Category: Regulation

Is Airworthiness dead?

Now, there’s a provocative proposition. Is Airworthiness dead? How you answer may depend somewhat on what you take to be the definition of airworthiness.

I think the place to start is the internationally agreed definition in the ICAO Annexes[1] and associated manuals[2]. Here “Airworthy” is defined as: The status of an aircraft, engine, propeller or part when it conforms to its approved design and is in a condition for safe operation.

Right away we start with a two-part definition. There’s a need for conformity and safety. Some might say that they are one and the same. That is, that conformity with an approved design equals safety. That statement always makes me uneasy given that, however hard we work, we know approved designs are not perfect, and can’t be perfect.

The connection between airworthiness and safety seems obvious. An aircraft deemed unsafe is unlikely to be considered airworthy. However, the caveat there is that centred around the degree of safety. Say, an aircraft maybe considered airworthy enough to make a ferry flight but not to carry passengers on that flight. Safety, that freedom from danger is a particular level of freedom.

At one end is that which is thought to be absolutely safe, and at the other end is a boundary beyond which an aircraft is unsafe. When evaluating what is designated as “unsafe” a whole set of detailed criteria are called into action[3].

Dictionaries often give a simpler definition of airworthiness as “fit to fly.” This is a common definition that is comforting and explainable. Anyone might ask: is a vehicle fit to make a journey through air or across sea[4] or land[5]? That is “fit” in the sense of providing an acceptable means of travel. Acceptable in terms of risk to the vehicle, and any person or cargo travelling or 3rd parties on route. In fact, “worthiness” itself is a question of suitability.

My provocative proposition isn’t aimed at the fundamental need for safety. The part of Airworthiness meaning in a condition for safe operation is universal and indisputable. The part that needs exploring is the part that equates of safety and conformity.

A great deal of my engineering career has been accepting the importance of configuration management[6]. Always ensuring that the intended configuration of systems, equipment or components is exactly what is need for a given activity or situation. Significant resources can be expended ensuing that the given configuration meets a defined specification.

The assumption has always been that once a marker has been set down and proven, then repeating a process will produce a good (safe) outcome. Reproducibility becomes fundamental. When dealing with physical products this works well. It’s the foundation of approved designs.

But what happens when the function and characteristics of a product change as it is used? For example, an expert system learns from experience. On day one, a given set of inputs may produce predicable outputs. On day one hundred, when subject to the same stimulus those outputs may have changed significantly. No longer do we experience steadfast repeatable.

So, what does conformity mean in such situations? There’s the crux of the matter.

[1] ICAO Annex 8, Airworthiness of Aircraft. ISBN 978-92-9231-518-4

[2] ICAO Doc 9760, Airworthiness Manual. ISBN 978-92-9265-135-0

[3] https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-I/subchapter-C/part-39

[4] Seaworthiness: the fact that a ship is in a good enough condition to travel safely on the sea.

[5] Roadworthy: (of a vehicle) in good enough condition to be driven without danger.

[6] https://www.apm.org.uk/resources/what-is-project-management/what-is-configuration-management/

Safety Research

I’ve always found Patrick Hudson’s[1] graphic, that maps safety improvements to factors, like technology, systems, and culture an engaging summary. Unfortunately, it’s wrong or at least that’s my experience. I mean not wholly wrong but the reality of achieving safety performance improvement doesn’t look like this graph. Figure 1[2].

Yes, aviation safety improvement has been as story of continuous improvement, at least if the numbers are aggregated. Yes, a great number of the earlier improvements (1950s-70s) were made by what might be called hard technology improvements. Technical requirements mandated systems and equipment that had to meet higher performance specifications.

For the last two decades, the growth in support for safety management, and the use of risk assessment has made a considerable contribution to aviation safety. Now, safety culture is seen as part of a safety management system. It’s undeniably important[3].

My argument is that aviation’s complex mix of technology, systems, and culture is not of one superseding the other. This is particularly relevant in respect of safety research. Looking at Figure 1, it could be concluded that there’s not much to be gained by spending on technological solutions to problems because most of the issues rest with the human actors in the system. Again, not diminishing the contribution human error makes to accidents and incidents, the physical context within which errors occur is changing dramatically.

Let’s imagine the role of a sponsor of safety related research who has funds to distribute. For one, there are few such entities because most of the available funds go into making something happen in the first place. New products, aircraft, components, propulsion, or control systems always get the lion’s share of funds. Safety related research is way down the order.

