Aviation – John Vincent

Perceptions of Aviation Professionals

Let’s see what aviation stereotypes look like. There’s a wide selection of free images on-line. There’s a typical view of the crew of an aircraft. It didn’t take long to find one.

I can point out the obvious gender related features of such images, but what first caught my eye were the aircraft engines. They were way to far out on the wings. I suspect our good friend artificial intelligence may have generated such a colourful image.

Now let’s go for an Air Traffic Controller. The image that came up did have plus points. It did give an impression of what a controller’s job is about, at least as much as a simple graphic image can. I did expect to see a radar screen with dots on it as part of the image. A controller sitting at a desk with buttons to press and a window to look out of sums up the basic picture.

Next my on-line search was for an aircraft mechanic. Now, I started this search with low expectations of what might come up. The picture I got was of a hanger with two large aircraft to the left and right. Standing in the middle of this scene was a man in overalls moving an aircraft engine on a trolly. Proportions were off, in that the engine diameter was half the hight of the mechanic. Yes, the stereotype of a workingman with a spanner persists.

So, what have I discovered? Not much really. Or not much that didn’t fit the title of time-honoured stereotype. Images that pigeonhole jobs as done by people who dress in a particular way and are surrounded by the equipment of their trade. Roles, age, race and gender are fixed in a traditional pattern. I do draw the conclusion that, for all the daily hype, artificial intelligence is not going to do anything original when faced with a simple question about specific job.

This isn’t good. If the latest advance in technology is locked into classical and predicable images from the archives, then it’s not so advanced at all.

Why does this matter? Well, there’s a great deal of concern about where the next generation of professional in aviation are going to come from. Our wish to fly is affected by lots of social, environmental, and economic factors. Overall, the trend over coming decades is in one direction – up. More flights, more aircraft, and the need for more people to operate the system.

If the generic images of the professional roles in aviation are stuck in the past, then that’s not going to help. It’s off-putting. There are those young people who may find the traditional professional stereotypes appealing. My guess is the majority are unlikely to think this way.

In an on-line environment where artificial intelligence regurgitates the past this technology may drive us backwards. Not for one moment does the image of a workingman with a spanner need to be demoted. What needs a touch of imagination is a portrayal of images more akin to reality. A changing reality too.

[Yes, the title image is an appropriately prompted artificial intelligence generate one provided by WordPress].

Lessons from Operational Events

For an aviation industry that takes pride in learning lessons from experience and taking timely corrective action, a series of operational events is surprising to say the least.

Today’s large aircraft do look much the same. The tricycle undercarriage has become universal. A set of steerable wheels at the front and a heavy set of landing gear, each side, to the rear. When parked, a nose gear collapse or inadvertent retraction on a large aircraft is not catastrophic. The aircraft can be recovered, inspected, and repaired. This undesirable event can be dangerous for anyone in the vicinity. It has the potential to be fatal. Fortunately, so far, there has been no fatalities.

For an aircraft operator such an event at an airport gate is a massive expense. Putting an in-service aircraft out of action for a considerable time.

To date, several damaging nose gear collapse (and alike) events have occurred to large aircraft[1]. Detailed analysis of these events exists and corrective actions are proposed.

One conclusion is to say that this is about people not following procedures. That is the instruction is to put a pin in one place but instead it gets put in the wrong place. So, this dramatic unintended event is written up as a maintenance error. It’s an outcome that no one intended. That’s fine. There’s no doubt that an error was made. Accepting that an error occurred is not a reason to blame. That is if there are no signs of negligence.

The trouble is the simple question – how easy was it to make that error?

Then we get into that grey area of the gap between aircraft design and operations. In a design office it may be reasonably assumed that a procedure will be followed in an almost robotic manner. No need for the people in operations to think beyond taking the same action day-after-day. This would surely become widespread practice.

As we know the actual environment of aircraft operations can be more demanding than the original equipment manufactures might imagine. Pressure to turn around an aircraft can be high, working conditions can be poor and fatigue can play a part.

There are lines of communication between the aircraft design and operations organisations, and such difficulties are regularly discussed.

Faced with an event categorised as maintenance error then what next? Redesign the aircraft? Change a procedure or require more training? Those are three of the options, there are more.

This is where the possible discussion gets reactive. Now, it would be extremely costly to redesign an aircraft for the sake of an event that is rare or for which the consequences are minor. It is possible to put numbers on each of these. The rarity, the cost, and the impact.

