Category: Aviation

SPO 2

An instant reaction to Single Pilot Operations (SPO) is like the instant reaction to completely autonomous flight. “I’m not getting on an aircraft without a pilot!” Then to justify that reaction fatal accidents of the past are cited. Typically, this is to remind everyone of the tragic Germanwings accident[1]. It was 24 March 2015, that an Airbus A320 was crashed deliberately killing all onboard.  

However, it’s wise to remember that the likelihood of incapacitation[2] is much greater than that of the malicious behaviour of the pilot in command. Cases of malicious behaviour leading to a catastrophic outcome are truly shocking but extremely rare.

One fatal accident, that is still disputed is EgyptAir Flight 990[3] that killed 217 people in 1999. The possibility of inflight pilot suicide is unnerving, since on the face of it there is little any of the aircraft’s cabin crew or passengers can do to stop it.

This could be a future opportunity to use automation to prevent these scenarios occurring. Afterall the aircraft knows where it is and that a sustained high-speed dive towards the ground is not normally intended. A safety system exists to do this[4], but its outputs are not connected to the aircraft’s flight controls.

Humans being adaptable, extremely creative and capable of highly irrational actions, it’s unlikely that malicious behaviour resulting in aviation accidents will ever be reduced to zero. This is said regardless of the procedures or technology involved. The fate of flight MH 370 remains a mystery.

Thus, the prominent safety issue in respect of SPO is pilot incapacitation. Where the pilot in command is no longer able to perform as expected. That is, if the aircraft flown is not capable of safely landing itself. The objective always being safe continued flight and landing.

I’ve had the “1% Rule” rule explained to me by a notable aviation doctor, but I must admit I didn’t fully take it in. So far, the rule has stood the test of time. When the pilot in command of a Czech Airlines aircraft collapsed and died on route from Warsaw to Prague in 2012, the co-pilot took over and everyone got home safely.

Any automated co-pilot must be at least as capable as a human co-pilot in all aspects of operation of an aircraft. The key word here being “all”. It’s not enough to have the functions necessary to undertake safe continued flight and landing. Task such as communicating with the cabin crew and passengers must also be considered. Including preparation for an emergency landing.

[1] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32072218

[2] http://www.avmed.in/2012/02/pilot-incapacitation-debate-on-assessment-1-rule-etc/

[3] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/16/duncancampbell

[4] https://skybrary.aero/articles/terrain-avoidance-and-warning-system-taws

Single Pilot Operations

Single Pilot Operations is not new. What’s new is considering this way of working for everyday public transport operations of large aircraft

Research is of fundamental importance. It seems obvious to say so given the benefits it has given us. When proposals come forward to exploit new technologies there needs to be that moment when everyone steps back and takes a long hard look at the implications of its use.

In basic technical research it’s not the most important consideration is to focus on the drivers for change. They can be multifarious: economic, environmental, social, safety, security, political, and maybe just a matter of preference. Policy directions are taken by the industry and governments not constrained by what is happening now as much as what might happen tomorrow.

Research has delivered incredible safety improvements in aviation. This is not only in the basic design and construction of aircraft but all aspects of their operation. So, to see that the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) sponsoring research to study the implications of aircraft Single Pilot Operations[1] is a wholly good measure.

My history goes back to the early days of fly-by-wire aircraft systems. This is where the mechanical and physical connection between an aircraft pilot’s actions and the control surfaces that determine flight are replaced by digital computers. Back in the 1980s, a great deal of research and experimental flying proved the technology to make fly-by-wire work. It first found favour with the military. One reason being that an aircraft’s capability could be extended well beyond what was formerly reached. This change was introduced with caution, analysis, testing and much detailed risk assessment.

At the time, there was a significant body of professional pessimists who predicted a diminishment of aviation safety. Today, four decades on, studies show that even as air traffic has increased so civil aviation safety has improved. A momentous achievement. An achievement that has, in part, been because of the well-regulated adoption of advanced technologies. 

It is important to look at potential changes with an open mind. It’s easy to come to an instant opinion and dismiss proposals before a detailed study has been conducted. The detailed technical research can then be part of the challenge and response that is necessary to before approval of any major change. First difficult questions need to be tabled and thoroughly investigated.

[1] https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/research-projects/emco-sipo-extended-minimum-crew-operations-single-pilot-operations-safety-risk

Step on the Moon

This coming Wednesday it will be 50-years since the last human footstep was made on our Moon. On 11th December 1972, Apollo 17 arrived on the surface of the Moon. Although 10 Apollo missions were planned to step on our Moon only 6 were made. The last man on the Moon left on 14th December 1972. Eugene Cernan was the astronaut who made that last footprint[1].

