Tag: Travel

Regulatory Insights

I can’t remember if my teacher was talking about maths or physics. His scholarly advice has stuck with me. When things get complex, they can seem overwhelming. Problems seem insolvable. So, it’s good to take a deep breath, step back and see if it’s possible to reduce the problem to its most basic elements. Do what could be called helicopter behaviour. Try to look at the problem top-down, in its simplest form. Break it into parts to see if each part is more easily comprehended.

Today’s international aviation regulatory structure, for design and production, follows the arrow of time. From birth to death. Every commercial aircraft that there ever was started as a set of ideas, progressed to a prototype and, if successful, entered service to have a life in the air.

This elementary aircraft life cycle is embedded in standards as well as aviation rules. Documents like, ARP4754(), Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems are constructed in this manner. There are as many graphs and curves that represent the aircraft life cycle as there are views on the subject, but they all have common themes.

That said, the end-of-life scenarios for aircraft of all kinds is often haphazard. Those like the Douglas DC-3 go on almost without end. Fascinatingly, this week, I read of an Airbus A321neo being scrapped after only 6-years of operations. Parts being more valuable than the aircraft.

Generally, flight-time lives in operational service are getting shorter. The pace of technology is such that advances offer commercial and environmental advantages that cannot be resisted. Operating conditions change, business models change and innovation speeds forward.

My earlier proposition was that our traditional aviation regulatory structure is out of date. Well, the detail is ever evolving – it’s true. Some of the fundamentals remain. The arrow of time, however fast the wheels spin, mixing my metaphors, remains an immobile reality.

In airworthiness terms an aircraft life cycle is divided into two halves. Initial airworthiness and continuing airworthiness. This provides for a gate keeper. A design does not advance into operational service, along the aircraft life cycle, until specified standards have been demonstrated as met. An authority has deemed that acceptable standards are met.

I’m arguing, this part of the aviation regulatory structure is far from out of date. However much there’s talk of so called “self-regulation” by industry it has not come into being for commercial aviation. I think there’s good reason for retaining the role that a capable independent authority plays in the system. A gate keeper is there to ensure that the public interest is served. That means safety, security and environmental considerations are given appropriate priority.

To fulfil these basic objectives there’s a need for oversight. That is the transparency needed to ensure confidence is maintained not just for a day but for the whole aircraft life cycle. And so, the case for both design and production approvals remain solid. The devil being in the detail.

Flag Displays

Traveling here, travelling there, it’s not usual to see a national flag displayed. Whether it be on public buildings, airports terminals or stadiums it’s up there to celebrate belonging. National flags come out most often when major sporting events are underway. They appear and then disappear like a tsunami. It’s a field day for retailers. From the finest natural materials to the cheapest plastics, every size and shape is available.

I’ve kept a flags few, rolled up waiting for a special occasion. One Union Jack, a cross of St George, the European stars, a German one and a flag of the city of Cologne. I did have a Somerset County flag but now can’t find it.

Twice I’ve been to the last night at the Proms[1]. One of the fun parts of that evening is spotting the more unusual flags and trying to work out where they represent. Don’t tell me you know what the Northumberland flag looks like. I certainly didn’t until it was explained to me. By the way it looks like alternating red and yellow Lego bricks stuck together.

For me, as it is for most people, waving a flag is for a special occasion. Carnaval, a parade or Royal occasion. The Eurovision song contest, World Cup or Olympics. These are events where we come together as a community.

Frankly, going around and painting roundabouts red and white with the cross of St George, with cars whizzing around, is plain foolish. It detracts from the importance of the national symbol. What a grown man, in the recent News reports, thinks he’s doing with his tin of paint, I can’t fathom.

Flying Union Jacks, often upside down, from Motorway bridges is juvenile. Today, I saw one or two and it made me think that there’s likely three reactions.

One: ambivalence. That is, either not to notice or to ignore the display as much as ignoring the writing on the side of a large truck. Conveying no message other than what a waste of time.

Two: annoyance: That is, to go back to my point about degrading the symbol. Seeing the fixer as a pompous twat or intimidating bully with time on their hands. Stirring up political divisions for the sake of it.

Three: acclamation. That is, being distracted enough to put a big thumbs up to whoever bought the flag and tied it into position. On-board with plastering every road bridge with flags as an imagined rebellious act.

Doesn’t take much to figure out which one of those I might be. On this subject it’s as well to be as generous as possible. These acts of putting up flags for no reason obviously makes some people happy. Given that they are ranked number one in the world, I’d like to think that the flag waving is in support of England women and rugby union. Somehow, that’s a stretch given the utterances of the flag painters and the bandwagon jumping political stirrers.