Modifying or rewriting a procedure, on the other hand, can be less costly and it may be quite sufficient as a corrective action. That said, any procedure that can be written can be subject to error. In fact, the original procedure may have been straightforward and well thought out.

Then there is the fall-back position. Give the people in aircraft operations more training. The assumption being that more training means less errors. It is a crude assumption because this is not a linear relationship. So many other factors come into play.

Discussions surround the above possibilities can become protracted. There’s a call for more analysis and more data. There’s the proposal for a study to be conducted. Once in that loop a year can go by as if it was a month.

There’s always the argument that highlights dozens of aircraft operators haven’t had this event occur and therefore the finger is pointed at those who have. This argument gets an outing, but it is foolish. It’s like saying – I haven’t had an accident yet, and therefore I’m safe. Foolish.

There are a lot of detailed discussions and a million and one opinions. Taking the big picture, this is a problem that is solvable[2]. What is surprising is the reoccurrence of the problem.

[1] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/aaib-special-bulletin-g-zbjb-inadvertent-nose-landing-gear-retraction-during-pre-flight-maintenance

[2] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/12/12/2019-26734/airworthiness-directives-the-boeing-company-airplanes

Future Aircraft Systems

I read that there’s lesson to learn from the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) experience that plagued Boeing. And led to fatalities. There’s a lot that has been written about the tragic saga. Much of great value.

It’s true. Aviation advances as the community learns lessons from incidents and accidents. Yes, there’s variability in the effectivity of this learning process. Occasions when oceans are written about one case and dozens of others are given an inappropriate light touch[1]. A trustworthy centralised repository of safety recommendations from published aviation accident reports is a useful tool. A point of reference. In the first months of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in Cologne, back in 2005, my team established such a database. It’s only possible to track the follow-up of key safety recommendation if there’s a well-maintained administrative system. Safety is often about the intelligent use of data.

Cockpit design, and the human factors issues involved, are without doubt one of the most critical parts of an aircraft. Society is not ready for fully autonomous passenger carrying aircraft. I believe it will happen, in decades to come but the horizon is way off. For certain types of vehicles, autonomy must be the solution given that flight control is beyond human capacities. Here’s I’m thinking mostly of hypersonic and space flight.

For a pilot to exercise responsibility for a flight there’s a need to have, at least, a basic understanding of what a machine is doing. In past times of strings and wires and clockwork instruments that understanding was ingrained knowledge gained from training and experience.

Future aircraft systems will not be easily described as functional blocks that perform well understood and dedicated functions. An autopilot, an autothrottle, autobraking, a flight management system, even an engine. Hybridisation is coming.

That does not mean a pilot must understand the inner working for a multicore microprocessor or complex software algorithm. Flight test pilots being the exception, in this case.

The design goal should always be to make safer systems. Engineering these aircraft systems is not a case of purely fitting together a set of Lego like components. The error made with the MCAS is one that ignored this fact. Interdependencies are manyfold.

Ideally, future aircraft systems, however capable and complex, should be describable, predicable, and ultimately trustworthy. These words sound so simple. One reason this is not simple is that very word – complex. The minute that there’s a massive number of possible combinations and permutations of conditions at may exit boundaries must be set. What’s a little more reassuring is that complexity if far from new in human experience[2].

Just to make the airspace of the future even more complex it’s no longer correct to think of an aircraft as alone and free to make any appropriate manoeuvre. Increasing connectivity, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence (AI) all come into the mix.

To stay safe, pilots will have to appreciate how constraints and boundaries are managed. This information must be provided transparently and preferable with options.

[1] https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/opinions/the-safety-paradox-fewer-accidents-greater-responsibility/

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wheat_and_chessboard_problem

Sustainability in Aviation

Conventional thinking pervades. It’s the model for seeming to be reasonable. To grow consensus and find a middle way through opposing parties. To bend in response to the wind that blows from popular opinion. Institutions are inclined to go this way. This is not surprising when an organisation is set-up to serve a large constituency. There’s the need to emphasise the parts of public policy that coincide with the mission of the institution. To push back gently against the ones that run adverse to that mission too. The Royal Aeronautical Society’s (RAeS) position paper on Airports[1] is a nice example. Here’s a few points that come to mind.

Linking Airports and Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) isn’t such a good idea. Yes, there’s the fact that Airports have infrastructure which every form of air transport needs. That’s the upside. The downside is the competing for resources and high cost of the provisions at major Airports. There’s a degree of environmental saturation that can’t be avoided.