The big aviation safety risks haven’t changed much in recent years, namely: controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), loss of control in-flight (LOC-I), mid-air collision (MAC), runway excursion (RE) and runway incursion (RI)[4]. What’s worth noting is that the potential for reducing each one of them is changing as the setting within which aviation operates is changing. Rapid technological innovation is shaping flight and ground operations. The balance between reliance on human activities and automation is changing. Integrated systems are getting more integrated.

As the contribution of human activities reduces so an appeal to culture has less impact. Future errors may be more machine errors rather than human errors.

It’s best to get back to designing in hard safety from day one. Safety related research should focus more on questions like; what does hard safety look like for high levels of automation, including use of artificial intelligence? What does hard safety look like for autonomous flight? What does hard safety look like for dense airspace at low level?

Just a thought.

[1] https://nl.linkedin.com/in/patrick-hudson-7221aa6

[2] Achieving a Safety Culture in Aviation (1999).

[3] https://www.flightsafetyaustralia.com/2017/08/safety-in-mind-hudsons-culture-ladder/

[4] https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a41/Documents/10004_en.pdf

Red Tape

I know. Why explain? When people only hear what they want to hear? On the scale of right-wing political good or bad there are words that can make a slogan to suite any blank page. Shape any mood. Frame a slogan around “tax cuts” and you are at the happy end of the spectrum (blue). Frame a sentence around “red tape” and unhappy faces will appear (red).

My heart sinks when I see British newspaper headlines like: Truss pledges EU red tape bonfire[1]. It’s a celebration of ignorance and pessimism. The politics is crude. It’s kindergarten. Dam the past and paint a picture of gleaming utopia ahead. Comic book stuff. There’s never been a quicker way to appeal to the Conservative Grumpy[2] family.

In earlier articles, I’ve made it clear that 6-years of Brexit has meant more “red tape” rather than less. That is red tape that greatly impacts UK exports, imports, livelihoods, jobs, and prosperity.

For Leavers, the Brexit project was about cutting so called red tape in the belief that administration, laws and rights are the ultimate problems. However, the post-Brexit UK is presenting more complex bureaucracy, producing poorer results at a greater cost than before.

It’s always peculiar when legislators blame legislation for our ills.

When the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) countries worked together, removing trade barriers, and promoting free movement to create a better future. Now, the UK is determined to continue to reverse that good work much to its own detriment. Plainly, we are a country determined to sanction itself. All because it opens the political convenience of being able to blame others.

These years are the topsy-turvy years. A Government that tables a no-confidence vote and then cheers a discredited Prime Minister[3]. A zombie Government then limps on while a few thousand people mull over our future. Ministers boast of their achievements but then dam everything that has gone in the past.

It’s unfortunate but this generation of uncivilised minnows is in charge. At least for the moment.

POST 1: False words compound the problem of understanding. There is no EU “red tape”. The UK left the EU. What we have is UK law. Law made by the politicians that who are damming that law. Yes, parts of UK law have been derived from EU law. That is law that the UK helped make while in the EU.

POST 2: Concerns about the removal of consumer protection are being raised widely. Believe me, you will miss that red tape once it’s gone | Money | The Sunday Times (thetimes.co.uk)

POST 3: The list goes on and on UK chemicals sector hit by £2bn Brexit red tape bill | Financial Times (ft.com)

[1] https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/uknews/uk-leadership-candidate-truss-pledges-to-ditch-all-eu-laws-by-2023/ar-AAZSeN6

[2] My coffee mug is from the Mr Men, Little Miss series (2017).

[3] https://votes.parliament.uk/Votes/Commons/Division/1351

Social media and aviation safety. Part 2.

Reports of aviation accidents and incidents and occurrence reports vary greatly in quantity and quality. Improvements have been made, as legislation has demanded basic data be recorded and retained.

Nevertheless, the one-line narrative is still with us. These reports are frustrating for safety analysts. If a bland statement about an aviation occurrence is received a couple of weeks after an event it can be almost impossible to classify. The good that social media can do is to supplement official information.

In most cases, mobile phone video taken by a passenger or onlooker can be checked for veracity. It needs to have the characteristics that confirm that it was taken at the time and place of the event it depicts. Photographs often have location, picture size, resolution, and device information.

It’s as well to recognise that this work can’t be taken for granted. There is work for aviation safety analysts to do verifying information. Images can be edited by effects that create an exagerated sense of drama.

