with bankruptcy has been a habit of past adventurous aviation developments. Read the turbulent story of the jumbo jet. Most agree this is not a desirable state to wish for or be in. Maybe this is the tale of the tortoise and the hare. Methodical plodding through the difficulties, incremental change, ingenuity and sheer hard headedness are needed. A couple of points to round off.

One – don’t get stuck on the repetitive nonsense that new developments can’t takes place until the regulatory structure is in place.

Two – don’t build houses on all the small airfields and lesser-known airports that may, one day, become part of a new transport system[1].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plymouth_City_Airport