One of the greatest opportunities for AAM is that of entirely new air transport links. Afterall, a Vertiport needn’t take up much space. As long at there’s plenty of electrical power and links with other modes of transport there are exciting possibilities.

A long time ago the commuter class of aircraft operations was created in the US. These were referred to as air taxies (fixed wing). The idea was then to open a travel market at a layer below large transport operation. It wasn’t that successful but does show mixes of types of traffic at major Airports doesn’t work out for the smaller parties.

Regional airports, and their potential, are greatly undersold. It’s wrong to see them as merely part of a hub and spoke network. What they do best is to serve their local communities. Having recently flown through Bournemouth (Hurn) Airport for the first time, it’s clear that so much can be done to spread the load and make traveling again a pleasant experience.

To me, I see the emperor’s new clothes. The case of the expansion of London Heathrow Airport (LHR) is not viable. Dressed up as an investment opportunity this continuation of incremental development is what we do badly in the UK. Environmental saturation has hit the rails. The proposers are dressing up a project that is the proverbial putting of eggs in one basket.

I don’t think the same can be said of London Gatwick Airport (LGW). In fact, squeezing the amount of capacity out of what’s there now is a feat of amazing ingenuity. Surely, that major London airport does need a genuine second runway. Even with less good than needed surface access this former racecourse has the ingredients for success.

Yes, I know it’s difficult to get away from London centric thinking in the UK. Nevertheless, that’s what’s needed to ensure the whole country thrives. Airport policies that lump everything else as “others” or under one label as “regional” aren’t tacking the challenges. The UK as major cities. Each has significant needs for air transport.

Some say that environmental objectives and Airport expansion are not compatible. The difficulties are clear to see. Each area of concern needs resources at a level commiserate with the needs. Quality of life, in and around Airports, should not be traded for economic benefits alone. Tackling air quality, water quality, on and off Airport noise, waste management, traffic volumes, overflight privacy, and enhancing biodiversity are not merely nice to haves.

[1] https://www.aerosociety.com/media/29306/raes-airport-expansion-in-the-uk-position-paper-april-2026.pdf

Numbers, Nostalgia, and Dystopia

I’m not sure what conclusion to draw from these numbers. There are people who believe that numbers are important in a cosmic sort of way. Certain combinations have a special meaning. Even the Bible goes in for this kind of mystical philosophy. I think this is a normal human instinct to look for patterns in everything. That is, even when nothing useful can be said about those apparent patterns. Me being reasonably rational, numbers are simple symbols with relatively simple meanings put to a myriad of uses. [Please let’s not go into complex numbers].

The thought that came to me is that the auspicious year of 1984[1] is now 42 years ago. And I think you know what I might write about the number 42. Life the Universe and Everything. The result of a long computation started to find out what life was all about in a fantasy world.

So, now it’s fine to conclude that the fictional world of 1984 didn’t come into being in the last 42 years. However, it can be argued that the groundwork for a political dystopia has been done in the meantime. There’s no doubt that in four decades a lot of interconnections and interdependencies have been constructed as globalisation has taken hold. Our everyday News cycle is proving this to be undeniable. A repercussion of the acts of a difficult politician on one continent impacts the availability of home-grown food on another poorer one.

My life in 1984 was as a young engineer trying to navigate through several workplaces to get the most interesting employment that was on offer. Fortunately, a great deal was happening in the field of electronics in the 80s. Integrated circuits where getting increasingly powerful. As the years clicked by the miniaturisation of components made possible what was once impossible. Several major projects were underway whilst industry was undergoing a rapid transformation.

[A different transition from the one in prospect brought about by artificial intelligence but, in so many ways, just as impactful and a fundamental percussor.]

This weekend, I was transported back to August 1984 and the island of Crete. In amongst piles of memorabilia there I found a scruffy notebook from a package holiday to Greece. My second venture to that Mediterranean country but the first with my partner.

That was a paper-based time. Airline tickets were paper. Money was paper (traveller’s cheques). Photographs were paper. Travel was a wholly analogue experience. Telephones tied down by wires. Even the Boeing 757 that transported us from London Gatwick to Crete had a cockpit full of dials, levers, knobs and switches, all mechanical.

Illuminating in our notes was the reaction to the heat and some continuity. Crete in August is hot at the best of times. That didn’t stop me from wandering along a long stretch of beach looking for an archaeological site. The further we went, the further it seemed we had to go. My saying that it was – just around the next bend – was never forgotten. And this week, there it was in barely legible handwriting.

