Tag: airlines

Harmonisation

There’s an example in of itself. I’ve used the British English spelling. Perhaps I should have standardised on the American spelling, namely Harmonization. Or does it matter at all given that the definition of the word remains the same, whatever. Oh, I can’t resist the temptation to say; you say Tomato, I say Tomato.

“You say tomato, I say tomato.

You eat potato and I eat potato,

Tomato, tomato, potato, potato,

Let’s call the whole thing off.”

Naturally, in the voice of Fred Astaire[1]. Nice though this is, my subject is not pronunciation.

Aviation is a highly regulated business. It’s been that since its potential for transporting huge numbers of people around the globe was recognised. Safety must be number one. Although, it’s not if you read the first few words of the all-important Chicago convention.

Article 1: Every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over airspace above its territory.

In the minds of those who signed the convention it was sovereignty that took first place. That didn’t mean abusing the word “sovereignty” as has to often been done. Afterall, the whole basis of the Convention on International Civil Aviation was international cooperation. It still is.

Let’s put that to one side for a moment. One of the challenges of international aviation has been the different rules and regulations in place in each country. There’s a level of harmony in the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). But ICAO is not a regulator and it’s for each country to interpret agreed standards within their domestic law.

Europe, or at least the European Union (EU) is different in this respect. Since there’s European law and an active European regulator then there’s common rules and regulation set for a regional grouping of countries. So far, Europe is the only region to go this far.

When it comes to aircraft airworthiness this has been a topic of a lot of discussion in the last four decades. In the 1990s, that discussion centred around the idea that a single worldwide code was a desirable achievement. That the time the two major entities engaged in the business of aviation rulemaking, and the maintenance of rules were the FAA (US) and the JAA (Europe).

A single worldwide code could greatly facilitate the movement of aviation produces around the globe. That done to ensure that common safety standards were maintained on every occasion. It proved hard to get to this utopian condition. That said, a great deal was achieved in the harmonisation of existing civil aviation codes. Today, we benefit from that work. I’d say we even take it for granted.

In around 2000, after much study, countries concluded that it was fine to seek some form of equivalence between respective rules rather than having to write done one single set of rules. Mutual recognition has flourished in the form of agreements between countries that has smoothed the path for the aviation industries.

That last major study of the pros and cons of harmonisation is now nearly a generation old. A lot has moved on. For one, in Europe the JAA transition to the EASA.

At the same time the manufacturing countries worked closely together to agree on measures to ensure that there was no great divergence in rules and regulations. Now subjects, like Safety Management Systems (SMS) became codified. However, sovereign countries continued to develop and maintain their own aviation rules and regulations.

International working groups often achieve remarkable commonality and convergence on detailed technical topics. Often because the few people who were deeply embedded in a technical subjects all knew each other and shared information relatively freely.

Discussion as to the viability of a single worldwide code has not completely faded into the past. In fact, there’s some good reason to breath life back into this historic debate. Here’s what’s added to the dynamics of the situation:

  1. Ongoing moves from prescriptive rules to more performance-based rules,
  2. Entirely new products in development, like eVTOL aircraft,
  3. Interdependency, interconnection, and integration all increased since 2000,
  4. Security and safety are becoming inseparable,
  5. Digitisation is changing the ways that we ensure that an aircraft is airworthy.

If you have knowledge of, and thoughts on this subject, I’d be happy to hear from you.

[1] https://youtu.be/LOILZ_D3aRg

Hydrogen in Aviation

The potential for LH2 (liquid hydrogen) is enormous. That’s matched by the logistical and technical difficulties in exploiting this gas’s great potential. It offers energy for a means of propulsion that is nowhere near as environmentally damaging as existing means.

Society already integrates hazardous liquids and gases into everyday life. Each one has been through several iterations. It has been a rollercoaster. Each one has been at the root of disasters, at one time or another.

  • We use gas for cooking and heating in domestic settings. Periodically explosions demolish buildings. Leaks cannot be ignored. Harm can be done.
  • We use light and heavy oils widely in transport systems. Periodically intense fires burn vehicles. Care in handling is essential. Harm can be done.

Without having to say it, both above harm the environment. The search for non-CO2 emitting ways of flying is urgent. Here, I’m writing about harm to people. Physical harm. The business of aviation safety.

Often the physical harm is not associated with the design of the systems used but to the maintenance of those systems. Naturally, there was a learning curve. If we look at early versions of those systems, fatal accidents and incidents were far more regular. So, here’s the challenge for aviation. How do we skip the dangers of the early learning phase? How do we embed rigorous maintenance practices from day one? Big questions.

