boeing – John Vincent

Jeju Air Flight 7C2216, arriving from the Thai capital of Bangkok, at South Korea’s Muan Airport (MWX), crashed at around 9am local time (00:00 GMT/UTC) on Sunday, 29 December 2024.

My condolences to the families and loved ones of those who died or were injured in this fatal aircraft accident.

Pictures of the Jeju Air Boeing 737-800 landing[1] show that no landing gear can be seen deployed. A video image shows the aircraft skidding down the runway at high speed. The aircraft is wings level. It is reported the aircraft overrunning the runway and colliding with a wall or ramp. The video image does suggest that the aircraft engine thrust reversers were deployed. This is wrong. Weight on wheels is needed for deployment.

MWX runway 19 has a Landing Distance Available (LDA) of 2800 m. The local visibility was reported as 9000m and the wind speed at 2kt.

Was the pilot in command trying to go around? The accident flight recordings should answer this question. That is from the aircraft Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR).

This remains a hope. Reports are that the FDR has been damaged. This should not be a surprise given the nature of the impact it suffered. However, both FDR and CVR are designed and tested to survive extreme cases.

The South Korean Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport says that the accident flight and voice recorders have been recovered[2].

Jeju Air is a popular South Korean low-cost airline. The airline was established in 2005.

A full independent accident investigation will no doubt take place. That is in accordance with the standards and recommended practices of ICAO Annex 13.

Current media speculation surrounding possible causes of this Boeing 737 accident do not offer any satisfactory explanation for the sequence of events. For example, it would be astonishing if the root cause of the accident was a bird strike or multiple bird strike shortly before landing. The aircraft has several means to deploy its main undercarriage.

It is likely that safety culture, controller and pilot training, and airport facilities are bigger factors in this fatal accident than the fact that it involved the loss of a Boeing 737-800 aircraft.

NOTE: Boeing 737 “If the gear fails to extend properly or hydraulic system A is lost, the gear can be manually extended by pulling the manual gear extension handles, located in the flight deck.” Landing Gear

POST: The impact test in the applicable technical standards EUROCAE ED55 (FDR) and ED56A (CVR) are demanding. The recorder’s crash protected memory module is fired out of a canon into a shaped target to simulate an accident scenario. It must be readable afterwards.

[1] https://www.independent.co.uk/tv/news/south-korea-jeju-air-crash-b2671085.html

[2] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/c4glr85l2ldt

Yet again, Boeing is in the news. The events of recent times, I feel are immensely sad. Now, it is reported that the FAA has opened an investigation into a possible manufacturing quality lapse on the Boeing 787 aircraft[1]. Concern is that inspection records may have been falsified.

A company that once had a massive professional engineering reputation has sunk to a place where expectations are low. It’s not so much that the company is having a Gerald Ratner moment. Unfortunately, the constant stream of bad news indicates something deeper.

It’s interesting to note that Frank Shrontz[2] passed away last Friday at the grand age of 92. He was the CEO and Chairman of Boeing, who led the company during development of the Boeing 737NG and Boeing 777 aircraft. In the 1990s, I worked on both large aircraft types.

A commonly held view is that, after his time and the merger with McDonnell Douglas the culture of the organisation changed. There’s a view that business schools graduates took over and the mighty engineering ethos that Boeing was known for then went into decline. Some of this maybe anecdotal. Afterall, the whole world has changed in the last 30-years. However, it’s undoubtably true that a lot of people lament the passing of an engineering culture that aimed to be the best.

A famous quote comes to mind: “Culture eats strategy for breakfast.” Those sharp 5 words get discussed time and time again. Having been involved in a lot of strategic planning in my time it’s not nice to read. How wonderful intent, and well described policies can be diluted or ignored is often an indicator of decline. It’s that cartoon of two cavemen pushing a cart with a square wheel. One says to the other: “I’ve been so busy. Working my socks off”. Ignored, on the ground is an unused round wheel. If an organisation’s culture is aggressively centred on short-term gain, then many of the opportunities to fix stuff gets blown out of the window.

We keep talking about “performance” as if it’s a magic pill. Performance based rules, performance-based oversight, and a long list of performance indicators. That, in of itself is not a bad thing. Let’s face it we all want to get better at something. The problem lies with performance only being tagged to commercial performance. Or where commercial performance trumps every other value an engineering company affirms.

To make it clear that all the above is not just a one company problem, it’s useful to look at what confidential reporting schemes have to say. UK CHIRP is a long standing one. Many recent CHIRP reports cite management as a predominant issue[3]. Leadership skills are an issue.

[1] https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/some-787-production-test-records-were-falsified-boeing-says

[2] https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/frank-shrontz-former-ceo-and-chairman-of-boeing-dies-at-92/

[3] https://chirp.co.uk/newsletter/trust-in-management-and-cultures-is-the-key-to-promoting-confidence-in-safety-reporting/