Image copywrite does have to be considered. Professional photographers make it clear that their work is protected. This is often stamped on the material in some manner.

Impromptu videoing of an aviation incident, that may involve the person taking the video changes its status once its launched on social media. At least that is my understanding of the legal paperwork that few people ever read, namely the common clauses of End-User License Agreements. 

So, advice might be, to try to avoid copyright infringement it’s always a good idea to credit the source of the material used. Using copyed material in good faith is no defence for ignoring ownership.

The pursuit of aviation safety can be argued to be the pursuit of the greater public good. Unfortunately, the lawyers of some newsgathering organisations will not give the time of day to anyone who argues that they are in pursuit of the greater good.

Suprisingly, the subject of who is a press reporter or newsgathering organisation is vague in a lot of national legal frameworks. Protecting free speech is a strong case for not drawing too many boundaries but a complete free for all has a downside as “truth” goes out the window.

On another subject, privacy is a sticky one. Where people are identifiable in randomly taken pcitures or video of accidents and incidents there is currently no protection.

Again, there are questions to be answered in relation to use of social media derived safety information.

NOTE:

Example: Dramatic footage shows firefighters tackling fire on British Airways passenger plane at Copenhagen airport. [Dailymotion embeded video].

An Online Safety Bill in the UK will shake up the regulation of material on-line even if its not designed to address the issue raised in my blog. Online Safety Bill: factsheet – GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

Social media is changing aviation safety

You may ask, how do I sustain that statement? Well, it’s not so difficult. My perspective that of one who spent years, decades in-fact, digging through accident, incident, and occurrence reports, following them up and trying to make sense of the direction aviation safety was taking.

In the 1990s, the growth of digital technology was seen as a huge boon that would help safety professionals in every way. It was difficult to see a downside. Really comprehensive databases, search capabilities and computational tools made generating safety analysis reports much faster and simpler. Getting better information to key decision-makers surely contributed to an improvement in global aviation safety. It started the ball rolling on a move to a more performance-based form of safety regulation. That ball continues to roll slowly forward but the subject has proved to be not without difficulties.

Digging through paper-based reports, that overfilled in-trays, no longer stresses-out technical specialist quite the same as it did. Answers are more accessible and can reflect the real world of daily aircraft operations. Well, that is the theory, at least. As is often the case with an expansion of a technical capability, this can lead to more questions and higher demands for accuracy, coverage, and veracity. It’s a dynamic situation.

Where data becomes public, media attention is always drawn to passenger aircraft accidents and incidents. The first questions are always about what and where it happened. A descriptive narrative. Not long after those questions comes: how and why it happened. The speed at which questions arise often depends on the severity of the event. Unlike road traffic accidents, fatal aviation accidents always command newsprint column inches, airtime, and internet flurries.

Anyone trying to answer such urgent public questions will look for context. Even in the heat of the hottest moments, perspective matters. This is because, thankfully, fatal aviation accidents remain rare. When rare events occur, there can be a reasonable unfamiliarity with their characteristic and implications. We know that knee-jerk reactions can create havoc and often not address real causes.

In the past, access to the safety data needed to construct a context was not immediately available to all commers. Yes, the media often has its “go-to” people that can provide a quick but reliable analysis, but they were few and far between.

This puts the finger on one of the biggest changes in aviation safety in the 2020s. Now, everyone is an expert. The immediacy and speed at which information flows is entirely new. That can be photography and video content from a live event. Because of the compelling nature of pictures, this fuels speculation and theorising. A lot of this is purely ephemeral but it does catch the eye of news makers, politicians, and decision-makers.

So, has anyone studied the impact of social media on developments in aviation safety? Now, there’s a good topic for a thesis.

Safety in numbers. Part 4

In the last 3 parts, we have covered just 2 basic types about failures that can be encountered in any flight. Now, that’s those that effect single systems, and their subsystems and those that impact a whole aircraft as a common effect.

The single failure cases were considered assuming that failures were independent. That is something fails but the effects are contained within one system.

There’s a whole range of other failures where dependencies exist between different systems as they fail. We did mention the relationship between a fuel system and a propulsion system. Their coexistence is obvious. What we need to do is to go beyond the obvious and look for relationships that can be characterised and studied.

At the top of my list is a condition where a cascade of failures ripple through aviation systems. This is when a trigger event starts a set of interconnected responses. Videos of falling dominoes pepper social media and there’s something satisfying about watching them fall one by one.

