Security – Page 5 – John Vincent

Electrics & Mechanics

Yesterday, I wrote on LH2. The potential fuel for electric aircraft of any size. Yes, I’m not just talking about smaller commuter class transport aircraft.

Let me take some anecdotal evidence from the transition that is going on in road transport. Repairer turns up to fix an electric car that will not start. It’s a simple matter given that the car has been standing unused for a long time. The battery had discharged. A quick charge from another battery pack and all is well. Meantime in conversation it’s clear that the repairer hates working on electric cars. I could say, no surprise, they were trained on combustion engines and have been forced to make a transition in technology.

What’s evident here is the apprehension of a person who likely has a mechanical bias towards their work and the necessity to take on fixing powerful electrics. Mechanics, those who love working with moving parts, often have a dislike of electrics and electronics. It’s an engineer’s “feeling” expressed to me casually over the last 40-years.

In fact, it can be the reason that a design or maintenance engineer took the career path that they did. There is a dividing line between mechanical engineers and electrical engineers that is embedded in our institutional, educational, and training systems.

So, there’s two practical human issues to grapple with in a transition:

Propensity of one branch of technically capable people to find mechanical work less fearsome and more satisfying than electrics or electronics, and
Streaming that is embedded in our institutional, educational, and training systems. Qualifications and recognition are often not so multi-disciplinary focused.

I’m not for one single moment making a luddite argument that mechanical engineers[1] and electrical engineers[2] are two tribes that must be kept apart. Far from it. What’s more important is to recognise that transitions are hard.

New electric aircraft are going to demand technical people with a multiplicity of both mechanical and electrical knowledge. The way the engineering world has been divided up in the past doesn’t cut it. Some of our most cherished niches will need to be challenged.

Transitions of this nature always take much longer than is originally anticipated. In a way, that should be such a surprise. It’s a generational change for a community that can be conservative with a small “c”.

This is NOT business as usual. For example, handling powerful 1000-volt electric technology is not for everyone. Removing and replacing cryogenic plumbing is, again, not for everyone. The hazards are clear. The skills needed are clear.

Reorienting the aircraft maintenance engineering world is going to need new plans and programmes. Better start by enthusing people about the change rather than just forcing it.

[1] https://www.imeche.org/

[2] https://www.theiet.org/

Hydrogen in Aviation

The potential for LH2 (liquid hydrogen) is enormous. That’s matched by the logistical and technical difficulties in exploiting this gas’s great potential. It offers energy for a means of propulsion that is nowhere near as environmentally damaging as existing means.

Society already integrates hazardous liquids and gases into everyday life. Each one has been through several iterations. It has been a rollercoaster. Each one has been at the root of disasters, at one time or another.

We use gas for cooking and heating in domestic settings. Periodically explosions demolish buildings. Leaks cannot be ignored. Harm can be done.
We use light and heavy oils widely in transport systems. Periodically intense fires burn vehicles. Care in handling is essential. Harm can be done.

Without having to say it, both above harm the environment. The search for non-CO2 emitting ways of flying is urgent. Here, I’m writing about harm to people. Physical harm. The business of aviation safety.

Often the physical harm is not associated with the design of the systems used but to the maintenance of those systems. Naturally, there was a learning curve. If we look at early versions of those systems, fatal accidents and incidents were far more regular. So, here’s the challenge for aviation. How do we skip the dangers of the early learning phase? How do we embed rigorous maintenance practices from day one? Big questions.

On the first one of these, lots of fine minds are engaged in putting together standards and practices that will address good design. If this works, and it will be tested extensively, the chance opens for introduction to service with a great deal of confidence that the main risks will be managed.

On the second of these, there’s not much happening. You might say there’s an element of chicken and egg. The shape and form of future LH2 systems needs much more work before we can think deeply about how they will be maintained.

I think that’s wrong. It’s old-fashioned thinking. As the industry has often practiced, making the systems first and then devising ways of maintaining them while in-service. That’s yesterday’s reasoning.

Making aviation system maintenance the Cinderella in the LH2 world is to invite failure. This is a situation where advancing the consideration of how the in-service realm could work, day by day, is necessary. It’s advantageous.

Here’s my reasons.