This last week, I listened to an online lecture called: “Return to the Moon: “Apollo” for a new generation”. Professor Craig Underwood gave that lecture[2] at Surrey University. He reflected on the success of the Apollo moon landing missions between 1969 and 1972.

Just as he did it gave me cause to reflect on the impact that space adventure had on my boyhood self. Those years from age 9 to 12 must have had a profound impact on not only Eugene Cernan but Professor Underwood and me. We each became electrical engineers.

We became captivated by the unbounded capacity of engineering to change the world around us. It’s true that’s a double-edged sword in that both positive and negative transformations can occur. Notably, we can see that with the current use of airborne drones. On the one hand they can be used to deliver medical supplies on the other hand they can deliver devastation in war.

Here in the UK, we have a lot to thank Gerry Anderson[3] too. The creator of Thunderbirds, Captain Scarlet, Stingray, Joe 90, UFO and Space:1999 had a market impact on both the Professor and me. Colourful fantasy it may have all been, but those stories captured the imagination a generation.

The British TV series UFO and Space:1999 envisioned a permanently stationed Moon base. The leaps of the imagination in the 70s were partly due to the real achievements of the Apollo missions. Maybe it was beyond us to have a working base on the Moon by 1999 but now it’s starting to become a practical possibility.

Today, Sunday, NASA’s Orion capsule arrives home[4]. All being well, the spacecraft will splashdown in the Pacific Ocean after a 3-week trip around the Moon. I wish the project good fortune. 

POST: Sunday 17:40 GMT. The Orion spacecraft, which is to carry astronauts to and from the Moon, has splashed down in the Pacific Ocean after its test flight

[1] https://thelastmanonthemoon.com/

[2] The Institution of Engineering & Technology

[3] https://www.gerryanderson.com/

[4] https://www.nasa.gov/exploration/systems/orion/index.html

Air Safety List 2

It may seem obvious that there should be an Air Safety List that bans airlines that do not sufficiently met international standards. It’s a right that exists within the Chicago Convention[1]. The first words of the convention concern sovereignty. Every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over their airspace. From the first days of flight the potential use of aircraft to wage war was recognised. Thus, it could be said that the first article of the Chicago Convention existed even before it was written down and agreed.

However, it’s similarly recognised that the future development of international civil aviation has always depended upon agreements between States. Without over-flight and permission to land in another country there is no international civil aviation.

I do remember some agonising over having an explicit list of banned countries and airlines. In a liberal democracy choice is greatly valued. Here the choice concerns passengers being permitted to board aircraft from another country where there is knowledge of safety deficiencies related to the operation of the aircraft of that country. Should the law make that choice for the air traveller, or should the air traveller be free to make an informed choice?

There lies the crux of the matter. How do ordinary citizens, without aviation safety expertise make judgements concerning complex technical information? Understanding the implications of failing to meet the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)[2] is not so easy even for aviation experts.

Additionally, there is the issue of third-party risks. It would not be wise to permit foreign aircraft, whose safety is not sufficiently assured, to fly over a nation’s towns and cities.

Regulatory legislation was framed not only to put airlines on the Air Safety List but to take them off the list too. In fact, sometimes this is harder law to frame. In this case the decisions must be made in a fair, transparent, and technically rigorous manner otherwise the politics of such choices could overwhelm the whole process.

There’s been much success in this endeavour. It’s clear that this is a valuable aviation safety measure. It may have driven some contracting States to improve the performance of their airlines.

[1] https://www.icao.int/publications/Pages/doc7300.aspx

[2] https://www.icao.int/safety/CMAForum/Pages/default.aspx

Air Safety List

A long time ago in a far away place. Well, that’s how it seems, and it was more than 17 years ago.

A flight ban was placed on Turkish airline Onur Air back in 2005. At that time, I was in my first full year in Cologne, Germany building up the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). We were well on the road managing the handover of responsibilities from activities of the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) to EASA. However, the European legislation that empowered EASA was in a first and most basic version. This was planned to be so because taking on aircraft certification work was a big enough task to start the new Agency.

The JAA had coordinated an aircraft ramp inspection programme and maintained a centralised database for its members. This was where a member state would inspect an aircraft arriving from a third country to ensure that international rules were fully met. The SAFA programme was launched by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) in 1996. SAFA standing for Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft.

