Flying – Page 8 – John Vincent

H2 is difficult

I mentioned Hydrogen as an option for aviation. The use of Hydrogen to either power jet engines or to power fuel cells to provide electricity is a real technical option. Although the person I was talking to was engaged in environmental work, they shrugged their shoulders when I mentioned Hydrogen. They were certainly not impressed by these possibilities despite our agreement on the urgent need for de-carbonisation.

I can understand why there’s a level of cynicisms. On my part, it’s like the X-Files[1]. Fox Mulder was the believer and Dana Scully the sceptic. Broadly, I want to believe.

Today’s, liquid fuels can be explosive in certain conditions. However, it takes a considerable effort to create the conditions whereby a devastating explosion can occur. The Boeing 747-100 that was Trans World Airlines Flight 800 (TWA 800)[2] exploded, broke up in the air and fell into the Atlantic Ocean in 1996. This was an example of a worst-case scenario. 230 people were lost in that fatal accident. Now, the ignition of a flammable fuel/air mixture in aircraft tanks is better prevented by design and operational procedures.

If Hydrogen is to be viable in civil aviation such hazardous conditions will be harder to prevent. A flammable hydrogen/air mixture can be ignited much more easily than conventional liquid fuels. Such dangerous situations can be prevented but the measure to do so will require robust design and stringent operational procedures.

Several development programmes are underway, making practical Hydrogen powered aircraft viable. A range of aircraft configurations are possible. From hybrid generator and electric motor set-ups to combustion-based propulsion. This work is moving from academic research into commercial possibilities.

There little read across between the behaviour of conventional hydrocarbon liquid fuels and liquid Hydrogen. This would be evident in any serious incident or accident scenario. Let us imagine the case of British Airways Flight 38, in 2006, a Boeing 777-236 that came down at the end of a runway at London Heathrow[3]. A significant amount of fuel leaked from the aircraft after it came to rest, but there was no fire. There were no fatalities.

The breakup of liquid Hydrogen tanks or plumbing in such a scenario would almost certainly result in a significant fire. The mitigating impact of that fire is the lightness of the gas. Instead of liquid fuel pooling on the ground, Hydrogen would burn upward. However, any explosion could be devastating.

So, for large aircraft design the provisions to protect liquid Hydrogen tanks and plumbing must be extensive and extremely robust. This would have to be maintained, as such throughout the whole operational life of the aircraft. These requirements would be onerous.

Keeping crew and passengers well away from Hydrogen infrastructure will be a must.

POST 1: Crashworthiness doesn’t get much of a look-in. Without it there’s going to be a problem over the horizon. https://www.ati.org.uk/flyzero-reports/

POST 2: At least for eVTOL aircraft some work is being done. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10011735

[1] https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0106179/

[2] https://www.history.com/news/twa-flight-800-crash-investigation

[3] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422ec32e5274a13170000ed/S1-2008_G-YMMM.pdf

Local air

There are cases of synergy. That’s where aviation and local authorities have a mutual interest. This often centres around the economic prosperity of an area. Relationships can be complex, difficult, and fraught with volatility. There are plenty of housing and industrial estates that cover the ground of former airfields. Like the railways that closed under Beeching’s axe[1].

Public interest was dominant 50-years ago, but privatisation dramatically changed relationships. Sustaining profitability through good times and bad have proven to be more than some locations could support. There’s so many combinations and permutations but fewer and fewer active commercial airfields in the UK.

London Manston Airport is an airport that only just clings on to existence. In 2013, the Welsh Government acquired Cardiff Airport. So, some aviation facilities have returned to public ownership and run as an arm’s length business. A few airports are given support to ensure connections exists between remote parts of the UK. Highlands and Islands Airports is an example.

Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) is coming. This is the extensive use of electric vertical take-off and landing aircraft (eVTOLs). AAM is an innovative concept that will require Vertiports and integration into busy airspace. To make the economics work a lot of routes will be in, and over urban areas.

My view is that AAM will only succeed in the UK if aviation and local authorities come together and embrace it. That is going to be a massive challenge whatever national government does.

In the case of local authorities with a mission of protecting the interests of residents this has often meant objecting to aviation developments. I go back to proposals of 30-years ago to make Redhill Aerodrome a feeder to London Gatwick Airport[2]. This was well and truly shot down by local interests. In fact, rightly so given the complex twists and turns it would have made in the airspace.