There are generic approaches that can be tested without knowing the detailed design. That can take existing learning from other industries, like chemical and space industries, and consider their application in aviation.
Emerging technologies, like machine learning, coupled with large scale modelling can provide ways of simulating the operational environment before it exists. Thereby rapidly testing maintenance practices in a safe way.
It’s imperative to start early given the mountain that needs to be climbed. This is particularly true when it comes to education and training of engineers, flight crew, airport and logistics staff and even administrators.

Everyone wants to accelerate environmentally sustainable solutions. When they do get to be in-service, they will be there for decades. Thus, an investment, now, in study of maintenance systems will pay dividends in the longer term. Remember, early fatal accidents and incidents can kill otherwise sound projects or at least put them back on the drawing board for a long time.

NOTE 1: I didn’t mention Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). It’s in the mix. Another CO2 contributor. LPG containers have pressure relief valves. LH2 containers will likely have pressure relief valves too. That said, venting LPG is a lot more environmentally damaging than LH2. From a safety perspective they can both create explosive conditions in confined spaces. Maintenance staff may not need to carry a canary in a cage, but they will certainly need to carry gas detectors when working on LH2 powered aircraft. Our noses will not do the job.

NOTE 2: Events on the subject: https://www.iata.org/en/events/all/iata-aviation-energy-forum/

https://events.farnboroughinternational.org/aerospace/sustainable-skies-world-summit-2024

2024 ICAO Symposium on Non-CO₂ Aviation Emissions

Choice

Desperate British Prime Minister (PM) comes out with the line that the future will be troubled and fast paced change will outstrip past progress. Ok, so what’s new? Hasn’t that been the path of the world since the invention of the computer? Acceleration of change is now locked into humanities destiny.

The audacity of the man is astonishing. Having been intimately associated with calamitous failures of the past decade he espouses his unique abilities to keep us safe and secure.

Hell, I thought former PM Boris Johnson had a big ego. Monday’s speech goes beyond ridiculous[1]. When he says: “People are abusing our liberal democratic values” what comes to my mind is the right-wing government he leads.

We all know, it’s reported continuously, how dangerous the world has become. Noone in any major political party would dismiss that reality. That is bar the eccentric, downright crazy and maybe the fringes of the Greens party.

Interestingly, as far as I know, PM Rishi Sunak isn’t a climate change denier, but he doesn’t have much to say on this monumental global issue. When he says: “And in this world of greater conflict and danger, 100 million people are now displaced globally.” It should occur to him that competition for resources in a world where the climate is changing is at the root of this movement. By the way, there are 8 billion people in the world[2]. So, let’s get our reality in proportion. True, the 0.1 billion people now displaced globally is a figure likely to grow in the next decade. But they are not the enemy.

I had to laugh when I came to the mention in the speech of “robust plans”. The thing that has been characteristic of this Conservative period of government is the distinct lack of planning.

The country’s whole relationship with its neighbours was changed without any plan (Brexit). The ups and downs of the COVID epidemic were endured without a plan, other than that which was made up day-to-day. Year-on-year cuts in defence spending have only been reversed in the wake of global events not a plan of any kind. Surely the Conservatives can only offer a – make it up as we go along – way of governing? It’s what they’ve always done. Hence, the slow decline that has afflicted the country.

The PM lapses into a lazy “needs must” argument that sprinkled with Brexit bull****. Shakespeare would have approved. One example, in All’s Well That Ends Well:

Countess: Tell me thy reason why thou wilt marry.

Clown: My poor body, madam, requires it: I am driven on by the flesh; and he must needs go that the devil drives.

Nothing wrong with being positive about the future. As a country we can do great things. What the PM claims is to have a plan. What he hasn’t got is a plan. And if he did have a plan the likelihood of his own side following that plan is absolutely minimal. He only goes where the devil drives.

[1] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-security-13-may-2024

[2] https://www.census.gov/popclock/world

ID

Photo ID is essential, or your ballot will be denied to you in the UK. You can’t vote in elections. That was the case for service veterans, last Thursday. The armed forces veteran card was not deemed acceptable ID[1]. This card was heralded as a great step forward by Conservative Ministers. It seems they had not thought through the implications of the new ID card.

The Electoral Reform Society pointed out that the arbitrary nature of voter ID rules is a problem.

