Tag: Aviation

Transport of Delight

Air Taxies are becoming a reality. It’s not Science Fiction anymore.

The history of the “hackney carriage” is along and illustrious one. They remain firmly attached to the road. They do move with the times. From horses to combustion engines to electrified cabs[1], I wonder if London back cabs will adopt Hydrogen fuel next?

Providing safe and reliable public transport for about 8-passengers, in reasonable comfort, with a limited amount of luggage, they are a vital part of the city landscape. Ferrying people from place to place and even going south of the river (a popular saying from the people who live north of the River Thames).

In New York, “Yellow schools of taxi fishes” in a song by Joni Mitchell. Schools or sholes of taxies swimming in a sea of traffic. Frantic and colourful as they are shown in a lot of 1970s movies. A chaotic scene where the protagonist runs out into the middle of dense, barely moving traffic.

What happens when these modern convinces take to the air? If they were still with us, I’m sure Flanders and Swann[2] would have written a song about this new marvel. The distain of London buses towards black cabs is there in the lyrics. So, as air taxies take-off, as it were, will the cab drivers of the city protest or join the ranks of new flyers?

Please don’t answer that question. I’ve in mind more serious issues. The whole history of aviation safety data analysis shows us an immutable fact. Take-offs and landings are riskier than flying in at altitude. It really matters not if flying horizontally or vertically.

How does this come to be? A simple answer would be to say that the results of aviation accidents eventually end-up on the ground. Gravity does its work. Put that aside for a moment. Take-offs are optional but landings are mandatory. That’s a traditional saying that amuses non-flyers but is all too real to pilots and alike.

The act of taking a flying machine from the freedom of movement in 4-dimensions to a preselected stationary point on the ground. Those policies and plans that are published refer to Vertiports being established much as Heliports have been in the past. Some may double up. The theory is good. A pre-defined clear space that can accommodate a typical eVTOL aircraft used as an Air Taxi, with all the necessary operational and safety provisions. Surrounding areas protected from the down wash of the Air Taxi. Care to remove any foreign objects from the vertiport surface. A mini terminal to add to the cityscape.

One of the biggest variables in this brave new world of public transport is as old as the hills. It’s the local weather. Dubai can roast an aircraft with clear skies and 50C while Aberdeen can soak them in rain and impenetrable mist. Dust and wind can blow through Marseilles while deep snow and ice covers Montreal. Whilst in Lahore the air itself can be hazardous.

Terrestrial vehicles do cope. Often this means that there are different rules and regulation that take account of the local conditions and priorities. The impatience that some advocates have for a rapidly formulated globally set of harmonised rules and regulations might be misplaced. In fact, it may even impede the introduction to service of Air Taxi services.

Since I’m discussing the urban environment, I can presume that any accidents and incidents will be the focus of a great deal of public attention. Ultimate safety is a nice aspiration, but then reality takes hold. There will be occurrences. When they happen, city councillors are going to have their say.

POST: The Air Taxi topic has become newsworthy this last week. US lawmakers push FAA certification reforms for eVTOLs:

https://aviationweek.com/aerospace/advanced-air-mobility/lawmakers-push-faa-certification-reforms-evtols

https://www.flyingmag.com/congress-faa-electric-air-taxi-certification/

Click to access Aviation-Innovation-and-Global-Competitiveness-Act-Final-Bill-Text.pdf

[1] https://www.levc.com/

[2] https://youtu.be/7yHrpPRYgYM

FLANDERS & SWANN – ‘A Transport of Delight’ – 1957.

Aviation Insights

One shilling and seven pence, that’s what a copy of Flight magazine cost in 1960. Today, roughly that’s equivalent to £6. Which is not so far off the weekly cost of a typical printed magazine taken off-the-shelf in a newsagent. Now, Flight is a digital subscription[1] at £22 a month. We consume our News in a different way, but the overall price is not so different.