AAM needs the harmonisation of standards to ensure interoperability anywhere in the country. There are one or two UK local authorities that are already embracing the potential opportunities of this new form of flying. Coventry City Council is taking on the challenge[3]. It’s welcoming the development of the ground infrastructure for “air taxis” and delivery drones.

By the way, my view is that introducing the subject as “flying cars” or “air taxis” is not a good idea. This creates images from science fiction that may not resemble the reality of these new air services.

[1] https://www.networkrail.co.uk/who-we-are/our-history/making-the-connection/dr-beechings-axe/

[2]https://john-w-vincent.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/bf3ec-clear_for_take_off.pdf

[3] https://www.coventry.gov.uk/news/article/4232/world-first-hub-for-flying-taxis-air-one-opens-in-coventry-uk-heralding-a-new-age-of-zero-emission-transport

Weight

Projects aiming to electrify aviation are numerous. This is one strand to the vigorous effort to reduce the environmental impact of civil aviation. Clearly, feasible aircraft that do not use combustion are an attractive possibility. This step shows signs of being practical for the smaller sizes of aircraft.

Along the research road there are several hurdles that need to be overcome. One centres around the source of airborne power that is used. State-of-the-art battery technology is heavy. The combinations of materials used, and the modest power densities available result in the need for bulky batteries.

For any vehicle based on electric propulsion a chief challenge is not only to carry a useful load but to carry its own power source. These issues are evident in the introduction of electric road vehicles. They are by no means insurmountable, but they are quite different from conventional combustion engineered vehicles.

The density of conventional liquid fuels means that we get a big bang for your buck[1]. Not only that but as a flight progresses so the weight of fuel to be carried by an aircraft reduces. That’s two major pluses for kerosene. The major negative remains the environmental impact of its use.

Both electricity and conventional liquid fuels have a huge plus. The ground infrastructure needed to move them from A to B is well understood and not onerously expensive. It’s no good considering an aircraft design entirely in isolation. Any useful vehicle needs to be able to be re-powered easily, not too frequently and without breaking the bank[2].

Back to the subject of weight. It really is a number one concern. I recall a certain large helicopter design were the effort put into weight reduction was considerable. Design engineers were rushing around trying to shave-off even a tiny fraction of weight from every bit of kit. At one stage it was mooted that designers should remove all the handles from the avionics boxes in the e-bay of the aircraft. That was dismissed after further thought about how that idea would impact aircraft maintenance. However, suppliers were urged think again about equipment handling.

This extensive exercise happened because less aircraft weight equated to more aircraft payload. That simple equation was a massive commercial driver. It could be the difference between being competitive in the marketplace or being overtaken by others.

Aviation will always face this problem. Aircraft design is sensitive to weight. Not only does this mean maximum power at minimum weight, but this mean that what power that is available must be used in the most efficient manner possible.

So, is there a huge international investment in power electronics for aviation? Yes, it does come down to semiconductors. Now, there’s a lot of piggybacking[3] from the automotive industries. In my view that’s NOT good enough. [Sorry, about the idiom overload].

[1] https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/bang-for-the-buck

[2] https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/break-the-bank

[3] https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/piggybacking

Safety is poltical

It’s a surprisingly controversial statement. It’s particularly difficult for those working in traditionally technical specialisations to come to openly acknowledge “politics” in their work. By raising the subject, it’s almost as if one had stepped in something unpleasant.

I recall the period when a new aviation agency was being established. That’s in the dawn of this new century. EASA, the European Aviation Safety Agency came into operation in 2003, but the debate about its shape and form occupied many of the preceding years. Politicians, administrators, technocrats, and industry were vocal about the direction to take.

The impact of liberalising European civil aviation, that stated in the 1970s, was primarily a political drive. It envisaged both a commercial and social benefits. Separating the operation of aviation from the vagaries of political personalities seemed to offer a future that would be led by the customers needs.

The general acceptance that State control of businesses, like airlines and manufacturers, had a stifling effect, limiting innovation and opportunity was questioned but not so much by those with the power to make changes. Momentum pushing liberalisation was given a boost by the apparent successes of businesses, like Southwest airlines[1] in the US. Freddie Laker had a big influence in the UK[2].