Tourism has expanded many fold since those innocent wanderings. Greek buses are now modern and often quite regular, which they weren’t in 1984. Basic bathroom facilities in uncooled concrete apartments have given way to four-star hotels and luxurious pools. Nostalgia is fine, if it’s not taken to ridiculous levels, as is the habit of some of my generation.

[1] https://www.orwellfoundation.com/

Runway Incursions and Airline Safety

Firstly, condolences to the families and friends of those killed in the recent aviation accident at LaGuardia airport in New York. It’s incredibly sad that this destructive runway incident took place in the way that it did. At this stage there is a jumble of international News reports. As is often the case while attention is focused on what happened at a time when the facts have not been verified or data collected.

What is known is that Air Canada Express flight 8646 was where it was supposed to be on a runway and an airport-based fire truck was not. The resulting high-speed collision had disastrous consequences for both the aircraft and the fire truck.

The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has quickly engaged to start a detailed technical investigation. Their role is to independently piece together all the information that is available and determine a probable cause of the accident. With that to make formal safety recommendations aimed at preventing accidents and incidents.

What I can say is that the subject of Runway Incursion (RI)[1] is a long-standing aviation safety concern. So much so that it has its own accident category when it comes to aviation safety data analysis. Such tragic events are not isolated or extremely improbable.

Air Traffic Control (ATC) is tasked with separating aircraft from each other and any other vehicles. Accidents in this category have been the catalyst for advances in equipment and procedures. That said, there’s no getting away from the substantial number of human and operational factors that pervade this domain.

Unlike the design and construction of aircraft system whereby an onerous safety objective can be stamped on a technical specification. Managing air traffic on the ground is done with a high dependency on the actions of professionally trained staff.

In an internationally accepted code, a RI is defined as:

Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.

I don’t hesitate to say that’s what happened at LaGuardia. This says nothing about – why?

So, we have an indication of what happened. What’s a little unsettling is how quickly there is News reports speculation on why it happened. Initial references to someone having made a mistake or error are no helpful. This signalling tends to encourage a simplification of the circumstances of the accident into a matter of blame. That unfortunately leads to an impression that this is a rare event that can be attributed to one factor. All to often this is not the case.

The actions of professionally trained staff can be put under such work pressure as it comes to a situation where no normal person can perform adequately. It was the introduction of Safety Management Systems (SMS) that was intended to identify these scenarios and ensure that they were mitigated or eliminated.

The actions of everyone involved with this fatal aviation accident are now under investigation. Aviation is not a “a dangerous business”. However, it is a business that requires more care and attention than most. That includes the provision of adequate resources at all times.

[1] https://www.intlaviationstandards.org/Documents/OccurrenceCategoryDefinitions.pdf

Transitioning to Green Aviation

Put your hands over your ears if your mantra is – drill baby drill. If climate change is a myth, in your mind, or you take a devil may care attitude, then the mere mention of the word “green” may give you the jitters. This is not for you. Move out of the way.

For the rest of us, who live in the real world, on planet Earth, there’s a problem. A prickly, tricky, sticky, long-term global problem. One that has commanded a great deal of attention but sometimes almost to the point of boring the pants off. Transport is one of those sectors that needs attention. Progress toward the adoption of Electric Vehicles (EV) is underway. Now and then, there’s a push back, but the direction of travel is clear. An immediate reminder of the need to change is the volatility of fuel prices at the pump. An inability to control or foresee global events that push oil and gas prices one way and then the next.

Sustainable aviation is turning out to be a hard nut to crack. For ground-based vehicles the issue of power density is not as constraining as it is in aviation. Weight is one of the fundamental parameters in flight. So, current high energy batteries present a particular technical challenge.

Exploring new forms of flight propulsion is a god send for futurologists, researchers and adventurous innovators. None of the technical challenges are a quick win. The avenues for study are infinite. Well almost. Antigravity doesn’t seem to be on the cards – yet.

I guess one of the barriers is that we have a sophisticated global aviation system that we, almost entirely, take for granted. The technology involved in transporting 200 people from a cold, grey, dull, wet Britain to a sunny warm inviting holiday destination has matured to such a point that few look at it with astonishment. That so much is provided for so little outlay.

It wasn’t that the problems of providing such air transport services were easy to solve. It’s an inheritance that has stretched over many decades. Testament to the work of a vast number of smart entrepreneurs, engineers, scientists, officials and alike.

Hydrogen fuel, or some form of hybrid propulsion does seem to be a long-term prospect.

