ICAO – John Vincent

Regulatory Insights

I can’t remember if my teacher was talking about maths or physics. His scholarly advice has stuck with me. When things get complex, they can seem overwhelming. Problems seem insolvable. So, it’s good to take a deep breath, step back and see if it’s possible to reduce the problem to its most basic elements. Do what could be called helicopter behaviour. Try to look at the problem top-down, in its simplest form. Break it into parts to see if each part is more easily comprehended.

Today’s international aviation regulatory structure, for design and production, follows the arrow of time. From birth to death. Every commercial aircraft that there ever was started as a set of ideas, progressed to a prototype and, if successful, entered service to have a life in the air.

This elementary aircraft life cycle is embedded in standards as well as aviation rules. Documents like, ARP4754(), Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems are constructed in this manner. There are as many graphs and curves that represent the aircraft life cycle as there are views on the subject, but they all have common themes.

That said, the end-of-life scenarios for aircraft of all kinds is often haphazard. Those like the Douglas DC-3 go on almost without end. Fascinatingly, this week, I read of an Airbus A321neo being scrapped after only 6-years of operations. Parts being more valuable than the aircraft.

Generally, flight-time lives in operational service are getting shorter. The pace of technology is such that advances offer commercial and environmental advantages that cannot be resisted. Operating conditions change, business models change and innovation speeds forward.

My earlier proposition was that our traditional aviation regulatory structure is out of date. Well, the detail is ever evolving – it’s true. Some of the fundamentals remain. The arrow of time, however fast the wheels spin, mixing my metaphors, remains an immobile reality.

In airworthiness terms an aircraft life cycle is divided into two halves. Initial airworthiness and continuing airworthiness. This provides for a gate keeper. A design does not advance into operational service, along the aircraft life cycle, until specified standards have been demonstrated as met. An authority has deemed that acceptable standards are met.

I’m arguing, this part of the aviation regulatory structure is far from out of date. However much there’s talk of so called “self-regulation” by industry it has not come into being for commercial aviation. I think there’s good reason for retaining the role that a capable independent authority plays in the system. A gate keeper is there to ensure that the public interest is served. That means safety, security and environmental considerations are given appropriate priority.

To fulfil these basic objectives there’s a need for oversight. That is the transparency needed to ensure confidence is maintained not just for a day but for the whole aircraft life cycle. And so, the case for both design and production approvals remain solid. The devil being in the detail.

Harmonisation

There’s an example in of itself. I’ve used the British English spelling. Perhaps I should have standardised on the American spelling, namely Harmonization. Or does it matter at all given that the definition of the word remains the same, whatever. Oh, I can’t resist the temptation to say; you say Tomato, I say Tomato.

“You say tomato, I say tomato.

You eat potato and I eat potato,

Tomato, tomato, potato, potato,

Let’s call the whole thing off.”

Naturally, in the voice of Fred Astaire[1]. Nice though this is, my subject is not pronunciation.

Aviation is a highly regulated business. It’s been that since its potential for transporting huge numbers of people around the globe was recognised. Safety must be number one. Although, it’s not if you read the first few words of the all-important Chicago convention.

Article 1: Every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over airspace above its territory.

In the minds of those who signed the convention it was sovereignty that took first place. That didn’t mean abusing the word “sovereignty” as has to often been done. Afterall, the whole basis of the Convention on International Civil Aviation was international cooperation. It still is.

Let’s put that to one side for a moment. One of the challenges of international aviation has been the different rules and regulations in place in each country. There’s a level of harmony in the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). But ICAO is not a regulator and it’s for each country to interpret agreed standards within their domestic law.

Europe, or at least the European Union (EU) is different in this respect. Since there’s European law and an active European regulator then there’s common rules and regulation set for a regional grouping of countries. So far, Europe is the only region to go this far.

When it comes to aircraft airworthiness this has been a topic of a lot of discussion in the last four decades. In the 1990s, that discussion centred around the idea that a single worldwide code was a desirable achievement. That the time the two major entities engaged in the business of aviation rulemaking, and the maintenance of rules were the FAA (US) and the JAA (Europe).

