The last time I visited the city of Baltimore was in 2012. It was the location of the annual seminar of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI)[1]. That was when I was representing the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) at such international events.
The relationship between aviation accident investigators and regulators are generally cordial. There’s a great deal of work that requires cooperation and good communication. That’s not to say that the relationships between these two vital parts of national and international aviation safety systems is easy. It’s not. My reflection on that fact is that a degree of constructive tension is inevitable and not always a bad thing.
One way of seeing that relationship is that the primary role of an investigator is to make findings to prevent the repeat of a given accident. For a regulator the primary role is to ensure the complete aviation system runs safely on a day-to-day basis. Both organisations have the public interest at their heart. However, their operational context and perspective are different.
Firstly, my condolence to the families and friends of those who perished because of the Francis Scott Key Bridge accident[2]. The collapse victims and survivors had no way of knowing what was to happen on the night of the accident. I use the word “accident”. This was not an act of God, as some commentators would have it. The safety risks involved in the operation of the port in Baltimore could be anticipated.
In the US there’s an independent federal agency that is tasked with such major investigations. Interestingly, it’s the same one as that investigates aviation accidents and incidents. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is a multi-modal organisation. That is something we don’t have in the UK. Also, we don’t have a divide between federal and state organisations. Since in the UK we have separate independent national Air, Marine and Rail investigation agencies that cover the country (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland).
I will not comment on the accident sequence or causes. It’s the job of an independent investigation to arrive at the technical facts. Recommendations will flow from that investigation.
Where a comment may be in order is that there are many locations across the globe where a vital piece of infrastructure, like a bridge being struck by a large container ship is a possibility. I’d generalise that further. When infrastructure that was designed a built 50 years ago meets modern day operational stress there’s going to be vulnerabilities. Yes, the aviation system is not immune from this fact too. It wasn’t so long ago when I read of PDP-11 computer hardware used for air traffic control (now, historic artifacts[3]). I’m sure there are still Boeing 747s, and alike that need floppy disks to update their hardware.
So, the wider subject is operational legacy systems working with modern systems. This is the interface that requires particular care. The safety risk appetite and exposure in the 1970s/80s was quite different from that which we expect upheld today.
Unfortunately, society is often reluctant to revisit this subject. Additionally, there’s the incentive to go for quick fixes and sweating assets. The example I have in mind the so-called “smart motorways” in the UK[4]. I don’t know how many fatalities can be linked to “smart motorways” but I’m sure, sadly, it’s too many.
POST: In time-off I enjoyed a trip out to Fort McHenry and a walk around the places where The Wire was filmed. The Fort McHenry story is interesting given its role in times of war. The British burnt the White House but the navy didn’t get past Fort McHenry in 1812.
[2] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-us-canada-68661318
[3] https://www.tnmoc.org/air-traffic-control
[4] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/plans-for-new-smart-motorways-cancelled
John Vincent 