What I see now is the excitement created by past projections is being tempered by practical reality. Wonderful strategic plans, with outlandish charts, pointed the way to a fossil fuel free utopia. Those colourful documents did good in driving forward a level of thinking. Where they offered a lesser contribution is in predicting and enabling a practical transition.

This is the time when everyone does a double take. Where the aim is a workable business cases that provides a transition in a believable, sound and rational sense. Flirting with bankruptcy has been a habit of past adventurous aviation developments. Read the turbulent story of the jumbo jet. Most agree this is not a desirable state to wish for or be in. Maybe this is the tale of the tortoise and the hare. Methodical plodding through the difficulties, incremental change, ingenuity and sheer hard headedness are needed. A couple of points to round off.

One – don’t get stuck on the repetitive nonsense that new developments can’t takes place until the regulatory structure is in place.

Two – don’t build houses on all the small airfields and lesser-known airports that may, one day, become part of a new transport system[1].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plymouth_City_Airport

The Mystery of Flight MH370

It’s ridiculous and shocking. In the modern era of civil aviation, that a large passenger aircraft can go missing and never be found. This tragic disappearance that has had experts baffled.

Mysteries, in the early days of flying, were not commonplace. They were, however, sufficiently commonplace for pulp fiction writers and amateur investigators to fill their boots. Mysteries at sea, and in the air have been a fascination for as long as there has been maritime and air transport. As our scientific and technical capabilities have increased so has our expectation that these mysteries are of the past, not the present.

Without any cause for concern, Malaysia Airlines flight MH370[1] took off 12-years ago. The aircraft disappeared from radar and has never been seen since. Parts of the aircraft have been recovered. Unfortunately, those parts provided insufficient evidence as to where the whole aircraft crashed. With what is known, this Boeing 777-200ER[2] aircraft is somewhere in the depths of the ocean. How it got there, wherever there is, and why remain unknown.

The most recent sea search for the wreckage of the aircraft has yielded no findings. Systematically searching the Indian Ocean, an organisation known as Ocean Infinity, has not advanced our understanding of what happened to flight MH370. That might be unfair, since we now know that the aircraft wreckage is not likely to be at the locations they searched.

The vast area of the Indian Ocean has an average depth of over 12,000 feet. Locating an object on the seabed is a hard task even when there’s some idea where it’s resting. To make the task even more difficult, ocean seabeds have a wide variety of geological formations. Mountains, crevasse and flat expanses.

We spend most of our time living on dry land. The reality of planet Earth is that a larger part of its surface is covered with water. That we can be thankful for given what we see of other planets.

Thus, the importance of having the mechanism for location that works anywhere and everywhere. Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) is vital in all aspects of international flight. Flight MH370 was equipped with Boeing’s FANS-1 (Future Air Navigation System). This does have a surveillance function in that it provides aircraft position reports via satellite communication (SATCOM).

[In the late-1990s, I was involved in the standards setting and regulatory approval of the airborne components of both the Boeing FANS-1 and AIRBUS FANS-A systems].

Reports of the loss of MH-370 say this aircraft system was working at the point of take-off. Official reports also say that this aircraft system was “deliberately” disabled during the flight. A mystery remains as we may never get to understand the motivation for this action.

There’s no good reason for disabling such systems unless they are presenting a hazard to the aircraft in flight. Clearly the crew need to have the ability to isolate aircraft systems in the event of an avionics bay fire or other significant failure events. Circuit breakers are provided for that purpose. Procedures and training are too.

So many questions. Will the Indian Ocean search be revived again? Not for a while, I think.

[1] https://john-w-vincent.com/2024/12/20/mh370-and-mh17-a-decade-on/

[2] The ER stands for Extended Range.

Integrating for Success

It’s almost as if there’s two types of humans. Who often find it difficult to understand the other. In the field of pros and cons here’s a sketch.

One who takes a general overview that can be called the “big picture”. They shy away from dense information. Much in favour of short précis and a well-crafted pitch. Not so much interested in how an answer was derived as what it is an how it impacts their interests.

Another who specialises and focuses on precise detail. Deeply engrained in the working of a particular issue. Open to a continuous round of investigation and discovery. Not so much interested in an outcome as the interaction of the components that produced an outcome.

With the first, they are comfortable with ambiguity. A degree of vagueness. They can short-cut to decisions to provide a sense of certainty. On the downside this can lead to turning a blind eye to difficulties and failing.

With the second, they are obsessed with the pursuit of excellence almost to the exclusion of practicality. On the upside they may anticipate problems. Providing workable solutions before they become forced.