No doubt to get milk the publicity, Boris Johnson, former PM, praised the officials who turned him away from the polling station where he attempted to vote in the South Oxfordshire police commissioner vote[2]. That inspired one or two cartoons. As you would expect featuring clowns. The legacy of Boris Johnson’s chaotic time in the premiership continues to echo.

News is not all negative on the voting front. The 15-year time limit on the eligibility of British people living overseas has been lifted. They will now be permitted to vote in UK elections[3]. Most interestingly, around 3.5 million additional people will have the right to vote in the forthcoming UK General Election. I wonder how those living in the European Union (EU) will vote.

Anyway, if we look at the results from last Thursday, the Conservative attempt at what could be called voter suppression seem to have backfired. Big time. My view is that we should be making it easier for citizens to vote and not harder to vote. As one joker pointed out, in this Parliament, there have been more cases of MP’s misdemeanours than there have been of voter fraud.

I agree that many of the heartfelt arguments of 25-years ago about ID cards are now somewhat moot. The way we use mobile phones has put paid to those arguments. Big Brother is here to stay. It’s astonishing how much personal information we give away freely, not to the Government, but to commercial entities committed to extracting profits from our data.

Formally proving ID is an anarchic process in the UK. There are multiple means, and they are all confusing or mixtures of one another. What is becoming a fixed point is one’s mobile phone number. So many computer systems send a text message that requires acknowledgement to prove who you are who you say you are. The assumption being that the person with the mobile phone is the person who owns the phone, and its number.

Maybe it is time for one unified and recognised official UK ID system.

[1] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2024/05/02/minister-apologises-veteran-turned-away-refused-voter-id/

[2] https://www.theguardian.com/politics/article/2024/may/04/boris-johnson-pays-tribute-to-polling-staff-who-refused-to-let-him-vote-without-id

[3] https://www.gov.uk/voting-when-abroad

Culture

Yet again, Boeing is in the news. The events of recent times, I feel are immensely sad. Now, it is reported that the FAA has opened an investigation into a possible manufacturing quality lapse on the Boeing 787 aircraft[1]. Concern is that inspection records may have been falsified.

A company that once had a massive professional engineering reputation has sunk to a place where expectations are low. It’s not so much that the company is having a Gerald Ratner moment. Unfortunately, the constant stream of bad news indicates something deeper.

It’s interesting to note that Frank Shrontz[2] passed away last Friday at the grand age of 92. He was the CEO and Chairman of Boeing, who led the company during development of the Boeing 737NG and Boeing 777 aircraft. In the 1990s, I worked on both large aircraft types.

A commonly held view is that, after his time and the merger with McDonnell Douglas the culture of the organisation changed. There’s a view that business schools graduates took over and the mighty engineering ethos that Boeing was known for then went into decline. Some of this maybe anecdotal. Afterall, the whole world has changed in the last 30-years. However, it’s undoubtably true that a lot of people lament the passing of an engineering culture that aimed to be the best.

A famous quote comes to mind: “Culture eats strategy for breakfast.” Those sharp 5 words get discussed time and time again. Having been involved in a lot of strategic planning in my time it’s not nice to read. How wonderful intent, and well described policies can be diluted or ignored is often an indicator of decline. It’s that cartoon of two cavemen pushing a cart with a square wheel. One says to the other: “I’ve been so busy. Working my socks off”. Ignored, on the ground is an unused round wheel. If an organisation’s culture is aggressively centred on short-term gain, then many of the opportunities to fix stuff gets blown out of the window.

We keep talking about “performance” as if it’s a magic pill. Performance based rules, performance-based oversight, and a long list of performance indicators. That, in of itself is not a bad thing. Let’s face it we all want to get better at something. The problem lies with performance only being tagged to commercial performance. Or where commercial performance trumps every other value an engineering company affirms.

To make it clear that all the above is not just a one company problem, it’s useful to look at what confidential reporting schemes have to say. UK CHIRP is a long standing one. Many recent CHIRP reports cite management as a predominant issue[3]. Leadership skills are an issue.

[1] https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/some-787-production-test-records-were-falsified-boeing-says

[2] https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/frank-shrontz-former-ceo-and-chairman-of-boeing-dies-at-92/

[3] https://chirp.co.uk/newsletter/trust-in-management-and-cultures-is-the-key-to-promoting-confidence-in-safety-reporting/

Highways

The last time I visited the city of Baltimore was in 2012. It was the location of the annual seminar of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI)[1]. That was when I was representing the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) at such international events.