In these decades of transformation aviation safety has always been heralded as a priority. Whoever is speaking, that’s the line that is taken. Safety is number one. What industry has experienced is a decades long transition from the ways and mean of trying to control safety to an approach more based on managing potential outcomes. This is characterised in a shift from mostly prescriptive rules and regulations to other more adaptive approaches.

Back to the proposition that safety is political. There are several ways to address this as an exercise of analysis. There’s a mammoth amount of historical evidence to draw upon. However, my thoughts are more to do with anecdote and lived experience.

Number one is that our institutions are shaped by political decision-making. This is to varying degrees, from year to year, but international bodies, national ministries, administration, authorities, agencies, committees, learned bodies, all depend upon political support. If they do not muster and sustain this support, they will wither and die.

Number two, change is a constant, failures happen but safety achievement depends on a consistency, dependability, and stability. Maintaining public confidence. There lies a dissonance that must be reconciled. Governments and politicians instinctively insulate themselves in such cases and so the notion of “independent” regulation is promoted.

Number three, arguments for liberalisation or intervention do not stop. The perpetual seesaw of cutting “red tape” and tightening rules and regulation may settle for a while even if these are always in movement. This can be driven by events. The proximity of fatal accidents is always a significant political driver. Domestic fatalities, where consequences are borne locally, will have much more impact than similar events 1000 miles away.

Does any of this matter? Afterall it’s a context that exists, de-facto. It’s no good saying: stop the world I want to get off.

Yes, it does matter. Accepting that safety is political helps dispel some of the myths that persist.

A prerequisite to safety success is provision of adequate resources. Constantly cutting a budget has consequences. A blind drive for efficiency that doesn’t effectively measure performance invites failure. Much as lack of planning invites failure. Reality bites.

It’s reasonable to question of investigatory or regulatory “independence” from time-to-time. The reasons for safety decision-making can be purely objective and technical. Questioning that “purity” need not be impugning politicians, administrators, or managers in their motivations. Shedding light on contextual factors can help learning and avoidance of future failures.

Accepting the perpetual political seesaw of debate can help a great deal in meeting safety goals. What this means is the importance of timing. Making a proposal to tighten a rule concerning a known deficiency can meet a stone wall. Making the same proposal after an accident, involving that deficiency, can go much better. Evidence that is compelling can change minds. This is reality.

[1] https://www.southwest.com/about-southwest/#aboutUs

[2] https://simpleflying.com/laker-airways-brief-history/

UAP

….none of us are familiar with the variety in shape and size of flying machines currently being designed and developed for general use

There was a time when anyone raising the issue of the potential for an asteroid to send humans back to the stone age was mocked and derided. Anyone bringing apparent sci-fi plots into Parliament was jeered. Now, the subject is studied with intensity and considerable resources. The probabilities of Near-Earth Object[1] (NEO) impact is calculated, and small asteroid and comet orbits are monitored in detail.

Really bad films, like the one starring Bruce Willis have a lot to answer for. That space between fiction and reality gets filled with more than a few eccentrics and conspiracy theories. Trouble is that gives you, and me licence to smirk anytime cosmic occurrences come into discussion.

I must admit I like the term Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) better than UFO. They are airborne phenomena, they are unidentified until we know better, and they are anomalous. Although, most reports are attributed to things that are known, even if they are rare events. Some are pooly reported and only scant evidence is avialable.

Discovering all there is to know about such airborne phenomena is a matter of both safety and security. However remote it might seem, part of this is the safety of aircraft in flight. I know of no examples of extra-terrestrial objects colliding with aircraft but it’s not impossible. I’m reminded of that classic picture of a bullet hitting a bullet in-flight and fusing together. It’s from the Battle of Gallipoli.

We might be entering a new era of transparency in the scientific study of UAP. This is a wholly good thing and highly necessary given the coming expansion in the number of air vehicles in flight. If Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) is going to do anything, it’s going to led to an increase in aviators and public reports. For one, none of us are familiar with the variety in shape and size of flying machines currently being designed and developed for general use. It’s likly that red and green lights moving through the sky at night is going to prompt public reports of the “unknown”.