Where public property is concerned it’s the duty of public authorities to take them down. Not to tolerate the defacing of public property. However, I can imagine this is just the provocation that some people are inviting.

POST 1 : Talk about utterly desperate bandwagon jumpers. Kemi Badenoch: It is shameful of councils to remove St George’s Cross flags | The Independent

Post 2: Now, I do approve of that. On the main A34 road someone has put up a County flag Berkshire Flag | Free official image and info | UK Flag Registry

[1] https://www.royalalberthall.com/tickets/proms/bbc-proms-24/prom-73

Why 12,500 Pounds?

Regulation is a strange business. It often means drawing lines between A and B. Bit like map making. Those lines on a map that mark out where you are and the features of the landscape. You could say that’s when all our troubles start but it’s been proven unavoidable. As soon as our vocabulary extends to words like “big” and “small” someone somewhere is going to ask for a definition. What do you mean? Explain.

For a while you may be able to get away with saying; well, it’s obvious. That works when it is obvious for all to see. An alpine mountain is bigger than a molehill. When you get to the region where it’s not clear if a large hill is a small mountain, or not then discussion gets interesting. Some say 1000 ft (about 300 m) others say much more. There’s no one universal definition.

[This week, I drove through the Brecon Beacons. Not big mountains but treeless mountains, nevertheless. Fine on a clear day but when it rains that’s a different story. This week Wales looked at its best].

Aviation progressed by both evolution and revolution. Undeniably because of the risks involved it’s a highly regulated sector of activity. Not only that but people are rightly sensitive about objects flying over their heads.

For reasons that I will not go into, I’ve been looking at one of these lines on a regulatory map. One that’s been around for a long time.

I cannot tell you how many discussions about what’s “minor” and what’s “major” that have taken place. That’s in terms of an aircraft modification. However, these terms are well documented. Digging out and crewing over the background material and rationale is not too difficult, if you are deeply interested in the subject.

The subject I’m thinking about is that difference between what is considered in the rules to be a “large” aeroplane and a “small” aeroplane. Or for any American readers – airplane. So, I set off to do some quick research about where the figure of weight limit: maximum take-off weight of 12,500 pounds or less originated for small airplanes (aeroplanes).

I expected someone to comment; that’s obvious. The figure came from this or that historic document and has stuck ever since. It seems to work, most of the time. A confirmation or dismissal that I wanted addressed the question, is the longstanding folklore story is true. That the airplane weight limit was chosen in the early 1950s because it’s half the weight of one of the most popular commercial transport aircraft of that time.

There is no doubt that the Douglas DC-3[1] is an astonishing airplane. It started flying in 1935 and there are versions of it still flying. Rugged and reliable, this elegant metal monoplane is the star of Hollywood movies as well as having been the mainstay of the early air transport system is the US. Celebrations are in order. This year is the 90th anniversary of the Douglas DC-3[2].

What I’ve discovered, so far, is that the simple story may be true. Interestingly the rational for the weight figure has more to do with economic regulation than it has with airplane airworthiness. The early commercial air transport system was highly regulated by the State in matters both economic and safety. Managing competition was a bureaucratic process.  Routes needed approval. Thus, a distinction established between what was commercial air transport and what was not.

POST 1: There is no mention of 12,500 pounds in the excellent reference on the early days of civil aviation in the US. Commercial Air Transportation. John H. Frederick PhD. 1947 Revised Edition. Published by Richard D. Irwin Inc. Chicago.

POST 2: The small aircraft definition of 12,500 pounds max certificated take-off weight first appears in US CAB SPECIAL CIVIL AIR REGULATION. Effective February 20, 1952. AUTHORIZATION FOR AIR TAXI OPERATORS TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PART 42 OF THE CIVIL AIR REGULATIONS. This was a subject of economic regulation in the creation of the air taxi class of operations.

[1] https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-objects/douglas-dc-3/nasm_A19530075000

[2] https://www.eaa.org/airventure/eaa-airventure-news-and-multimedia/eaa-airventure-news/2025-07-17_dc3_society_celebrate_90_years_douglas_dc3_airventure25

Aircraft Safety and Fuel Starvation

Unsafe. In common language it’s the opposite to being safe. So, take a definition of “safe” and reverse it. Let’s say to be safe is to be free from harm (not a good definition). That would lead to “unsafe” being subject to harm or potentially being subject to harm. The probabilistic element always creeps in since it’s the future that is of concern. Absolute safety is as mercurial or unreal as absolute certainty.