The relationship between aviation accident investigators and regulators are generally cordial. There’s a great deal of work that requires cooperation and good communication. That’s not to say that the relationships between these two vital parts of national and international aviation safety systems is easy. It’s not. My reflection on that fact is that a degree of constructive tension is inevitable and not always a bad thing.

One way of seeing that relationship is that the primary role of an investigator is to make findings to prevent the repeat of a given accident. For a regulator the primary role is to ensure the complete aviation system runs safely on a day-to-day basis. Both organisations have the public interest at their heart. However, their operational context and perspective are different.

Firstly, my condolence to the families and friends of those who perished because of the Francis Scott Key Bridge accident[2]. The collapse victims and survivors had no way of knowing what was to happen on the night of the accident. I use the word “accident”. This was not an act of God, as some commentators would have it. The safety risks involved in the operation of the port in Baltimore could be anticipated.

In the US there’s an independent federal agency that is tasked with such major investigations. Interestingly, it’s the same one as that investigates aviation accidents and incidents. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is a multi-modal organisation. That is something we don’t have in the UK. Also, we don’t have a divide between federal and state organisations. Since in the UK we have separate independent national Air, Marine and Rail investigation agencies that cover the country (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland).

I will not comment on the accident sequence or causes. It’s the job of an independent investigation to arrive at the technical facts. Recommendations will flow from that investigation.

Where a comment may be in order is that there are many locations across the globe where a vital piece of infrastructure, like a bridge being struck by a large container ship is a possibility. I’d generalise that further. When infrastructure that was designed a built 50 years ago meets modern day operational stress there’s going to be vulnerabilities. Yes, the aviation system is not immune from this fact too. It wasn’t so long ago when I read of PDP-11 computer hardware used for air traffic control (now, historic artifacts[3]). I’m sure there are still Boeing 747s, and alike that need floppy disks to update their hardware.

So, the wider subject is operational legacy systems working with modern systems. This is the interface that requires particular care. The safety risk appetite and exposure in the 1970s/80s was quite different from that which we expect upheld today.

Unfortunately, society is often reluctant to revisit this subject. Additionally, there’s the incentive to go for quick fixes and sweating assets. The example I have in mind the so-called “smart motorways” in the UK[4]. I don’t know how many fatalities can be linked to “smart motorways” but I’m sure, sadly, it’s too many.

POST: In time-off I enjoyed a trip out to Fort McHenry and a walk around the places where The Wire was filmed. The Fort McHenry story is interesting given its role in times of war. The British burnt the White House but the navy didn’t get past Fort McHenry in 1812.

[1] https://www.isasi.org/

[2] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-us-canada-68661318

[3] https://www.tnmoc.org/air-traffic-control

[4] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/plans-for-new-smart-motorways-cancelled

Safety Culture 2

This may sound at variance with my last blog. I hope it’s not. I hope it’s complementary. What I’m highlighting here has been observed over decades of contact with a wide variety of organisations.

The term safety culture is fused into the pillars of ICAO Annex 19. The essence of building a good safety culture that fosters sound practices and encourages communications, in a non-punitive environment is at the heart of standards and recommended practices. With all those decades behind us the reader might assume that there’s unambiguous and well aligned attitudes and ways of working throughout the aviation industry. That’s not so.

On a spectrum of what could be called hard to soft the manner of application of know best practices can take different forms. By the way, please disassociate those two words with both easy and difficult. That’s not what I mean.

In my interpretation “hard” means like pages of Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince[1]. Aggressive, persistent, mandatory, uncompromising and all encompassing.

In my interpretation “soft” means like pages of The Little Book of Calm by Paul Wilson[2]. Harmonious, enlightened, progressive, sympathetic, and understanding.

As with extremes on any scale, going to the ends of that scale are not the best way to operate. I say “best” in terms of getting to ways of working to endure with engagement and effectiveness. I observe much of this depends on how power is disseminated through an organisational structure. Highly hierarchical organisations will approach culture differently from organisations with a relatively flat management system.