Perspective plays a part too. A small drone close can look like a large airship at distance. As environmental conditions change so the perception of airborne objects can change dramatically. So, what we might observe and confidently attribute to be a drone or helicopter or aircraft in-flight is not always definitive. Applying disciplined scientific analysis to the data that is available has benefits.

Given that our airspace is likely to become ever more crowded, NASA’s study[2] of UAP has much merit. Recognising that resources are needed for this work is a lesson most nations need to learn. We can sit on our hands or giggle at the more ridiculous interpretations of observations, but this kind of reporting and analysis will be advantageous to aviation safety and security. It’s part of giving the public confidence that nothing unknown, unmanaged or uncontrolled is going on abover their heads too.

POST: UFOs: Five revelations from Nasa’s public meeting – BBC News

[1] https://neo.ssa.esa.int/home

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bQo08JRY0iM

Happy Birthday EASA

Happy Birthday EASA. 20 years is a good age

For me, it was a peculiar day in July. It was a baking hot Brussels. The sun beat down and the city’s trams were full of sweaty travellers. The interview room was a classic board room style. Modern office, heavy polished wooden table, and heavy black leather chairs. On a hot bright sunny summer day that was not a pleasing formula for a formal interview.

I was surprised at the result. I got the job. A moment in July 2004 became a pivotal moment in my aviation career. Not quite 20-years ago. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)[1] was already up and running in a shared office in a Brussels suburb. It was the bare bones of an organisation in the process of a rapid build-up. Discussion about the locations of the Agency’s eventual headquarters were concluding.

That kicked-off my 11-years in Cologne. I arrived in the city when the tower building was being constructed and as the staff had just moved from Brussels to take up the new headquarters. It was December 2004. Offices, on the 6^th floor of the main building were buzzing. The Agency was small in numbers and running fast to fulfil its new responsibilities.

European aviation safety regulation was going through a major change. Up until September 2003, Europe’s National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) acted as a partnership within the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)[2]. A body of rules and regulations and ways of working had been harmonised. However, because of the “club” like nature of the JAA there remained unresolved disagreements, incontinences, and a confusing representation at international level.

The legislation that called for the formation of EASA was set to unify aircraft certification and rulemaking activities and drive a consistency in the application of standards across Europe. It was the start of a long road to build world-class civil aviation safety regulator. It worked.

I experienced the first decade in Cologne. The storming and norming. The extensions of remit and turbulent days when we were finding our way. Several tragic fatal accidents and a least one Europe wide crisis. Now, the Agency is about to start its third decade.

EASA is undisputed as the European organisation that talks to the international aviation community. It works in lockstep with the European Commission. It is an achievement to be celebrated.

Yes, I find it sad that the UK is no longer a member of the Agency. But that doesn’t stop National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) working together in a constructive and positive manner[3]. There’s much to be gained from avoiding the fragmentation and conflicts of the past.

Happy Birthday EASA. 20 years is a good age.

[1] What’s #EASA’s story? See what we have achieved in 20 years https://www.easa.europa.eu/…/looking-back-move-forward…

[2] https://jaato.com/start/

[3] https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/domains/international-cooperation/easa-by-country

Don Bateman

At the start of the jet-age, changes in aircraft design and the improvement of maintenance procedures made a significant improvement in aviation safety. One set of accidents remain stubbornly difficult to reduce. This is the tragic case where a perfectly airworthy aircraft is flown into the ground or sea. Clearly the crew, in such cases had no intention to crash but never-the-less the crash happens. Loss of situation awareness, fixation on other problems or lack of adherence to standard operating procedures can all contribute to these aircraft accidents. So often these are fatal accidents.

One strategy for reducing accidents, where there is a significant human factor, is the implementation of suitable alerting and warning systems in the cockpit. It could be said that such aircraft systems support the vigilance of the crew and thus help reduce human error.

For decades the number one fatal accident category was Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT). It always came top of global accident analysis reports. Pick up a book on the world’s major civil aircraft crashes since the 1960s and there will be a list of CFIT accidents. By the way, this term CFIT is an internationally agreed category for classifying accidents[1]. 20-years ago, I was part of a team that managed these classifications.

When I started work on aircraft certification, in the early 1990s, the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) already existed. A huge amount of work had been done since the 1970s defining and refining a set of protection envelopes that underpinned cockpit warnings aimed at avoiding CFIT.