A single worldwide code could greatly facilitate the movement of aviation produces around the globe. That done to ensure that common safety standards were maintained on every occasion. It proved hard to get to this utopian condition. That said, a great deal was achieved in the harmonisation of existing civil aviation codes. Today, we benefit from that work. I’d say we even take it for granted.

In around 2000, after much study, countries concluded that it was fine to seek some form of equivalence between respective rules rather than having to write done one single set of rules. Mutual recognition has flourished in the form of agreements between countries that has smoothed the path for the aviation industries.

That last major study of the pros and cons of harmonisation is now nearly a generation old. A lot has moved on. For one, in Europe the JAA transition to the EASA.

At the same time the manufacturing countries worked closely together to agree on measures to ensure that there was no great divergence in rules and regulations. Now subjects, like Safety Management Systems (SMS) became codified. However, sovereign countries continued to develop and maintain their own aviation rules and regulations.

International working groups often achieve remarkable commonality and convergence on detailed technical topics. Often because the few people who were deeply embedded in a technical subjects all knew each other and shared information relatively freely.

Discussion as to the viability of a single worldwide code has not completely faded into the past. In fact, there’s some good reason to breath life back into this historic debate. Here’s what’s added to the dynamics of the situation:

Ongoing moves from prescriptive rules to more performance-based rules,
Entirely new products in development, like eVTOL aircraft,
Interdependency, interconnection, and integration all increased since 2000,
Security and safety are becoming inseparable,
Digitisation is changing the ways that we ensure that an aircraft is airworthy.

If you have knowledge of, and thoughts on this subject, I’d be happy to hear from you.

[1] https://youtu.be/LOILZ_D3aRg

Safety Culture 2

This may sound at variance with my last blog. I hope it’s not. I hope it’s complementary. What I’m highlighting here has been observed over decades of contact with a wide variety of organisations.

The term safety culture is fused into the pillars of ICAO Annex 19. The essence of building a good safety culture that fosters sound practices and encourages communications, in a non-punitive environment is at the heart of standards and recommended practices. With all those decades behind us the reader might assume that there’s unambiguous and well aligned attitudes and ways of working throughout the aviation industry. That’s not so.

On a spectrum of what could be called hard to soft the manner of application of know best practices can take different forms. By the way, please disassociate those two words with both easy and difficult. That’s not what I mean.

In my interpretation “hard” means like pages of Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince[1]. Aggressive, persistent, mandatory, uncompromising and all encompassing.

In my interpretation “soft” means like pages of The Little Book of Calm by Paul Wilson[2]. Harmonious, enlightened, progressive, sympathetic, and understanding.

As with extremes on any scale, going to the ends of that scale are not the best way to operate. I say “best” in terms of getting to ways of working to endure with engagement and effectiveness. I observe much of this depends on how power is disseminated through an organisational structure. Highly hierarchical organisations will approach culture differently from organisations with a relatively flat management system.

It may not be surprising to suggest that aviation Authorities can veer towards the “hard” approach and staff Unions towards the “soft” approach. Even when both are trying to reach the same goal. Where people come from a military background, command and control can be an instinctive reaction. Where people come from an advanced technology company background, collaboration and communication can be an instinctive reaction. In my observation there are advantages in both a hard and soft safety cultural approaches.

One advantage of a hard safety culture is that the time between discovery of a safety problem, taking corrective action and resolving that operational problem can be short. Clearly, that has distinct safety advantages. Certain airlines come to mind.

One advantage of a soft safety culture is that there can be the discovery of safety problems that would otherwise remain hidden. Where collective ownership of the problem is not in question. Again, clearly, that has distinct safety advantages too. Certain manufacturers come to mind.

I guess my message is as per much ancient thinking. All things in moderation. Try to reap the benefits of both ends of the scale. Balance.

[1] https://www.londonreviewbookshop.co.uk/stock/the-prince-niccolo-machiavelli

[2] https://www.waterstones.com/book/the-little-book-of-calm/paul-wilson/9780241257449

UAP

….none of us are familiar with the variety in shape and size of flying machines currently being designed and developed for general use

There was a time when anyone raising the issue of the potential for an asteroid to send humans back to the stone age was mocked and derided. Anyone bringing apparent sci-fi plots into Parliament was jeered. Now, the subject is studied with intensity and considerable resources. The probabilities of Near-Earth Object[1] (NEO) impact is calculated, and small asteroid and comet orbits are monitored in detail.