Onur Air failed such inspections, and the Dutch government imposed a flight ban[1]. Similar bans were imposed by Germany, Switzerland, and France. However, if my reflections are correct the airline moved operations to Beligum where there was no ban. As you might imagine this caused concern amongst EU Member States. Where everyone had agreed to cooperate on aviation safety matters there seemed to be a degree of incoherence.

Long before the first EASA Basic Regulation, which by the way, didn’t address this subject, there was Regulation 3922/91[2]. I remember a hastily convened committee composed of representatives of the Member States and chaired by the European Commission (EC). The “3922[3]” committee hadn’t sat for years but then it sprung into action in response to the lack of a consistent approach to airline safety bans across Europe. I was there representing EASA.

So, the EU Air Safety List was born and the associated legislation[4] to support it. Even though the UK has left the EU, and left EASA this safety list remains the basis of the UK’s own Air Safety List[5]. Adding and removing air carriers and States that fail to meet internationally agreed safety standards is work that no one State should do alone.

[For safety’s sake, this should not be one of the parts of adopted EU legislation the UK Parliament wants to sweep away with its planned new Brexit law].

POST: Current list The EU Air Safety List (europa.eu)

[1] https://www.expatica.com/nl/general/dutch-lift-ban-on-onur-air-38258/

[2] Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 of 16 December 1991 on the harmonization of technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation.

[3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ%3AL%3A1991%3A373%3A0004%3A0008%3AEN%3APDF

[4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005R2111&rid=6

[5] https://www.caa.co.uk/commercial-industry/airlines/licensing/requirements-and-guidance/third-country-operator-certificates/

Bird Strike 2

What makes a bird strike different is that it’s an unpredictable collision. If we talk about aircraft collisions with terrain the outcome is predicable bad. All that kinetic energy must go somewhere. So, a high-speed vehicle hitting something that is immovable is not going to end well.

Now, it must be said that some hunting birds can dive at incredible speeds. More typically, a large bird in flight between feeding sites isn’t going to be traveling fast. In fact, it may as well be viewed as a static object relative to an aircraft in flight. A bird in-flight is unlikely to be able to take avoiding action. For a pilot the action of “see and avoid” may work in respect of other aircraft but a bird ahead is no more than a pinprick in the sky.

These factors make aircraft bird strikes inevitable. That said, the range of outcome because of impacts are rarely at the severe end of the scale. One reason for this is the effort made at design certification to ensure an aircraft is sufficiently robust. Damage can occur but if the aircraft design and test processes have been rigorous everyone should get home safely.

I remember paying particular attention to the zonal analysis done by several major manufacturers. In my experience the most difficult designs are for those of business jets and large helicopters. One of the design challenges in both cases is the limited physical real estate within the aircraft structure. Weight is another big consideration. This leads to cramming essential avionics and electrical systems and their interconnections into confined spaces.

Zonal analysis is about ensuring there’s segregation between different systems. Afterall what’s the point of having two Attitude & Heading Reference Systems (AHRSs)[1] and putting them next to each other in the nose cone of an aircraft. That’s not a good design strategy. One damaging impact must not take out two essential independent aircraft systems.

It’s just as important to ensure an aircraft’s wiring isn’t all bundled togther and taken through one connector. That may save money on electrical parts but it’s not going to work after being hit hard by a 5kg goose.

These issues will need particular care in the new electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft that are on the drawing boards. Choosing a safe architecture, manufacturers must balance the use of creative design solutions, to produce a competitive product, with limited physical space.

A couple of key words in the certification requirements concern hazards that are anticipated. Bird Strike is hazardous and aircraft systems and equipment must “perform their intended function” should it occur. See EASA Special Condition for small-category VTOL aircraft, Subpart F[2].

POST: Good to see the bird strike criteria Joby’s airworthiness criteria: A blueprint for the nascent eVTOL industry – Vertical Mag

[1] https://helicoptermaintenancemagazine.com/article/layman%E2%80%99s-guide-attitude-heading-reference-systems-ahrs

[2] https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/SC-VTOL-01.pdf

Bird Strikes

Birds and aircraft share the same airspace. This is not a beneficial relationship for either.

I watched two rather aloof Branta canadensis in our local park the other day. They seemed oblivious to all the other birds on the priory pond. I’d certainly describe these two birds as being well fed. Given their stature and size, they looked formidable. These resident North American visitors are not to be messed with and are only eclipsed by the Swans on Reigate’s pond.