UK CAA Specification 14 on GPWS dates from 1976[2]. This safety equipment had been mandated in many countries for certain types of public transport aircraft operation. It was by no means fitted to all aircraft and all types of aircraft operation. This was highlighted when an Air Inter AIRBUS A320 crashed near Strasbourg, in France in January 1992[3].

No alerting or warning system is perfect. GPWS had been successful in reducing the number of CFIT accidents but there were still occurrences where the equipment proved ineffective or was ignored.

I first met Don Bateman[4] on one of his whistles-stop tours presenting detailed analysis of CFIT accidents and the latest versions of the GPWS. At that time, he was working for the company Sundstrand[5], based in Redmond in Washington State, US. It was a time when Enhanced GPWS (EGPWS)[6] was being promoted. This version of the equipment had an added capability to address approaches to runways where the classic GPWS was known to give false results. False alerts and warnings are the enemy of any aircraft system since they reduce a crew’s confidence in its workings.

My role was the UK approval of the systems and equipment. Over a decade the industry moved from a basic GPWS to EGPWS to what we have now, Terrain Avoidance and Warning Systems (TAWS).

When I think of Don Bateman’s contribution[7], there are few people who have advanced global aviation safety as much as he did. His dedication to driving forward GPWS ensured the technology became almost universal. Consequently, there must be a large number of lives saved because of the CFIT accidents that did not happen.

He left no doubt as to his passion for aviation safety, was outstandingly professional and a pleasure to work with on every occasion. This work was an example of a positive and constructive partnership between aviation authorities and industry. We need more of that approach.

POST 1: Don Bateman Saved More Lives Than Anyone in Aviation History | Aviation Pros

POST 2: Don Bateman, ‘Father’ Of Terrain Awareness Warning Systems, Dies At 91 | Aviation Week Network

[1] https://www.intlaviationstandards.org/Documents/CICTTStandardBriefing.pdf

[2] https://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CASPEC14.PDF

[3] https://reports.aviation-safety.net/1992/19920120-0_A320_F-GGED.pdf

[4] https://www.invent.org/inductees/c-donald-bateman

[5] https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=19930125&slug=1681820

[6] https://aerospace.honeywell.com/us/en/pages/enhanced-ground-proximity-warning-system

[7] https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/safety-ops-regulation/don-bateman-father-terrain-awareness-warning-systems-dies-91

Ban

Some policies are directly targeted to fix a problem, other policies maybe aimed at indicating a direction of travel. I think the measures in France to ban domestic flights on short routes is the later.

Internal routes that can be flown in less than two-and-a-half hours, are prohibited[1]. That can be done because high-speed rail transport offers a means of connecting certain French cities.

The calculation being that greenhouse gas emissions will be reduced by this control. There had been many calls for even stricter restrictions on flying in France. Lowering carbon emissions is a priority for many European governments. Sovereignty is primary in this respect. A State can take measures to control domestic flying much more readily than they can internationally. Connecting flights will not be changed by this new legislation.

High-speed trains do take passengers from airlines and take cars off the roads. Where a mature rail network exists, there are significant benefits in focusing on rail transport between cities. Often rail and air are complementary, with major high-speed rail stations at airports.

Given the rhetoric surrounding the “climate emergency” these restrictions are a modest measure that will make only a small difference to carbon emissions. The symbolism is significant. It’s a drive in a transport policy direction that may go further in time and other States may do the same.

Flying between Paris and Lyon doesn’t make much sense when a good alternative is available. Flying between London and Birmingham doesn’t make much sense either. However, changes like these need to be data-driven transformations. There needs to be a measure reduction in greenhouse gas emissions because of their implementation. For example, displacing travellers onto the roads would be a negative outcome.

The imperative of greenhouse gas emission reduction means creative and new measure will happen. It’s far better for aviation to adapt to this framework of operations rather than push back. The direction of travel is set.

[1] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65687665

Working hard for the money

What goes wrong with research spending? It’s a good question to ask. In some ways research spending is like advertising spending. “Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the trouble is I don’t know which half.[1]” Globally billions are spent on advertising so you might say – it must be working. In fact, far more is spent on advertising than is ever available for research in the aviation and aerospace world.