Aircraft systems cascade failures can start with a relatively minor event. When one failure has the potential to precipitate another it’s important to understand the nature of the dependency that can be hardwired into systems, procedures, or training.

It’s as well to note that a cascade, or avalanche breakdown may not be straightforward as it is with a line of carefully arranged dominos. The classical linear way of representing causal chains is useful. The limitation is that dominant, or hidden interdependencies can exist with multiple potential paths and different sequences of activation.

The next category of failure is a variation on the common-mode theme. This has more to do with the physical positions of systems and equipment on an aircraft. For example, a localised fire, flood, or explosion can defeat built-in redundancies or hardened components.

Earlier we mentioned particular risks. Now, we need to add to the list; bird strike, rotor burst, tyre burst and battery fires. The physical segregation of sub-systems can help address this problem.

Yes, probabilistic methods can be used to calculate likelihood of these failure conditions occurring.

The next category of failure is more a feature of failure rather than a type of failure. Everything we have talked about, so far, may be evident at the moment of occurrence. There can then be opportunities to take mitigating actions to overcome the impact of failure.

What about those aircraft systems failures that are dormant? That is that they remain passive and undetected until a moment when systems activation is needed or there’s demand for a back-up. One example could be just that, an emergency back-up battery that has discharged. It’s then unavailable when it’s needed the most. Design strategies like, pre-flight checks, built-in-test and continuous monitoring can overcome some of these conditions.

Safety in numbers, Part 3

The wind blows, the sun shines, a storm brews, and rain falls. Weather is the ultimate everyday talking point. Stand at a bus stop, start a conversation and it’ll likely be about the weather. Snow, sleet, ice or hail the atmosphere can be hostile to our best laid plans. It’s important to us because it affects us all. It has a common effect.

We started a discussion of common-mode failures in earlier paragraphs. We’ll follow it up here. Aircraft systems employ an array of strategies to address combinations and permutations of failure conditions. That said, we should not forget that these can be swamped by common-mode effects.

Environmental effects are at the top of the list of effects to consider. It’s a basic part of flying that the atmosphere changes with altitude. So, aircraft systems and equipment that work well on the ground may have vulnerabilities when exposed to large variations in temperatures, atmospheric pressure, and humidity.

Then there’s a series of effects that are inherent with rotating machinery and moving components. Vibration, shock impacts and heat all need to be addressed in design and testing.

It is possible to apply statistical methods to calculate levels of typical exposure to environmental effects, but it is more often the case that conservative limits are set as design targets.

Then there are particular risks. These are threats that, maybe don’t happen everyday but have the potential to be destructive and overcome design safety strategies. Electromagnetic interference and atmospheric disturbances, like lightning and electrostatic discharge can be dramatic. The defences against these phenomena can be to protect systems and limit impacts. Additionally, the separation or segregation of parts of systems can take advantage of any built-in redundancies.

Some common-mode effects can occur due to operational failures. The classic case is that of running out of fuel or electrical power. This is where there’s a role for dedicated back-up systems. It could be a hydraulic accumulator, a back-up battery, or a drop-out ram air turbine, for example.

Some common-mode effects are reversable and tolerable in that they don’t destroy systems and equipment but do produce forms of performance degradation. We get into the habit of talking about failure as if they are absolute, almost digital, but it’s an analogue world. There’s a range of cases where adjustments to operations can mitigate effects on aircraft performance. In fact, an aircraft’s operational envelope can be adjusted to ensure that it remains in a zone where safe flight and landing are possible, however much systems are degraded.

Probabilities can play a role in such considerations. Getting reliable data on which to base sound conclusions is often the biggest challenge. Focusing on maintaining a controllable aircraft with a minimum of propulsion, in the face of multiple hazards takes a lot of clear thought.

Identity

Britan was never part of the Schengen Agreement[1]. I get that. In the days when I was commuting backwards and forwards between the UK and Cologne, Germany, I always had to show my British passport. So, although we once had freedom of movement in the European Union (EU) that document was essential to prove identity. Afterall, we do not have Identity cards (ID) in the UK. Even inside the Schengen Area[2] it’s necessary to carry personal identification. I remember being told off by a policeman for not having ID, other than a UK driver’s licence, on a high-speed train on the trip between Cologne and Brussels. He was fine about it, but it was a friendly – don’t do it again.

Generally, British people do travel overseas. Many of us travel for holidays and business, and in Europe, Spain is one of the most popular destinations.