Really bad films, like the one starring Bruce Willis have a lot to answer for. That space between fiction and reality gets filled with more than a few eccentrics and conspiracy theories. Trouble is that gives you, and me licence to smirk anytime cosmic occurrences come into discussion.

I must admit I like the term Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) better than UFO. They are airborne phenomena, they are unidentified until we know better, and they are anomalous. Although, most reports are attributed to things that are known, even if they are rare events. Some are pooly reported and only scant evidence is avialable.

Discovering all there is to know about such airborne phenomena is a matter of both safety and security. However remote it might seem, part of this is the safety of aircraft in flight. I know of no examples of extra-terrestrial objects colliding with aircraft but it’s not impossible. I’m reminded of that classic picture of a bullet hitting a bullet in-flight and fusing together. It’s from the Battle of Gallipoli.

We might be entering a new era of transparency in the scientific study of UAP. This is a wholly good thing and highly necessary given the coming expansion in the number of air vehicles in flight. If Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) is going to do anything, it’s going to led to an increase in aviators and public reports. For one, none of us are familiar with the variety in shape and size of flying machines currently being designed and developed for general use. It’s likly that red and green lights moving through the sky at night is going to prompt public reports of the “unknown”.

Perspective plays a part too. A small drone close can look like a large airship at distance. As environmental conditions change so the perception of airborne objects can change dramatically. So, what we might observe and confidently attribute to be a drone or helicopter or aircraft in-flight is not always definitive. Applying disciplined scientific analysis to the data that is available has benefits.

Given that our airspace is likely to become ever more crowded, NASA’s study[2] of UAP has much merit. Recognising that resources are needed for this work is a lesson most nations need to learn. We can sit on our hands or giggle at the more ridiculous interpretations of observations, but this kind of reporting and analysis will be advantageous to aviation safety and security. It’s part of giving the public confidence that nothing unknown, unmanaged or uncontrolled is going on abover their heads too.

POST: UFOs: Five revelations from Nasa’s public meeting – BBC News

[1] https://neo.ssa.esa.int/home

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bQo08JRY0iM

Happy Birthday EASA

Happy Birthday EASA. 20 years is a good age

For me, it was a peculiar day in July. It was a baking hot Brussels. The sun beat down and the city’s trams were full of sweaty travellers. The interview room was a classic board room style. Modern office, heavy polished wooden table, and heavy black leather chairs. On a hot bright sunny summer day that was not a pleasing formula for a formal interview.

I was surprised at the result. I got the job. A moment in July 2004 became a pivotal moment in my aviation career. Not quite 20-years ago. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)[1] was already up and running in a shared office in a Brussels suburb. It was the bare bones of an organisation in the process of a rapid build-up. Discussion about the locations of the Agency’s eventual headquarters were concluding.

That kicked-off my 11-years in Cologne. I arrived in the city when the tower building was being constructed and as the staff had just moved from Brussels to take up the new headquarters. It was December 2004. Offices, on the 6^th floor of the main building were buzzing. The Agency was small in numbers and running fast to fulfil its new responsibilities.

European aviation safety regulation was going through a major change. Up until September 2003, Europe’s National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) acted as a partnership within the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)[2]. A body of rules and regulations and ways of working had been harmonised. However, because of the “club” like nature of the JAA there remained unresolved disagreements, incontinences, and a confusing representation at international level.

The legislation that called for the formation of EASA was set to unify aircraft certification and rulemaking activities and drive a consistency in the application of standards across Europe. It was the start of a long road to build world-class civil aviation safety regulator. It worked.

I experienced the first decade in Cologne. The storming and norming. The extensions of remit and turbulent days when we were finding our way. Several tragic fatal accidents and a least one Europe wide crisis. Now, the Agency is about to start its third decade.

EASA is undisputed as the European organisation that talks to the international aviation community. It works in lockstep with the European Commission. It is an achievement to be celebrated.

Yes, I find it sad that the UK is no longer a member of the Agency. But that doesn’t stop National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) working together in a constructive and positive manner[3]. There’s much to be gained from avoiding the fragmentation and conflicts of the past.

Happy Birthday EASA. 20 years is a good age.