Let’s apply this to an aircraft. The ultimate harm is that of a catastrophic event from which there is no escape. Surprisingly, taking a high-level view, there are few of these situations that can occur.

Flying, and continuing to fly, involves four forces. Lift, Weight, Thrust and Drag. It’s that simple. An aircraft moves through the air with these in balance. Flying straight and level, lift opposes weight and thrust opposes drag.

Yes, there are other safety considerations. If there are people on-board. For example, it’s important to maintain a habitable environment. At higher altitudes that requirement can be demanding. Structural integrity is important too. Otherwise flying is a short-lived experience.

In the recent Air India fatal accident, the four forces of flight were not maintained so as to make a continued safe flight possible. The wings provided lift but the force that was deficient was thrust.

Two large powerful engines, either of which could have provided enough thrust, were unable to do so. The trouble being fuel starvation. Fuel starvation occurs when the fuel supply to the engine(s) is interrupted. This can happen even when there is useable fuel on board an aircraft[1].

Sadly, in the records there are numerous aircraft incidents and accidents where this has happened. Quite a few fuel starvation incidents and accidents occur because of fuel mismanagement. This can result from a pilot selecting an incorrect, or empty, fuel tank during a flight.

Now and then, it is the aircraft systems that are at fault. The pilot(s) can be misled by a faulty fuel indication system[2]. In one notable case, a major fuel leak drained the aircraft’s fuel supply[3].

When there is useable fuel on-board an aircraft, the imperative is to restart and recover. It is not uncommon or unreasonable for there to be a delay in restarting engine(s), especially when a fuel starvation event is entirely unexpected. Diagnosis takes time given the numerous potential causes of a starvation event.

In cruise flight there is time available to perform a diagnosis and take appropriate corrective action. Both take-off and landing have their hazards. Both are busy times in the cockpit. When looking at the worldwide safety numbers, less fatal accidents occur on take-off than landing. The numbers Boeing provide put take-off at 6% and landing at 24% of fatal accidents. Each one only occupies about 1% of the total flight time.

Although these are the numbers, my view is that, even though take-offs are optional and landings are mandatory, the requirements for adequate thrust are most critical during take-off. This is arguable and it reminds me that safety assessment is never simple.

[1] https://www.faa.gov/lessons_learned/transport_airplane/accidents/G-YMMM

[2] https://asn.flightsafety.org/asndb/322358

[3] https://asn.flightsafety.org/asndb/323244

Fuel Control Switches

I’ll not go any further than the investigation report that’s in the public domain. The Air India AI171 Boeing 787-800 Preliminary Report is published for all to read. The aircraft’s Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder (EAFR) has been replayed. Sadly, this report raised questions as much as it closes down erroneous theories.

It warrants saying again, and again. My thoughts are with the friends and families of those affected. They deserve to know exactly what happened and as far as is possible, why. Not only that but the global travelling public need to be confident that any necessary corrective action is being taken to prevent a recurrence of such a rare fatal accident.

What requires a one or two words is one of the commonest ways we interact with electrical and electronic systems. The humble switch. In fact, they are far from humble and come in lots of shapes and sizes. The general idea is that a mechanical device, that can be manipulated with a purpose in mind, is used to control the flow of electrical current. There are non-mechanical switches, but I’ll not go there for the moment.

I remember conversations with my aircraft electrical engineering colleagues. It goes like this – you deal with the small currents (avionic systems), and we will deal with the big ones (power systems). Also, a mantra was that all electrical systems are, in part, mechanical systems. Switches, cables, generators, control valves, relays, bonding, you name it, they are in part, mechanical systems. In the past traditional electrical engineers got a but jittery when faced with “solid state” controls (semiconductors).

Switches. I’ve seen the words “cognitive engagement” used. In simpler terms, by design, pilots interact with switches with a purpose in mind. Equally, as in the world of human factors, unprotected switches can be operated in error, unintentionally or by physical force.

So, what are the chances of two protected Fuel Control Switches moving, within seconds of each other, at the most critical phase of an aircraft’s flight?

[There is a discussion to be had in respect of timing. Remember the record from the flight recorders is a sampling of events. The sampling rate maybe as low as one per second. Note: EASA AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.190.]

These cockpit switches are designed and certificated to perform as intended under specified operating and environmental conditions. That’s a wide range of vibration and temperature (shake and bake).