The number of British people holding a British passport could be well over 80%. This is way ahead of Americans, for example[3]. This doesn’t take account of British passports that may have expired or been lost or destroyed. However, the remarkably large number of British people with passports does underline our love of travel.

I came back from a week’s sunshine in Grand Canary on Monday evening. It’s the second time I’ve been through the airport on that island. Entering the spacious modern airport, the first part of the process is relatively easy. Check-in and drop bags were shared with a great number of tired travellers. Even the hand baggage security check was straightforward.

It’s not until the gate number came up, and the long walk to the far end of the terminal was needed did it appear that the British experience was different. The departure gates were in a glass box wrapped around the end of the terminal. To get into the glass box it was necessary to go through passport control.

For those, like me there were electronic passport barriers. The ques there were shorter than the manual checks. The electronic passport barriers worked. However, on the other side of the glass wall was another que and a uniformed official checking passport. After that there was a desk where each passport had to be stamped. So, that’s 3 checks and an official exit stamp.

So, what’s the value of this added bureaucracy post-Brexit? I have no idea. What’s more upon boarding the aircraft for the flight home, the gate staff check passports again. So, that’s 4 inspections of passenger identity. 5 if the check-in desk procedure is included. British passports may have thick cardboard covers, and secure bindings but their strength as an international travel document has diminished since Brexit.

[1] a treaty which led to the creation of Europe’s Schengen Area, in which internal border checks have largely been abolished.

[2] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/pages/glossary/schengen-agreement_en

[3] https://www.newsweek.com/record-number-americans-traveling-abroad-1377787

Caught in the crossfire?

There’s no doubt the relative calm of the beginning of this century, yes, it seems extraordinary to say that has gone and a series of international events confront civil aviation’s way of working. It’s dramatic. In Europe, most countries, and their industries are shifting the way they operate.

Unfortunately, any reasonable observation shows that the situation for aviation is worse in the UK. Well, that is worse than the UK’s former partner States in the European Union (EU).

In times of difficulty partnerships, between counties and in industry help make the absolute most of economies of scale. It’s difficult to plan when constantly firefighting. It’s like that comic story about crocodiles and draining the swam. It’s difficult to think ahead when surrounded by crocodiles.

I agree with the article posted by David Learmount[1]. The massive efforts to achieve international harmonization in aviation regulation, over decades is of incalculable value. I have been lucky enough to work with exceptional people across the globe and played a small part in helping that move along.

In fact, I’d go further than David. I remember, quite a while ago, attending a lecture at the Brooklands Museum[2]. It was about the history of post-war UK Government involvement in aerospace manufacturing[3]. It wasn’t a happy story. It went a bit like a soap opera with technical excellence mixed with commercial incompetence and political interference. The overall lesson was that going it alone, piling on the world beating rhetoric and an inability to forge working alliances spells disaster. Whereas coming together, working cooperatively, and building multinational partnership pays dividends. Airbus being a prime example.

I joined the European Union Aviation Safety Organisation (EASA) as the start of its operation. It was a huge privilege. It was a rare opportunity. I mean, how many people get to set-up a new aviation authority, let alone one that works for so many States in Europe? I was proud that the UK took a leading role in making this venture happen. It was a progression that had been careful and thoughtfully developed and steered over decades.

What we built was a uniquely European solution. It isn’t a federal construction as we see in the United States (US). In Europe, National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) remain a key part of the system. The part that was new in September 2003 was to overcome a major deficiency of earlier cooperative working. That was the unfortunate habit nation States have for saying that’ll do the same thing but then not doing the same thing in practice.

David mentions the tricky subject of UK Additional Requirements for import. This is when the UK demanded a special difference between its aircraft and those of other countries. Often expensive and making it difficult to move aircraft around. I remember some UK Additional Requirements found their way into new European requirements and others were removed. That was a painful transition period. In aviation, technical requirements are often born of experience of accidents and incidents.

Today, the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) works with a set of technical requirements that have been rolled over from the UK’s time as an EASA Member State (2003 – 2021). This presents opportunities to take a new path. Sounds tempting, if only you look at the subject superficially.

International technical standards never stand still. Big players invest resources influencing the direction that they take. Two of the biggest international players in respect of aerospace design and production are EASA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

So, UK CAA is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Unless it can significantly influence the big players the only practical way forward is to adopt what they produce (rules, regulations, standards, guidance material). Now, the UK CAA has considerable technical experience and maintains a high reputation, but it does not sit at all the tables where the major decisions are made.