[1] What’s #EASA’s story? See what we have achieved in 20 years https://www.easa.europa.eu/…/looking-back-move-forward…

[2] https://jaato.com/start/

[3] https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/domains/international-cooperation/easa-by-country

First Encounter

My first encounter with what could be classed as early Artificial Intelligence (AI) was a Dutch research project. It was around 2007. Let’s first note, a mathematical model isn’t pure AI, but it’s an example of a system that is trained on data.

It almost goes without saying that learning from accidents and incidents is a core part of the process to improve aviation safety. A key industry and regulatory goal is to understand what happened when things go wrong and to prevent a repetition of events.

Civil aviation is an extremely safe mode of transport. That said, because of the size of the global industry there are enough accidents and incidents worldwide to provide useful data on the historic safety record. Despite significant pre-COVID pandemic growth of civil aviation, the number of accidents is so low that further reduction in numbers is providing hard to win.

What if a system was developed that could look at all the historic aviation safety data and make a prediction as to what accidents might happen next?

The first challenge is the word “all” in that compiling such a comprehensive record of global aviation safety is a demanding task. It’s true that comprehensive databases do exist but even within these extremely valuable records there are errors, omissions, and summary information.

There’s also the kick back that is often associated with record keeping. A system that demands detailed record keeping, of even the most minor incident can be burdensome. Yes, such record keeping has admirable objectives, but the “red tape” wrapped around its objectives can have negative effects.

Looking at past events has only one aim. That’s to now do things to prevent aviation accidents in the future. Once a significant comprehensive database exists then analysis can provide simple indicators that can provide clues as to what might happen next. Even basic mathematics can give us a trend line drawn through a set of key data points[1]. It’s effective but crude.

What if a prediction could take on-board all the global aviation safety data available, with the knowledge of how civil aviation works and mix it in such a way as to provide reliable predictions? This is prognostics. It’s a bit like the Delphi oracle[2]. The aviation “oracle” could be consulted about the state of affairs in respect of aviation safety. Dream? – maybe not.

The acronym CAT normally refers to large commercial air transport (CAT) aeroplanes. What this article is about is a Causal model for Air Transport Safety (CATS)[3]. This research project could be called an early use of “Big Data” in aviation safety work. However, as I understand it, the original aim was to make prognostics a reality.

Using Bayesian network-based causal models it was theorised that a map of aviation safety could be produced. Then it could be possible to predict the direction of travel for the future.

This type of quantification has a lot of merit. It has weaknesses, in that the Human Factor (HF) often defies prediction. However, as AI advances maybe causal modelling ought to be revised. New off-the-shelf tools could be used to look again at the craft of prediction.

[1] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Air_safety_statistics_in_the_EU

[2] https://www.history.com/topics/ancient-greece/delphi

[3] https://open.overheid.nl/documenten/ronl-archief-d5cd2dc7-c53f-4105-83c8-c1785dcb98c0/pdf

Comms

The long history of data communications between air and ground has had numerous stops and starts. It’s not new to use digital communications while flying around the globe. That said, it has not been cheap, and traditional systems have evolved only slowly. If we think Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC)[1] is quite whizzy. It’s not. It belongs to a Windows 95 generation. Clunky messages and limited applications.

The sluggishness of adoption of digital communications in commercial aviation has been for several reasons. For one, standardised, certified, and maintainable systems and equipment have been expensive. It’s not just the purchase and installation but the connection charges that mount-up.

Unsurprisingly, aircraft operators have moved cautiously unless they can identify an income stream to be developed from airborne communication. That’s one reason why the passengers accessing the internet from their seats can have better connections than the two-crew in the cockpit.

Larger nations’ military flyers don’t have a problem spending money on airborne networking. For them it’s an integral part of being able to operate effectively. In the civil world, each part of the aviation system must make an economic contribution or be essential to safety to make the cut.

The regulatory material applicable to Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CS-ACNS)[2] can be found in publications coming from the aviation authorities. This material has the purpose of ensuring a high level of safety and aircraft interoperability. Much of this generally applicable material has evolved slowly over the last 30-years.

Now, it’s good to ask – is this collection of legacy aviation system going to be changed by the new technologies that are rapidly coming on-stream this year? Or are the current mandatory equipage requirements likely to stay the same but be greatly enhanced by cheaper, faster, and lower latency digital connections?