Spending money in charity shops always contributes to some good cause or another. Certainly, our British High Streets in 2026 are markedly transformed from that of 66 years ago. Fine, if I get hung up on that elegant number. It’s not a bingo call. It’s the number of times I’ve circled the Sun. Circled, that is, while safely attached to this rocky planet.

The young woman behind the counter was chatting to what must have been a regular when she looked up. I pointed an unregarded dusty box on the floor in the corner of the shop. “How much to you want for that box of old aviation magazines”. She looked slightly fazed. Nobody had even thought about pricing them let alone selling them. They had probably been donated as someone emptied the attic of their grandparents. Probably on the verge of going to the recycling bin.

Eventually, we settled on a modest price. She looked me up and down. I’m sure she thought that I was completely mad. That said, charity shop workers, volunteers, must face that colourful situation more than a couple of times a week. Even a day.

What struck me was the first inside page. The weekly editorial could have been written yesterday. It’s titled “Facing it” and reads thus:

“More than one great newspaper has given warning that our nation is living beyond its means – that our export prospects are poor, and that we are taking a commercial thrashing”.

“Bleak prospects for a people who have never had it so good, and one that promotes us to consider how the aircraft industry is facing up to cold reality.”

It went on to highlight that there had been few new aircraft at the Farnborough airshow of that year. It was an October publication[2]. There was a lot of talk about industry and Government cooperation but that this was not delivering.

“And now that the industry is needed, as it has never been needed before, it will not be found unready or unwilling.”

But the lament was about the failings of the Government of the time, and there being no room for complacency. This was 4-years after the Suez Crisis.

Today, we have an increased security threat, much as arose in the Cold War days. Industry and Government cooperation needs to be a lot more than fervent aspirations. We seem to be in the same phase of formulating strategies rather than implementing actions.

Don’t let me paint a picture of gloom and doom. What this Flight magazine had is great stories of British technical innovation. Electronics and control systems were advancing rapidly. Automatic landing systems were being pioneered. Technology applied improved aircraft performance and aviation safety significantly. In fact, in numerous areas Britain was not only leading, but guiding the world.

[1] https://www.flightglobal.com/subscribe

[2] Flight Number 2691 Volume 78.

Mutuality in Aviation Safety

Back to the benefits of mutuality. That idea of working together for a common goal. It may seem bazar but instead I will start with the downsides of mutuality.

Parties who are in conflict often like to deny interdependency. It’s that instinctive feeling that we can go it alone. Highlighting that working with others turns out to be complicated, calculating and compromising. Surely much better to be that lone High Plains Drifter who lives day to day.

In the aircraft airworthiness discipline, I saw this happening during the lengthy process of the international harmonisation of technical requirements that took shape in the 1990s.

It’s not easy to say but a substantial number of aviation rules and regulations that are applied are written in blood. Ever since the first aircraft took to the skies there has been incidents and accidents. Each one presents an opportunity to gain experience. Tragic though they maybe, if there’s a positive outcome, it’s that measures are put in place to try to prevent similar occurrences happening again. This doesn’t aways work but it works often enough to make it the intelligent way forward. When that learning doesn’t take place, the result is condemnation and outcry[1].

So, imagine a situation where Party A has a rule that comes from a tragic aviation event and Party B does not have that rule, or see the need for that rule. Equally, where Party A is eliminating a rule that Party B views as a judicious measure for managing aviation safety risk.

Clearly, where safety is the goal, the harmonisation of technical requirements is not a trivial matter. Disagreements can put stress on relationship. It can from time-to-time cause people to walk off the playing field. To use an expression that became real at the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations football final. When the application of international rules doesn’t go the way people would like the results can be testing.

What I’m alluding to here is the early days of the technical harmonisation work that was done within what was then called the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) in Europe. And how that work interleaved with the work that was done to harmonise rules across the North Atlantic.