Research spending is a precious asset because of its bounds. Even so, a great deal of research spending is lost on activities that deliver no or little benefit. It’s true Governments, institutions and industry don’t often put-up funds for vague and imprecise aspirations or outlandish predictions but nevertheless money goes down a sink hole on far too many occasions.

A reluctance to take tough decisions or at the other extreme of the spectrum a relish in disruption plagues research funding decision making. Bad projects can live long lives and good projects get shut down before their time. My observations are that these are some of the cases that crop-up all too often across the world.

Continuing to service infrastructure that cost a great deal to set-up. It’s the classic problem of having spent large sums of money on something and thereby the desperation to see a benefit encourages more spending. Nobody likes to admit defeat or that their original predictions were way off the mark.

Circles of virtue are difficult to address. For example, everyone wants to see a more efficient and sustainable use of valuable airspace therefore critics of spending towards that objective are not heard. That is even if substantial spending is misdirected or hopelessly optimistic.

Glamourous and sexy subjects, often in the public limelight, get a leg-up when it come to the evaluation of potential research projects. Politicians love press photographs that associate them with something that looks like a solution in the public mind. Academics are no different in that respect.

Behold unto the gurus! There’s conferences and symposiums where ideas are hammered home by persuasive speakers and charismatic thinkers. Amongst these forums there are innovative ideas but also those that get more consideration than they warrant.

Narrow focused recommendations can distort funding decision making. With the best of intent an investigation or study group might highlight a deficiency that needs work, but it sits in a distinct niche of interest. It can be a push in direction the opposite of a Pareto analysis[2].

Highlighting these points is easier than fixing the underlying problems. It’s a good start to be aware of them before pen and ink meets, and a contract is signed.

[1] statement on advertising, credited to both John Wanamaker (1838-1922) and Lord Leverhulme (1851-1925).

[2] https://asq.org/quality-resources/pareto

Who’s in control?

The subject of artificial intelligence (AI) in an aircraft cockpit stirs-up reactions that are both passionate and pragmatic. Maybe, it’s a Marmite issue[1]. Mention of the subject triggers an instant judgement.

Large passenger transport civil aircraft are flown by two human operators. Decisions are made by those two human operators. They are trained and acquire experience doing the job of flying. A word that has its origins in the marine world is used to describe their role – pilot.

One of my roles, early on in my career, was to lead the integration of a cockpit display system into a large new helicopter[2]. New, at the time. The design team, I was part of comprised of people with two different professional backgrounds. One had an engineering background, like me, and the other had qualification associated with psychology. The recognition that an aircraft cockpit is where the human and machine meet is not new. A lot of work was done in simulation with flight crews.

The first generation of jet aircraft put the pilot in full-time command. It’s as we moved from purely mechanical interactions with aircraft, the balance of flight control has been shared between pilot and aircraft systems. There’s no doubt, in the numbers, that this has improved aviation safety.

Nobody is calling for the removal of aircraft autopilot systems. Much of the role of the formerly required flight engineer has been integrated into the aircraft systems. Information is compressed and summarised on flat screen displays in the aircraft cockpit.

Today, AI is not just one thing. There’s a myriad of different types and configurations, some of which are frozen and some of which are constantly changing as they learn and grow. That said, a flawless machine is a myth. Now, that’s a brave statement. We are generations away from a world where sentient machines produce ever better machines. It’s the stuff of SiFi.

As we have tried to make ever more capable machines, failures are a normal part of evolution. Those cycles of attempts and failures will need to lead into the billions and billions before human capabilities are fully matched. Yes, I know that’s an assertion, but it has taken humans more than a million years to get to have this discussion. That’s with our incredible brains.

What AI can do well is to enhance human capabilities[3]. Let’s say, of all the billions of combinations and permutations, an aircraft in flight can experience, a failure that is not expected, not trained, and not easily understood occurs. This is where the benefits and speed of AI can add a lot. Aircraft system using AI should be able to consider a massive number of potential scenarios and provide a selection of viable options to a flight crew. In time critical events AI can help.

The road where AI replaces a pilot in the cockpit is a dead end. The road where AI helps a pilot in managing a flight is well worth pursuing. Don’t set the goal at replacing humans. Set the goal at maximising the unique qualities of human capabilities.

[1] https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/marmite_2

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AgustaWestland_AW101

[3] https://hbr.org/2021/03/ai-should-augment-human-intelligence-not-replace-it