This year, Starlink[3] is offering high-speed, in-flight internet connections with global connectivity. This company is not the only one developing Low Earth Orbit (LEO)[4] satellite communications. There are technical questions to be asked in respect of safety, performance, and interoperability but it’s a good bet that these new services will very capable and what’s more, not so expensive[5].

It’s time for airborne communications to step into the internet age.

NOTE: The author was a part of the EUROCAE/RTCA Special Committee 169 that created Minimum Operational Performance Standards for ATC Two-Way Data Link Communications back in the 1990s.

POST 1: Elon Musk’s Starlink Internet Service Coming to US Airlines; Free WiFi (businessinsider.com)

POST 2: With the mandate of VDLM2 we evolve at the pace of a snail. Internet Protocol (IP) Data Link may not be suitable for all uses but there’s a lot more that can be done.

[1] https://skybrary.aero/articles/controller-pilot-data-link-communications-cpdlc

[2] https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/easy-access-rules/easy-access-rules-airborne-communications-navigation-and

[3] https://www.starlink.com/

[4] https://www.esa.int/ESA_Multimedia/Images/2020/03/Low_Earth_orbit

[5] https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/10/starlink-unveils-airplane-service-musk-says-its-like-using-internet-at-home/

High ALT

Normal commercial air traffic control doesn’t go beyond 60,000 ft in altitude. That makes sense since civil flying activities have been limited to lower altitudes. In fact, modern commercial airliners are not designed to fly above about 45,000 feet. This is a compromise based on what works commercially as much as what’s works best. Aircraft instruments are calibrated making standard assumption about the atmosphere.

For some of its flight, Concorde cruised at a height of 60,000 feet. More like a military jet, with its speed it had the capability to make use of higher altitudes.

It’s even possible to fly above 50,000 feet without an engine. The world record glider flight by AIRBUS shows it’s possible.

The Earth’s atmosphere is not uniform. It changes its characteristics with altitude. The atmosphere can be divided into five layers, as the temperature and density change. They are named: Troposphere, Stratosphere Mesosphere, Ionosphere and Exosphere.

The Troposphere is a layer that goes from 8 kms (26,247 ft) on the poles to about 18 kms (59,055 ft) on the equator. This is the layer where weather is experienced.

On average, the Stratosphere goes up to about 40 kms (131,234 ft). The winds blows fast but they tend to be more consistent as they wrap around the globe. The lower portion of the Stratosphere is virtually isothermal (layer of constant temperature).

A medieval English philosopher and Franciscan friar, Roger Bacon[1] figured out that the air might support a ship in the same way that water supports ships. In the 13^th Century that was a nice academic conclusion but little more.

With all the current controversy surrounding high altitude balloons, that the road to flight started with balloons, could be said to be a bit ironic. It’s long been known about that balloons fly well at high altitudes but it’s a new frontier as far as commercial activity is concerned. For science, weather balloons may go up to 40 km to measure the high level winds.

Some experimental work has been done on trying to commercially use the airspace above normally civil flying. The Google Loon trials[2] are an example of an attempt to float a telecommunications platform high in the sky. These balloon trials were abandoned as difficulties proved greater than anticipated.

It’s not so easy to keep a high altitue balloon on-station.

Now, considering the news in North America, maybe high-altitude operations ought to be a matter of regulatory concern. This is not a subject that any one country can address alone.

There is some legal, regulatory and technical work[3] underway in Europe[4] but it needs to make progress. This is a subject for international collaboration.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Bacon

[2] https://blog.x.company/loons-final-flight-e9d699123a96

[3] https://www.eurocontrol.int/article/echo-making-space-new-high-altitude-entrants

[4] https://www.eurocontrol.int/events/european-higher-airspace-operations-symposium

UFO

It’s intriguing. Reports of unidentified flying objects being shot down over Alaska, Canada, and Michigan prompts a lot of questions.

The Earth’s atmosphere eventually becomes space at 100 km up. The Kármán line[1] is one way to define the boundary. All aeronautic activities are deemed to take place below that imaginary line. Theodore Karman[2] did his best to determine a height at which the Earth’s atmosphere is too thin to support flight. Now, there’s an international discussion about bringing that boundary down to 80 km. That is the hight above which a person in a space vehicle is said to become an astronaut.