People did indeed walk off the playing field. One or two of them became ardent anti-Europeans. Maybe it was easier for younger technical staff to accommodate change. Nevertheless, each step that was taken to change or eliminate additional national technical requirements created tension. Maintaining sight of the greater goal of mutual benefit was demanding work. In fact, technical harmonisation is demanding work and always will be as such.

Across boundaries circumstances differ. My analogy is that of saying that it is no surprise that the Netherlands maybe concerned about bird strikes and overwater helicopter operations. At the same time Switzerland maybe more concerned about mountain waves and high-altitude helicopter operations. Each concern needs to be met. Priorities may vary.

Recent headlines saying: “Trump Says He Is ‘Decertifying’ Bombardier Aircraft In US[2]” has a sour ring about it. Political pressure should not be the driver of aviation safety technical rules. It’s perfectly reasonable for aviation entities to compete aggressively in the commercial world. It’s idiocy to compete on aviation safety grounds. This is not new learning. This has been the case for at least the last half a century.

POST: A view Gulfstream Confirms Delay over Canadian Type Certification of Business Jets | Aviation International News

[1] https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20260127.aspx

[2] https://aviationweek.com/business-aviation/aircraft-propulsion/trump-says-he-decertifying-bombardier-aircraft-us

Visual Cues and Decision Making

Back to visual perception. Initially, it may not seem right to focus on one human sense and not discuss the others. We are multifaceted humans. The brain takes advantage of all its senses, when they are available. We’ve evolved with amazing capabilities.

The interesting notion that certain wines taste better when accompanies by certain music is a wonderful example of how interactive our systems can be. That’s without us having any conscious control over their immediate intimate workings. Parts maybe hardwired and others soft wired and adaptable.

Vision plays a dominant part in enabling us to move around. We haven’t yet evolved echo sounding, like bats and dolphins. This is not to say that those who loose vision can’t compensate to some extent, but they don’t fly aircraft or drive fast cars or become astronauts.

My thoughts arise from exposure to several aspects of our dependency on seeing the world around us. To begin, at the early part of my career, it was indeed the process of taking sound imaging and making it usable for recognising objects. Converting the information that come back from sending sound pluses through water into an image must deal with a dynamic environment. Interpretation of such electronic images can be the difference between hitting an object at sea and avoiding it.

Later, my design work concentrated on information presented to a pilot and what happens next. That whole arena of the aircraft cockpit is one big interface. The link between the senses and the decision maker. I’m not straying into the interminable debates about human factors.

Let’s stay with the trend that’s in front of us in every walk of life. That’s the dependence on recognising and acting on information that is presented to us on a nearby screen. In so far as I know, humans didn’t evolve with this need to relate acutely to closely presented information as much as reacting to distant stimulus. Afterall if a hostile animal or dangerously armed person was heading towards me at speed, I wouldn’t sit around debating the subject.

Aeronautics has experience in this shift of attention. At the start of my career aircraft cockpits where mostly knobs and dials. Mechanical indicators and filament bulbs. Sometime unreliable. Still the idea of flying by the “seat of the paints” prevailed. That centred around situation awareness, predominantly guided by looking out of the window. At the outside world. Distant vison equally, if not more, important as looking two feet ahead at a panel. Over the last five decades the above has changed radically. Instruments are large flat screens dotted with an array of colourful symbols offering every aspect of “situation awareness”.

Now, this is happening to cars. Most new cars have electronic screens. The expectation is that we humble humans have transitioned from simple mechanical dials to a fascinating world of colourful animated markers and whizzy logos. Despite the glorious technology the basic function remains the same. That is the link between the senses and the decision maker.

Adequate levels of visual perception being the number one attribute a pilot or driver is expected to maintain. This continues to be true as automation does more and more. What maybe a long-term trend in human evolution is that shift between the importance of what’s a couple of feet away and what’s in our surroundings. Will we become less sensitive to a personal experience of what’s more that two feet away? I wonder.