On the first one of these, lots of fine minds are engaged in putting together standards and practices that will address good design. If this works, and it will be tested extensively, the chance opens for introduction to service with a great deal of confidence that the main risks will be managed.

On the second of these, there’s not much happening. You might say there’s an element of chicken and egg. The shape and form of future LH2 systems needs much more work before we can think deeply about how they will be maintained.

I think that’s wrong. It’s old-fashioned thinking. As the industry has often practiced, making the systems first and then devising ways of maintaining them while in-service. That’s yesterday’s reasoning.

Making aviation system maintenance the Cinderella in the LH2 world is to invite failure. This is a situation where advancing the consideration of how the in-service realm could work, day by day, is necessary. It’s advantageous.

Here’s my reasons.

  1. There are generic approaches that can be tested without knowing the detailed design. That can take existing learning from other industries, like chemical and space industries, and consider their application in aviation.
  2. Emerging technologies, like machine learning, coupled with large scale modelling can provide ways of simulating the operational environment before it exists. Thereby rapidly testing maintenance practices in a safe way.
  3. It’s imperative to start early given the mountain that needs to be climbed. This is particularly true when it comes to education and training of engineers, flight crew, airport and logistics staff and even administrators.

Everyone wants to accelerate environmentally sustainable solutions. When they do get to be in-service, they will be there for decades. Thus, an investment, now, in study of maintenance systems will pay dividends in the longer term. Remember, early fatal accidents and incidents can kill otherwise sound projects or at least put them back on the drawing board for a long time.

NOTE 1: I didn’t mention Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). It’s in the mix. Another CO2 contributor. LPG containers have pressure relief valves. LH2 containers will likely have pressure relief valves too. That said, venting LPG is a lot more environmentally damaging than LH2. From a safety perspective they can both create explosive conditions in confined spaces. Maintenance staff may not need to carry a canary in a cage, but they will certainly need to carry gas detectors when working on LH2 powered aircraft. Our noses will not do the job.

NOTE 2: Events on the subject: https://www.iata.org/en/events/all/iata-aviation-energy-forum/

https://events.farnboroughinternational.org/aerospace/sustainable-skies-world-summit-2024

2024 ICAO Symposium on Non-CO₂ Aviation Emissions

Safety Culture

Civil aviation remains an extremely safe means of transport. That said, any form of complacency must be addressed. It’s reassuring to say the past has been great but what passengers are most concerned about is their next flight. To have the confidence, to think it irrational to be afraid of flying, to look forward to the next journey, we must have a safe aviation system everywhere and all the time.

For any widespread system that has complex interactions between people and technology there’s never a moment when it can be taken for granted. We count the numbers, but safety is not purely an absence of accidents and incidents. Numbers counted are always past events. They have no direct causal influence on what happens next. True, there are factors in past accidents and incidents that will pop up again and again, but every flight is a unique event.

One of my colleagues who was a senior captain in a major international airline always remined me of the fact that, for all that has gone before, flight risk begins the moment an aircraft sets off down the runway with the intention getting to a destination. When the wheels lift off the ground there’s no stopping time. Reliant on the diligence, vigilance, and integrity of everyone who made a flight possible, flight risk is then in the hands of the crew.

The above is perhaps why we talk a lot about safety culture. The whole aviation family has a role to play. The care, professionalism, and watchfulness of every person makes a difference.

This can extend from the drafting of a new component for a new design, that a decade down the line. ends up as a part of an aircraft just about to leave the gate. This can go back to a flight instructors’ message that emphasised a key point back in a pilot’s initial training, years ago. This can encompass the extra care a couple of air traffic controllers took as they changed shifts.

Safety culture comes from caring. It’s that heightened awareness of the consequence of actions. Being alert to possibilities. Both the good kind, and the bad.

Safety culture is a matter for both individuals and organisations. One without the other doesn’t work. Placing a vigilant person in an organisation that doesn’t care is much like placing a reckless person in an organisation that does care. Although this is what I’ve written, systemic problems are likely the ones that are most likely to cause negative outcomes. This is where the role of management has the most impact.

Culture exists in context. When the ways people interact are determined by practices, processes, and procedures there’s an obligation on management to ensure they fit the bill. Drivers are often economic. In a commercial operation that’s no surprise. It’s when that driver displaces the safety imperative then safety suffers. There’s been several occurrences of this negative phenomena in the last year.