What am I talking about? Most people don’t fit in either camp. Or we have subjects where we dig deeply and others where we skim the surface. I’ve used the analogy of a basic comb on this one. The spine of the comb is the overview. The prongs of the comb are the deeper scrutiny.

My message is simple – both are needed. That is, both are needed to understand what’s going on. Where the subject is a complex aircraft systems design both are essential.

There’s another way of saying this too. Slightly different because this way assumes a hierarchic organisational structure. For the most part, despite fads and fashions to do differently, most large organisation still have a form of hierarchical arrangement. Directorates, departments, sections, teams and alike.

One view of a complex system can be taken “top-down”. Another view is taken “bottom-up”. Phrased like this (top and bottom) it’s not easy to appreciate that both are equally important.

As an illustration, I certainly remember working with highly professional engineers with incredibly detailed knowledge of their part of an aircraft. However, they had little idea of the implications of some functions in relation to the abnormal operations of an aircraft in service.

Equally, to be fair, those meetings with capable and highly experienced managers who were inclined to bypass or belittle difficulties to ensure that a promised date was met. Or an inability to appreciate the necessity to consider the long-term consequences of a finding.

My message is simple – the two perspectives must be drawn together for success. Bringing together the points of connection between the nitty gritty detail and a wider appreciation is a hard job. Fraught with misunderstanding the people who can do this are rare and precious.

The above is a reason to be concerned when the approach to efficiency is biased towards automation. To speed up design processes to get all the ducks in a row. To more quickly pile up the paperwork, or its digital equivalent, without time to think. Without the space to use our most valuable skills – experience, creativity, imagination, discussion and mutual respect.

Navigating Change

It’s all too easy to say – it was different in my time. How things have gone downhill. There’s a boring refrain from me, and my baby boom generation, which laments a lost era. What we forget is that all of history is a lost era. Becoming history is a discomforting feeling.

I remember walking around the transport museum at Brooklands in Surrey. Look to one side and there was an aircraft cockpit display that was the latest tech in my days as a young design engineer. It was slightly worse than that in that the retired equipment, covered in dust, was one I worked on in the late 1980s. Sophisticated at the time. Now an item of curiosity.

This weekend, I stood under the last flying Concorde at Aerospace Bristol. Looking up the supersonic aircraft, it remains stunning, impressive, and futuristic. It’s a real testament to the British and French engineers who were so adventurous, creative, and foresighted in its design.

That said, in the end that era came down to money and politics. Just goes to show what the implications are of having made a robust international commitment and finding it impossible to backout. As a purely business adventure, a project like Concorde is difficult to justify. As a cultural icon and industrial marker laid down for all of history to appreciate, it’s momentous. It’s reasonable to say that the success modern-day AIRBUS has roots in this tremendous European collaboration.

Anyway, back to war and more day-to-day concerns. There’s no doubt that having some form of industrial strategy is better than not having one. The trouble is that UK Governments come and go and are incredibly fickle. So, a nice policy document with sound ideas can either spur change or slowly gather dust with equal measure.

Reflecting over the last 40-years and more, the UK has taken a large peace dividend. Defence spending has declined steadily under every political flag. This has led to a focus on fewer engineering projects. A concentration on fewer prestige assets whether in the air, at sea or on land. A gradual cutting of cloth to fit a lesser role in the world.

How do I write is without the predicable lament? It’s a matter of highlighting the downsides of the current position without lapsing into an archaic wish for a return to a bygone era.

One observation I would make here. If I pick up a British aviation magazine of the 1960/70s it’s clear that there’s a huge diversity of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) making products that are as diverse as they are spread across the country. Yes, the large aerospace companies have consolidated so that there remains a handful of prominent names. A lot of the iconic British names have disappeared. Consigned to museums. Inward investment has meant that the titans of the past have been swallowed up by international businesses.

There’s a pattern here that is not uniquely British. I’d make the point that one of the most concerning weaknesses is the decline of the large ecosystem of SMEs. Or the precarious situation that is often their fate. These businesses are the smaller fish that swim around the bigger players. They have the capacity to be dynamic and innovative. Even if they are often under regarded and more vulnerable to economic shocks.

Central government can’t always solve problems. That said, they can, at least, take an interest and create an environment where such entrepreneurs can flourish. Reflecting over the last 40-years and more, governments have been immensely ineffective in this respect. Policy documents are great. Where the failing persists is going from words to effective actions.