Safety Differences

Are the safety standards for all large aeroplanes the same? No, they are not. I’m never sure if the public naively expect this to be the case. I’m sure it’s not something that goes through the mind of every air traveller. Looking up at an aeroplane, flying overhead, this is not a thought that instantly comes to mind. Even watching them take-off and land at a busy airport.

A large aeroplane is a large aeroplane – surely. Well, not exactly. Several issue come into play when addressing the safety standards for large civil transport aeroplanes. For example, when did the type of aeroplane first go into service? What is it being used for? Where is it flying to? How many people are on-board?

One place to start with any discussion on this subject is with the basics. For a start an aeroplane is heavier than air and its power driven. Immediately, two important factors pop out of that definition. One: weight counts. Two: operating engine(s) are needed.

Almost lost in the mists of time are the reasons for dividing the world of transport aeroplanes into two categories. Simply called – large and small.

Underlying this basic categorisation is an historic assumption. This is an assumption upon which civil aviation safety regulation has been built. Namely, that efforts need to be made to ensure large aeroplanes are safer than small aeroplanes. One way of looking at this is to consider a spectrum of risk, and several parameters of concern.

Let’s start with the question above – what is it being used for? A transport aeroplane can be used to carry cargo or passengers, often both. The number of crew and passengers carried can range from 1 to 850[1]. In fact, for large aeroplanes, there’s no upper limit written into international standards. However, the term “very large aeroplane” is coined for the upper end of weight or passenger numbers carried. Sadly, the very largest of these very large aeroplanes (cargo), the Antonov An-225 Mriya, was destroyed by war.

Although, a matter of primary concern is the number of passengers carried, and therefore at risk in the event of an incident or accident, the main dividing line in the regulatory landscape between large and small aeroplanes is weight.

To some extent this has a foundation. It could be viewed that in the event of an incident or accident any resulting impact will be more severe the greater the weight of the aeroplane. This is where a parameter called the MTOW, or Maximum Take-off Weight, comes in. This number includes the total weight of an aeroplane, crew, fuel, passengers, and cargo.

Today, we divide the world of large and small aeroplanes based on MTOW. Yes, the maximum number of passengers that can be carried comes into the equation too. The question I have is, should that be the number one consideration?

[1] https://www.airwaysmag.com/legacy-posts/top-10-largest-passenger-aircraft

Exploring Airworthiness Knowledge

How many good books are there on aircraft airworthiness? I don’t suppose a lot of people are going to ask that question. General introductions to airworthiness are not necessarily bedtime reading. This thought came to my mind, this week, because I had some time to kill in a library. A particularly technical library in London[1]. It’s at the Institute of Engineering and Technology (IET).

Sited in a grand building on the banks of the River Thames. Savoy Place, as the name suggests, is next door to the famous hotel of the same name. What marks it out is a large statue, not of some long-forgotten stage actor or army general, but that of Michael Faraday[2]. His contribution to the modern world is enduring and undeniable.

I’ve been a member of this august engineering institute since my student days in the early 1980s. Then it was known as the IEE. One “E” being for Electrical. Our lectures encouraged us students to join and once done so they have us for life. Members worldwide have access to their books, databases and standards.

I could draw a thread between Faraday’s work and 21st century aviation. It’s a mighty wide thread and one that’s growing all the time. There are so many aspects of electromagnetism embedded in aviation. For example, without electric motors and servos, we’d still be controlling aircraft with strings and wires. Fine, hydraulics play their part too.

Technology has moved on. It continues to move. Electrification is displacing hydromechanical systems. The age of electric propulsion is getting closer as developers experiment with a myriad of different configurations of motors for different new aircraft types. More and more electrical power is needed to make modern aircraft tick.

In the IET’s library there are a few books with the word “airworthiness” on the cover. It’s a distinct niche. More often technical references contain huge amounts of material that concern or impact airworthiness, but the word itself is reserved for the more discerning.