I guess my point is that there’s a lot of the Earth’s atmosphere to continuously monitor, if the task is to know about everything that is flying everywhere. So, it’s perfectly reasonable that reports of unidentified flying objects will crop up, now and then.

It doesn’t mean that there are alien probes popping in to keep an eye on us earthlings. No, in so far as is commonly known there’s no evidence that stands up to scrutiny to definitively prove the existence of sustained airborne craft that are not of this Earth. However, extra-terrestrial objects fall to Earth all the time. Mostly ice and rocks. I wrote about objects falling from the sky in an earlier article.

It’s worth recalling the first article of the Chicago Convention on Sovereignty:

The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.

For those monitoring what’s in the air, the primary concern remains about flights over land and populated areas. This is the case where hazards can exist to those below.

All said and done, it’s no time to become alarmed. It may well be the case that these unidentified flying objects were previously ignored. Only now has the militaries in North America been galvanised into action and being more vigilant. The more people look, the more people see.

What do I know? Spy balloon, craft and drones may be much more common than has been generally reported.

Claims and counter claims that everyone is doing it shouldn’t be dismissed out of hand. The technology involved in flying above normal air traffic has a multitude of potential applications. A framework for higher altitude operations is now being written[1].

POST: Diplomatic tensions between the US and China continue to escalate as the US explains its shooting down of high altitude flying objects over North America. Much is still to be uncovered.

[1] https://www.eurocontrol.int/article/echo-making-space-new-high-altitude-entrants

[1] https://www.fai.org/news/statement-about-karman-line

[2] A Hungarian American physicist and engineer who was born 11 May 1881.

Fatal accident in Nepal 2

We are now one week from the fatal accident that occurred on Sunday, 15 January in Nepal. Yeti Airlines Flight 691, an ATR 72-500 aircraft, crashed while on approach at Pokhara International Airport in Nepal[1]. Sadly, this accident resulted in 72 fatalities. No one survived. Only one body remains to be discovered[2].

This has been Nepal’s deadliest aviation accident in over 30 years.

After years of pandemic-caused travel disruption this land locked nation was hopeful that their new airport would bring the tourists back. The nation’s second-largest city sits in the shadows of a towering mountain range. It’s a picture postcode setting for this tragedy.

Nepal’s government has set-up a five-member committee to investigate the accident.

As stated in the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Annex 13, Aircraft Accident, and Incident Investigation[3], it’s the responsibility of the State of Occurrence to lead an investigation. The objective of that investigation should be prevention of future accidents and incidents. It’s not the purpose of a technical activity to apportion blame or liability.

Nepal is the State of Registry and the State of the Operator, but they must notify the State of Design, the State of Manufacture (France) of the aircraft and ICAO in Montreal.

There are numerous speculations concerning the cause of this accident. The scant evidence available on social media does suggest that this aircraft accident fits into the category of Loss of Control in Flight. However, that suggestion is purely informed conjecture at this time.

I agree with David Learmount[4] in that it’s likely that this will be found to be a preventable accident. That said, once the accident flight recorders have been replayed there should be a substantially better indication of what really happened on that fateful day.

Whereas it was previously reported the accident recoders were going to France it’s now reported that they are going to Singapotre for replay Black boxes from Nepal plane crash to be sent to Singapore – ABC News (go.com)

Based on the experience of the analysis of numerous accidents it’s unlikely to be a simple single cause. Such fatal aircraft accidents are often combinations of factors that come together. Approach to a new airport plus an unexpected event or error plus aspects of organisational culture can be enough to tip the balance.

Aviation, in itself, is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.

A quote of Captain A. G. Lamplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group, London. c. early 1930’s. This famous phrase has been reproduced on posters many times.

POST: Here’s some examples of what can happen again and again. Lessons learned from business aviation accidents maybe equally applicable to this case. Lessons Learned from Business Aviation Accidents | NBAA – National Business Aviation Association

[1] https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20230115-0

[2] https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/nepal-plane-crash-search-continues-for-lone-missing-person/article66415303.ece

[3] https://store.icao.int/en/annexes/annex-13

[4] https://davidlearmount.com/2023/01/21/regional-airline-safety-really-doesnt-have-to-be-this-bad/