This is the concern that David mentions in his article. The unnecessary ideological exit from EASA membership, that came with Brexit places the UK in a third-party arrangement. Not good.

It’s not like the world has suddenly become dull. Frantic development efforts and huge sums of money are being pumped into greening aviation. Part of this is the new Advanced Air Mobility (AAM). Part of this is known as Urban Air Mobility (UAM). Aviation folk love acronyms. It’s almost as if we are back at the beginning of the jet-age[4]. We know how that went.

Not surprisingly, the UK wants to achieve successes in this new field of “green” aviation.

Flying is a heavily regulated industry. So, national, regional, and international rulemaking processes matter. They matter a lot. Harmonisation matters a lot. That’s having common rules and regulations to maximise the size of the marketplace while ensuring levels of safety and security are high.

The bureaucratic burden of Brexit costs. It’s not free. The UK duplicates rulemaking activities because it must independently update its laws, all the secondary legislation and guidance material that comes with aviation. When there’s a significant difference between UK, Europe, US, and the rest of the world it makes business more complex. Often that added complexity comes with no discernible benefits (economic, social, safety, security, or environmental).

The UK should become an EASA Member State once again. Why not? Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and Lichtenstein are not in the EU but are EASA Member States. Across the globe countries follow EASA rules as they are known to deliver the best results.

[1] https://davidlearmount.com/2022/06/17/uk-aviation-caught-in-the-crossfire/

[2] https://www.brooklandsmuseum.com/

[3] https://www.aerosociety.com/media/8257/government-and-british-civil-aerospace-1945-64.pdf

[4] https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/comets-tale-63573615/

Ash Legacy

12-years have elapsed since an Icelandic volcano’s eruption led to the shutting down of airspace in Europe. Travel chaos resulted, large sums of money were lost, and confidence was shaken. Many, like me, in the aviation world, quickly learnt more about volcanic ash than we ever dreamed possible.

Strangely enough the question: can commercial airline travel disruption be fixed for the summer? Is now doing the rounds. Again, the reason for this question is the consequence of an event that goes way beyond the boundaries of any one country, namely the COVID-19 pandemic. After the troublesome events of early 2010 there was a lot of talk about increasing the resilience of aviation. Now, the subject has come around again. The hot topic is how do we bring people together in this interconnected globe after a major shock to the travel industry?

The UK’s TV Channel 5 has a strong track record of screening documentaries about volcanos. Its audience must really like the drama and scariness of these earthly monsters. Channel 5’s latest offering is the story of the volcanic ash cloud that dominated European skies in 2010[1].

Explosive volcanic eruptions eject pyroclastic fragmented materials, and this case was one of those cases. The lightest material, the volcanic ash, can be carried great distances as we all found out. Volcanic ash has the potential to impact just about every aspect of flying. Close in it’s the aerodromes that get hit. Up in the air there can be effects on aircraft structure, systems, and aircraft engines. Melting ash in the hot section of a jet engine is something to be avoided. It’s not just aircraft engines since ash can abrades and damages parts of aircraft structure, such as cockpit windows, leading edges, paint, antennas, probes and, angle of attack vanes.

Channel 5’s documentary assumed ash was bad. It didn’t explain. It focused more on the experience of travellers and those managing the airspace over the UK. However, it did go into the 1982 incident when a Boeing 747’s engines all stopped after it flew through a dense volcanic ash cloud.

The documentary was right in that Europe was unprepared for volcanic ash clouds of the scale generated by Iceland’s volcanos. One of the problems during the April/May 2010 eruption was that the London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC)[2] computer model was a single source of flight planning data. There was found to be an urgent need for ground and airborne measurement of the actual densities of volcanic ash. Also, the greater use and interpretation of satellite images came into play.

Overall, the 85-minute documentary was enjoyable viewing showing some of what happened. It gave a snapshot from the point of views of both travellers and a few of those trying to resolve the crisis.

I remember that this event was a genuinely high-pressure multidisciplinary problem to solve. It isn’t every day that volcanologists, meteorologists, regulators, researchers, pilots, controllers, and engineers all get around a table. Especially when politicians, industry leaders and the media are all vying for the public spotlight. The outcome, if heeded, should be a much better response to a future airspace crisis.

[1] https://www.channel5.com/show/ash-cloud-the-week-the-world-stopped

[2] https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/services/transport/aviation/regulated/vaac/index