One I picked off the shelf was “Airworthiness: An Introduction to Aircraft Certification and Operations” by Filippo De Florio[3]”. For me it’s full of familiar material. I was surprised at the level of detail and range of coverage. In its latest version, it’s reasonably up-to-date too.

One book that was not on the IET’s shelf is “Initial Airworthiness: Determining the Acceptability of New Airborne Systems” by Professor Guy Gratton. I believe he’s updating this book now.

There was a copy of “Aircraft System Safety: Assessments for Initial Airworthiness Certification” by Duane Kritzinger. Again, for me it’s full of familiar material.

Another book that was not on the IET’s shelf is “Aircraft Continuing Airworthiness Management: A Practical Guide for Continuing Airworthiness Engineers” by Daniel Olufisan.

What I’m wondering now is how many other contemporary books are there on this subject. That is up-to-date references. Yes, I know I could do a quick search to turn up an easy answer but that tells me nothing of the quality of the publications. All four above are worth a read.

Help me out with some suggestions – please.

[1] https://www.theiet.org/membership/library-and-archives

[2] https://www.faraday.cam.ac.uk/about/michael-faraday/

[3] https://www.amazon.co.uk/Airworthiness-Introduction-Aircraft-Certification-Operations/dp/0081008880

Embracing Uncertainty

Imagine siting under a great wide spreading old oak tree. Acorns falling all around. The ground littered with whole ones, crashed ones and half eaten ones. It’s more the half-eaten hazelnuts that the squirrels leave behind that I’m thinking of. On one of those cool days, like this morning, when the rain has abated and the sun beams are streaming across the glistening fields. It was lower than 2 degrees, early this morning, so a heavy drew rests on the grass and leaves.

Think of title for a book or film that sums up the state of current affairs. I’m tempted to say “All the President’s Men” but that’s been well done in the 1970s. Not only that but the word “scandal” may have lost its meaning. Political fiction and reality are melding into one. Anyway, I don’t want to follow the crowd and obsess about America.

Was there ever an age when prosperity seemed assured and the population was happy. When men and women of honourable intentions and wisdom, judicially ruled the land? Maybe not. Or when it happened, to some limited extent it didn’t last beyond a generation.

Any title for a book or film would have to encompass the persistence of change. Nothing upon nothing ever stands still. In fact, that’s one of the few things I can write that is an absolute. A real natural absolute phenomenon. Everything we know of moves relative to something else and movements mean change. We never breath the same air.

In a storage box of my books there’s a title: “Thriving on chaos[1]“. That’s more to do with an attitude to change. It doesn’t sum up the moment although it does imply that chaos is normal. I’m not going there fully since not all change is chaotic. Life is punctuated with regularity. It’s the traditional saying about death and taxes. Those two are regular occurrences.

A financial crisis or stock market crash or bursting bubble seem to hit us as an unexpected instant of violent change. Unexpected that is until hindsight kicks in and we all wish we’d listed to siren voices. Analysis streams from the outcome of a crisis[2].

A title for a book or film would need to include the recurrent nature of both good and bad consequences. It would need to emphasis our inability to accurately predict what’s going to happen next. That is even if one or two of us may get it right.

All this leads me down the road of a manner of thinking that’s all too common to me. That’s the world of probabilities. Addressing that slippery ell called uncertainty. So, what could be better as a title than: “The Age of Uncertainty.” Oh look, that’s been taken back in the 1970s. What could be better than the title chosen by John Kenneth Galbraith[3]?

He looked at the chaotic but repetitious nature of our common history. Going way back. Unsurprisingly a little cynical and monosyllabic at times. I’ve been rewatching his BBC television series. It’s impressive.

Acorns are falling all around. An unusually large number, this year. Next year – who knows? If I could find some reliable data, I could do some probability calculations based on past seasons. But with certainty, I can say that we are in an age of uncertainty. Acorns will fall. How many – well that’s the question isn’t it.