This species of bird has adapted well to living in urban and suburban areas and are frequently found on lakes, ponds, and rivers. I used to see large flocks of them gather on the river Thames. That was only a couple of miles from London Heathrow.

Even though they are numerous in the UK these birds are protected by law (Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981[1]). Today, the population numbers may be as high as 62,000 breeding pairs[2]. Although these birds have the capability to fly great distances they tend to hang around where there’s a reliable source of food. Bird populations are changing their behaviours as a result of climate change.

Geese fly in the typical V-formation which is called a “wedge” or skein. From time to time, I see them fly over my house at a few hundred feet as they move between local lakes and ponds. They are easy to spot and often noisy as they elegantly traverse the sky.

Birds and aircraft share the same airspace. This is not a beneficial relationship for either. Strikes occur around the world every day. In the history of aviation, there have been hundreds of aircraft accidents and more than 47 fatal aircraft accidents caused by bird strikes[3].

It must be said that most bird strikes cause little damage to aircraft but that is highly dependent upon the size of the unfortunate bird and their habits. The story can be very different when an impact is with a Canada goose. Their large size and tendency to fly in flocks can have a devastating impact. On 15 January 2009, a US Airways Airbus A320 aircraft[4] ended up in Hudson River as the result of an encounter with such birds.

The risk of collision between birds and aircraft have always been part of aircraft operations. As a result, measures are taken to certify aircraft to be robust in the event of such collisions. Additionally, there’s a great deal of effort made at major airports to keep birds away from active runways.

Most of the bird threat to aviation safety exists when travelling at speed at relatively low altitudes. Bird strikes happen most often during take-off or landing. This makes me think that bird strikes are going to be a regular feature of the operations of Urban Air Mobility (UAM) / Advanced Air Mobility (AAM). The use of use highly automated aircraft may offer the opportunity to provide sophisticated bird avoidance features. However, so far, I’ve detected no talk of such features.

POST 1: A useful safety booklet Large Flocking Birds (skybrary.aero)

POST 2: A recent Boeing 737-800 serious incident LinkedIn

POST 3: An example of what can happen from 2019 Ural Airlines Flight 178 – Wikipedia

POST 4: Another useful safety booklet Bird strike, a European risk with local specificities, Edition 1 – Germany | SKYbrary Aviation Safety

[1] https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/69

[2] https://www.wildlifetrusts.org/wildlife-explorer/birds/waterfowl/canada-goose

[3] https://www.skybrary.aero/sites/default/files/bookshelf/615.pdf

[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Airways_Flight_1549

Walk the line

Aeronautical products must be certified before entering transport services. Is certification too complex? Is it too expensive and thus a barrier to innovation? Hasn’t deregulation delivered successes since the 1970s? More choice and more aviation services across the globe.

These are perfectly reasonable questions. They are asked frequently. Especially during economically tough times and when new products are pushing to get operational. In answering, it’s all too often a butting of heads that results. Industry puts its point. Authorities put theirs. Commercial reality and public interests settle at some point which leaves the debate on the table for next time.

Walking that line between satisfying the demand of the new and protecting the good safety performance of the aviation system is a perpetual challenge. It goes without saying that we all know what happens when the line is crossed. Textbooks will continue to chew over stories like that of the Boeing 737 MAX development. In fact, the stories of safety lapses are an important part of the learning process that led to aviation’s admirable safety record.

The counter argument is that we are in a new situation and that technology has significantly changed. This argument of the “new” is not new. Every major new step encountered significant hurdles to overcome. Pick-up the story of the development of the Boeing 747[1][2] and it’s a real dramatic page turner. However, the problem remains the same but as much innovative thinking needs to go into certification as the products that are certified. There’s a reason that’s difficult and its called legacy.

On the public’s behalf, how big is the risk appetite of the certification authorities? At the same time how far do the innovators want to push the envelope knowing that liability rest on their shoulders?

What I find inadequate is that when reading reports like “Funding Growth in Aerospace[3]” I find little, or no consideration is given to funding regulatory improvement. Arguments are for product development and little else. It’s as if certification activities are to be blamed for holding up innovations introduction to service but forget any thought of increasing the resources for certification activities.

It’s short-sighted. Believe it or not there is money to be made in testing and validation. There’s money to be made in education and training. These go hand in hand with efforts to exploit innovative products.