It may not be surprising to suggest that aviation Authorities can veer towards the “hard” approach and staff Unions towards the “soft” approach. Even when both are trying to reach the same goal. Where people come from a military background, command and control can be an instinctive reaction. Where people come from an advanced technology company background, collaboration and communication can be an instinctive reaction. In my observation there are advantages in both a hard and soft safety cultural approaches.

One advantage of a hard safety culture is that the time between discovery of a safety problem, taking corrective action and resolving that operational problem can be short. Clearly, that has distinct safety advantages. Certain airlines come to mind.

One advantage of a soft safety culture is that there can be the discovery of safety problems that would otherwise remain hidden. Where collective ownership of the problem is not in question. Again, clearly, that has distinct safety advantages too. Certain manufacturers come to mind.

I guess my message is as per much ancient thinking. All things in moderation. Try to reap the benefits of both ends of the scale. Balance.

[1] https://www.londonreviewbookshop.co.uk/stock/the-prince-niccolo-machiavelli

[2] https://www.waterstones.com/book/the-little-book-of-calm/paul-wilson/9780241257449

Safety Culture

Civil aviation remains an extremely safe means of transport. That said, any form of complacency must be addressed. It’s reassuring to say the past has been great but what passengers are most concerned about is their next flight. To have the confidence, to think it irrational to be afraid of flying, to look forward to the next journey, we must have a safe aviation system everywhere and all the time.

For any widespread system that has complex interactions between people and technology there’s never a moment when it can be taken for granted. We count the numbers, but safety is not purely an absence of accidents and incidents. Numbers counted are always past events. They have no direct causal influence on what happens next. True, there are factors in past accidents and incidents that will pop up again and again, but every flight is a unique event.

One of my colleagues who was a senior captain in a major international airline always remined me of the fact that, for all that has gone before, flight risk begins the moment an aircraft sets off down the runway with the intention getting to a destination. When the wheels lift off the ground there’s no stopping time. Reliant on the diligence, vigilance, and integrity of everyone who made a flight possible, flight risk is then in the hands of the crew.

The above is perhaps why we talk a lot about safety culture. The whole aviation family has a role to play. The care, professionalism, and watchfulness of every person makes a difference.

This can extend from the drafting of a new component for a new design, that a decade down the line. ends up as a part of an aircraft just about to leave the gate. This can go back to a flight instructors’ message that emphasised a key point back in a pilot’s initial training, years ago. This can encompass the extra care a couple of air traffic controllers took as they changed shifts.

Safety culture comes from caring. It’s that heightened awareness of the consequence of actions. Being alert to possibilities. Both the good kind, and the bad.

Safety culture is a matter for both individuals and organisations. One without the other doesn’t work. Placing a vigilant person in an organisation that doesn’t care is much like placing a reckless person in an organisation that does care. Although this is what I’ve written, systemic problems are likely the ones that are most likely to cause negative outcomes. This is where the role of management has the most impact.

Culture exists in context. When the ways people interact are determined by practices, processes, and procedures there’s an obligation on management to ensure they fit the bill. Drivers are often economic. In a commercial operation that’s no surprise. It’s when that driver displaces the safety imperative then safety suffers. There’s been several occurrences of this negative phenomena in the last year.

Dependency

It’s not unique. Charle Dickens wrote about it. We don’t like to admit it. We have a dependency on bureaucracy. Our complex society runs on it.

Whatever we do when it comes to the meeting of an individual with an organisation, it’s inevitable. Irrational people deny this fact or say it’s only true of public bodies, like government departments. It’s as if the generally high performance of modern computer systems renders them completely invisible.

One apt illustration of a dependency on systematic bureaucracy and digitisation combined can be read in a carefully constructed e-mail from the CEO of Sainsbury’s this weekend.

“I’m writing to update you on the technical issue that has affected our Groceries Online deliveries and some services in our stores this weekend.”

This could have come from any large complex organisation that exists in today’s digital world. When outages happen, we all sit patiently for affected systems to come back online with the full services that we normally take for granted. A sudden reversion to traditional cash transactions was a shock to the average post-COVID consumer.

This weekend my experience of one major hotel chain was that they would not accept cash at all in their restaurant. My “paper” money was useless. It sat in my pocket.

What we have is the power of utility. Systems become so good that we build ever more dependency into them doing the right thing, every time. The problem is that systems are often programmed to do certain tasks exceptionally well but as soon as there’s an unexpected deviation outside normal parameters the situation does not go well.