[1] https://tompeters.com/thriving-on-chaos/

[2] “The Storm” by Vince Cable, the Liberal Democrat politician, looking at the 2008 global economic crisis.

[3] https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episodes/m002l6sc/the-age-of-uncertainty

Why Timely Aviation Safety Reporting Matters

Waiting for accident reports can be frustrating. I’ve found this to be the case in past experiences. When a major fatal aviation accident happens the demand for information is exceptionally high. That means that every credible source of information will be drawn upon.

I don’t think anyone expects professional aviation accident investigators to come up with instant answers. Extensive and meticulous work is required to arrive at detailed findings. When it’s possible accident investigators publish interim reports to ensure that relevant information becomes generally available.

Countering this reality is the need to ensure that the aviation system is not operating at elevated risk during the period that investigation is being conducted. Information needs to flow to those who are empowered to take corrective action.

Given the nature of international civil aviation, accidents can occur anywhere at any time. There’s no rule, statistical or otherwise, that can stop these extremely rare events occurring. Much as it’s fine to promote an ambition for zero accidents, it’s not going to happen.

The frustration I’ve pointed to is shared by industry and authorities. As time goes by the level of speculation and misinformation always increases where there is an absence of verifiable facts. There’s always a need for industry, authorities and investigators to cooperate. As often each one will have a part of the jigsaw that when put together describes what happened.

For all sorts of reasons, this necessary cooperation does not always exist or exist as a smooth pathway to resolving a situation and initiating corrective action. Where barriers exist and delays accumulate the collective aim of assuring aviation safety is harmed.

The International Air Transport Association (IATA), at their recent conference, highlighted this as being a significant issue[1]. There are international standards, but these standards are not always applied in the manner with which they were intended. It seems obvious to say. It’s essential to learn safety lessons and take corrective action as soon as it’s humanly possible.

Where sufficient resources are an issue then there must be cooperative arrangement to allow others to help. It’s by sharing expertise and equipment that the time between occurrence of an event and the implementation of risk reduction measures can be reduced.

Risk reduction measures do not always need to be the final measure. There are the conventional strategies for addressing aviation safety risk – reduce, eliminate or mitigate. Even if publication of a final accident report is a year or more away, there’s often much that can be done in the interim.

Bureaucratic protocols, political sensitivities and commercial interests are real. However, most governments have signed up to obligations within the ICAO convention and its standards. It’s recognised that timeliness is vital.

[1] https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/2025-releases/2025-10-14-02/

Recent Aviation Accidents: Lessons Learned, or not

I start from a position of apprehension. Making aviation accidents, documentary style, the subject of a television series does give me some concern. Obviously, there’s the importance of being respectful to those involved. To reveal something that is of genuine public interest.

Accident investigation and journalism seek to answer the six questions – Who, what, where, when, why and how. When it comes to addressing aviation accidents that have occurred in the last 18-months some of the process of investigation may still be ongoing.

My apprehension starts with – what is the purpose of the series? Does it go some way to answering the question – why? That’s especially the case given that word is in the title[1]. Practically the “why” is turned into a probable cause because the “why” can include multiple factors. It’s rare for there to be a lone factor that results in a tragic outcome.

Broadcast last night by the BBC, this series took a selection of the accidents that recently commanded international headlines. The fatal events have been much discussed within informed professional communities and across social media. I’ve written on them too.

[Fatal Boeing 737 Crash in South Korea, Investigating the Black Hawk and American Eagle Collision, Aircraft Safety and Fuel Starvation, Understanding Boeing 787 Avionics.]

We do this to seek to understand. If there are always lessons to be learned, it’s imperative that those lessons be learned without delay. Lack of an informed and timely response exposes the flying public to further risks.