[1] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37231980

[2] https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/sep/07/joe-sutter-obituary

[3] https://www.ati.org.uk/publications/

Practicable

I am in two minds. When I see the words: “in so far as practicable” I can think; great, a degree of flexibility. On another occasions when I see the self-same words I think; that’s too vague and indistinct. It can easily circumvent more strict language.

Practicable is a perfectly useful word. The idea that it’s practical to do something and likely to succeed can be a matter of reasoned judgement. However, there lies the crux of the problem. It’s the subjective of that judgement, as to what’s practical and will it succeed, that becomes the possible difficulty.

If there’s a clause in a group’s constitution or working arrangements that says: “in so far as practicable” then it can become open season for someone to avoid a commitment or go their own way. That can be to shoot a big hole in a set of agreed expectations.

A lot depends on where the burden of proof sits. In other words, I may assert that something is not practicable but is it then for someone else to prove me wrong? Or do I have to provide the necessary proof?

There are elements of degree here too. If the assumption is that a judgement can be a snap judgement that’s one thing. However, there may be an assumption that a judgment is based on a rigorous level of analysis and reasoning.

The term “in so far as practicable” is most useful when applied thoughtfully and with honest intent. That the person applying this caveat would work hard to undertake whatever obligation was written and only as a fall back, having been unable to meet an obligation, revert to the use of these words.

Context and circumstances weigh heavily on what is practicable. An easy task on a sunny day can be a nightmare in a thunderstorm. Some legal clauses go as far as “insofar as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances”.

I guess I’m coming around to the wish that the “ALARP” concept (short for “as low as reasonably practicable”) would be sparingly used. ALARP weighs risk mitigation, elimination or reduction against time, trouble, and money. That’s a balancing act where there’s no perfect answer.

ALARP is a basic concept in health and safety law, but it hasn’t caught on in aviation or at least safety of flight. It’s not that aviation is blind to the fact that flight safety can be a priority, but it will never receive infinite time, trouble, and money.

It’s more that with flight there’s always a choice. It’s a “go – no go” choice. If adequate risk mitigation, elimination or reduction is not available the reasonable choice is to stay on the ground.

Luggage

It’s a space we have control over. Not a house or a room but, most often, a volume of space no greater than what we take up in our human frame. It’s not organic. It’s far from that because its role is security, storage and logistical. That’s the humble suitcase, and a great array of bags and backpacks that help us get from A to B with enough possessions to make life comfortable.

The choice of a suitcase or bag is not a trivial matter. Lessons from experience range from bursting zips to leaking contents that turn favourite clothes into damp rags. The challenge of replacing a cabin bag or case takes research and careful weighing of multiple options.

If traveling by air, there are numerous constraints on size and weight. A completely free choice as far as colour is concerned but that’s about the only characteristic that’s an open book. That said, it’s astonishing how many black cases look like other black cases in the array of black cases.

More than a decade ago airlines started charging extra for hold luggage on top of their basic fares. Since then, flying with hand luggage only has become popular. This trend can be troubling. Watching passengers squeeze unreasonably sized bags into overhead bins is not an entertainment. The expectation that an aircraft overhead bin can take a massive bag is not a reasonable one.

My latest purchase has been made from recycled plastic bottles. Naturally, that conveys a fell good factor. It’s a great way to give new life to the huge numbers of discarded single use plastic bottles that somehow we’ve become dependent upon. In my childhood, I don’t remember any plastic bottles. Plenty of glass but no plastics.

For short journeys, the faff of checking-in a suitcase, waiting to collect at a baggage belt and paying additional fees is a burden that is sometimes not worth carrying. There’s always the delightful experience of never seeing the case and its contents again as it wanders off into the maze of lost objects airports accumulate. Etched into my memory, even after more years than I care to think about, is arriving at a small airport after a tortuous journey of connections and having nothing but the clothes I stood up in. On a Sunday, in 35C degrees of bright summer sun that’s not an experience I want to ever repeat. Especially with a tough meeting planned for early the next day. A free airline toothbrush was no compensation.

So, I now have a new Cabin Max Metz 20 litre RPET backpack. This is an experiment on my part. Can I live out of this tiny space for 4-days? To do so is going to require some innovative thinking. In theory, it ticks all the boxes that I was considering essential. This backpack is lightweight but offers the maximum amount of packing space given an airline’s cabin bag restriction.

The plastic material the bag is made of doesn’t feel nice, but it’s flexible and hopefully durable. The zippers look substantial and should have a long life. Now, the task is mine. How to choose exactly the necessities of life to enjoy the journey ahead. To pack as smartly as smart can be.