An illustration of that experience can be read in the public version of the interim report on UK NATS[1]. After the event, and similar unfortunate events, there’s a cavalcade of calls for more contingency, more resilience, more planning, more training, more checking and so on.

That list is perfectly sensible. But wouldn’t it have been better if those actions had been taken up-front? I often saw this discovery in my time doing systems certification audits. Companies who spend a lot of money upfront to build software that was well characterised and tested were not guaranteed success, but their chances were greatly improved. Those who hit the road with over-confidence, marketing hype and rigorous cost cutting had a high probability of negative outcomes. It’s not a simple cause and effect but good system architecture, robust software and a management that understood the need to spend time and money judiciously do well.

Just think. If a runner ran a marathon without a strategy, training, basic fitness, planning and sound motivation no one would expect them to be winning anything unless they were exceptionally lucky or unbelievably talented. Not many in the latter category.

There’s a lesson here. It’s been copied over and over. Saddy the almost completely invisibly of complex system that work well in everyday life means we soon take them for granted. And the result is?

[1] https://www.caa.co.uk/publication/download/21478

Safety

A considerable part of my working life has been in the analysis of occurrence data and trying to distiller the factors that cause or contribute to accidents and incidents. It’s rewarding work. An opportunity to influence that has value. I subscribe to the dictum that everything we do should contribute to continuous improvement in safety. Not zero risk but to keep risks low and under control, in so much as it’s possible.

Aviation only has the great success that it does because it’s a safe industry. For mass transport by air to be viable across the globe, the public must have confidence in it. They are willing to place whole families in the care of an airline to get them from London Gatwick to the Canary Islands for something that is not a physical need[1]. Regular leisure travel is a luxury and a privilege. We live in a fortunate age when overseas travel can be afforded by a large section of the population.

I watched the recent documentary on flight MH370. It’s sobering. It’s a story of the loss of a large aircraft that still seems unbelievable in this era. It’s the 10th anniversary of the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines flight MH 370 on 8 March 2014. The loss is a stark reminder that the oceans cover over 70% of the surface of the Earth. We know less about parts of the oceans than we do about the surface of Mars. The depths remain uncharted.

With a paucity of evidence theories have taken root. Official investigation reports are available. However, mystery remains particularly when it comes to answering the question – why? If as the documentary suggest, the willful actions of the pilot-in-command brought about the fatal outcome then there’s little to tell of his motivation. Highlighting the tragic Germanwings aviation accident doesn’t offer anything other than a context to possibilities. Evidence that the MH370 pilot-in-command was suicidal is scant. Although his known actions do not make much sense without invoking such a theory. Understanding what drives people to purposefully undertake unpredictable and irrational actions is an area of study that always needs attention.

Yesterday, Sunday, I was remined that threats to safety can come out of nowhere. Seemingly routine car journeys can suddenly take a turn in an unexpected direction. We become subject to the fates. I use the word “fate” but I’m not a great believer in the fates. Randomness plays a part but, in this case, yesterday afternoon, I was the subject to the foolish and negligent actions of another car driver.

On a wet “B” road that climbs and descends over chalk hills, there are triangular road signs that warn drivers that the road is a high risk road. What the signs are referring to is the wildlife. A deer may leap out of a roadside hedge at great speed and misjudge the road traffic. In fact, I did see an unfortunate small dead deer at the kerbside.

What happened to me had a purely human cause. Naturally, I would call it complete idiocy. Coming over the brow of a hill, and descending, suddenly there was 4 bright headlights ahead. On a narrow country road, with overgrown banks on either side that was a scary sight. Nowhere to go. In a faction of a second the overtaking car coming up the hill veered back into the right-hand lane. No more than a couple of yards in front of my car. Fortunately, there was no collision. What on earth was the motivation of that driver? Overtaking, at high speed, approaching the brow of a hill, on a wet county road, in poor light, sheer madness. A small red car, overtaking a larger car.

In safety work this points to the most difficult situations to understand. The irrational, or stupid or reckless, or carless human drives that are hard to design out of systems. How do we take effective corrective action when one person’s risk threshold is so very much higher than normal or acceptable? The problem with saying – take their licence away – is that this is always reactive. After a negative event. Maybe even a fatal one.

[1] https://www.simplypsychology.org/maslow.html