Sadly, a few of the lessons learned in the past have not been translated into change. The fatal accident at Muan International Airport in South Korea is a case in point. Brid strikes are not new. The dangers of flocking birds have been highlighted time and time again. Whilst airports are built near large bodies of water this will continue be a risk. However, it wouldn’t be right to say this is the only cause of the accident outcome at Muan.

Truly tragic are what may be called: avoidable accidents. This is where the event is purely made up of human actions that need not have take the course they took. Processes and procedures were inadequate, and known to be inadequate, for the situation. To me, this is the case of the military helicopter that collided at low altitude with a passenger flight in Washington DC. It’s mystifying as to why past occurrences of near misses didn’t prompt a change to operations.

I’ll say this because it’s not often given credit. A testament to the good design of an aircraft, and the extensive certification work done and the rigorous training of crews, an accident in the Canadian snow did not become fatal. Upon a spectacular heavy landing in Toronto everyone escaped.

On take-off, a London bound, fully loaded Air India Boeing 787 failed to climb. The results were catastrophic in every sense. Not only were all on-board killed but there were multiple fatalities on the ground.  This tragic fatal accident remains mysterious. The published preliminary report is a source of more questions than answers. Facts so far published do not explain the sequence of events.

What connects this spate of aviation disasters? Nothing, that I can determine. Although, there is the importance of lessons learned. They are not that compilation of dusty past accident reports that sit on a shelf. They are a source of everyday learning. That is learning that needs to be put into action. Timely action. Not waiting for a final publication.

[1] https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m002kw1n/why-why-planes-crash

Trust in Voluntary Reporting

Hard data is immensely useful. Now there’s a surprise. That’s facts and figures. That’s accurate descriptions of occurrences. That’s measurements and readings of important factors. From this kind of data, a picture can be painted of events good and bad. However, this picture is not complete. It’s certainly not complete for any system that involves the interactions of humans and machines.

What’s often less visible is the need for what I might call – soft data. As such it’s not “soft”. I’m just using that loose term to distinguish it. Fine, you could say that social media is littered with the stuff. Vast qualities of instant judgements and colourful opinions. An array of off-the-shelf solutions to life’s ills. That’s all well and good for entertainment. It’s not so useful as a means of getting to the truth.

In civil aviation voluntary reporting systems have been around for several decades. They are not always successful, mainly because there’s a fair amount of trust required to use them when something major happens. When volunteering information there needs to be a level of assurance that the information will not be misused.

The human inclination to seek to blame is intrinsic. We wake-up in the morning, look out the window, and if it’s rainy and windy then someone is to blame. Probably a weather reporter for not warning us of a coming storm. Blame is a way of making sense of negative events without having to do lot of tedious investigation and analysis.

Don’t get me wrong. Accountability is vital. If someone does something unspeakably bad, they must be held accountable. That is a form of blame. Tracing the bad event back to the root cause. If that cause is found to be negligence or malicious intent, then blame can be assigned.

Where a good safety culture exists, as it often the case in civil aviation, then it is wrong to assume that undesirable outcomes can always be linked to a bad actor of some kind.

Human error is forever with us. Even with the absolute best of intent no one is immune from this pervasive creature. It can be illusive. There are environments where owning up to making mistakes is fine. Sadly, I’m sure it’s not uncommon to have worked in environments where such openness is punished. The difference between a good culture and a bad one.

One of my past jobs involved negotiation with a contactor. Every change that we made to a complex contact had a cost attracted to it. So, there was an understandable sensitivity to making changes. At the same time our customer for the product kept asking for changes. There’s nothing worse than being in a tense meeting with a contactor and having my boss pull the rug from under my feet. Seeking to blame a change on my error rather than a customer request. Introducing a voluntary reporting system in such an environment is pointless.

My message here is clear. Voluntary reporting in aviation is a powerful tool. Reports submitted by employees can offer insights that are not available by just looking at hard data. These reporting systems maybe required by regulation or company policy. However, without a good sound safety culture they can be all but useless. A safety culture that is defended and supported by employees and the senior management of an organisation.