Switch operation is indicated by their physical position[1]. In addition, operation of these switches will be evident by cockpit indications. The concept being that a flight crew can confirm that the Fuel Control Switches have moved by their effect on the engines. If a crew need to take corrective action it is in relation to the information presented to them by the engine instrument system.

The report makes it clear that both mechanical switches transitioned from ‘RUN’ to ‘CUT-OFF’ almost immediately as the aircraft became airborne. That is a worst-case scenario. The time available to recognise and understand the situation, for training to kick-in, and then to take appropriate corrective action was insufficient.

This leads me to think that there may be a case for disabling the Fuel Control Switch function up until at least an altitude where aircraft recovery is possible. Now, these switches need to be available up until the V1 speed is achieved (Example: aborting a take-off with an engine fire). After that an aircraft is committed to becoming airborne.

I suspect the reason there is no inhibit function is the possibility of adding another potential failure condition. Inadvertent and unrecoverable disabling of ‘CUT-OFF’ are scenarios that would need to be considered. No doubt a reasonableness argument was used. No crew would shut-down both engines down immediately an aircraft became airborne, would they?

POST: I hope I haven’t given the impression that this is a case of simple switches and wires. The Boeing 787 is a digital aircraft.  Mechanical fuel technology plays its part but control functions are digital.

[1] Designs that offer switch illumination are not used in this case.

Insights from AAIB Report on Boeing 787 Accident

Now, we know more about the most tragic aviation accident of recent years. The report by India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) about the June 12 fatal accident of a Boeing 787 raises new questions.

The careful wording of the preliminary report[1] is eminently sensible. The facts are what they are, but it remains difficult to construct a scenario around these facts. I suspect that all the parties involved in this fatal accident investigation had a hand in ensuring that the words used where as clear as can be at this early stage. As I said, the facts are what they are.

It’s good that the report shuts down some of the fervent and erroneous speculation that was filling the international media. For this accident, fuel supply being the substantive issue, decisions around flying controls and other aircraft performance issues can be put to one side.

The crew encountered, or were responsible for a situation that once established led to one inevitable sad outcome. The time available to react, at such low altitude, was less than that which was needed to continue a safe flight.

A focus at this point is on the Boeing 787 aircraft’s fuel control switches. These switches are installed in the flight deck and used by a pilot to cutoff fuel to the engines. When correctly installed, these fuel control switches have a locking feature to prevent inadvertent operation.

Clearly unintended switch movement between the fuel supply and fuel cutoff positions can be hazardous. Inadvertent operation of one or both switches could result in an unintended consequence, e.g. engine(s) shutdown. What we know is that sufficient fuel was supplied to the aircraft engines to conduct a take-off. Then for some unknown reason that fuel supply did not continue as it should.

So far, the respectable technical speculation I’ve read (pilot and aircraft engineer led), raises a limited number of possibilities.

One being that the crew acted in an inappropriate or inadvertent manner. Another being that the aircraft’s fuel control switches failed or were caused to fail. Another being that aircraft’s fuel control system (including wiring) failed or were caused to fail. The movement of the flight deck switches may or may not have been involved. What we know is that the record on the accident flight recorder shows a condition occurred that should not occur.

There is no doubt that this would have been a highly stressful situation in the cockpit whatever the root cause. Normally, immediately after the aircraft is leaving the runway the pilot-in-command would have no good reason to look at the aircraft’s fuel control switches. They would be looking forward at the aircraft instruments.

We can take it that every aviation authority/agency/administration with a Boeing aircraft on its aircraft register will be closely watching the progress of this accident investigation. Since, to date, no Airworthiness Directive (AD) has been issued, related this fatal accident, it is reasonable to assume that aircraft systems and equipment failure or maintenance error has not been found. That said, it is worth noting FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) No. NM-18-33 dated December 17, 2018.

We cannot rule out the possibility that this fatal accident was intentional. However, in the whole history of civil aviation this is one of the most extreme explanations. Looking at evidence, a situation when a competent and sane pilot is found to choose to act in an irrational manner is hard to diagnose.

POST: Just over 3-years ago, I wrote “The case for video”. That case to update the rules is now stronger than ever. The case for video.

[1] https://aaib.gov.in/

Managing Risk After Aircraft Accidents

Let me clarify. I can no more predict the future than is illustrated in the humour of this news report. “Psychic’s Gloucester show cancelled due to ‘unforeseen circumstances[1]‘”

Predicting the outcome of an aircraft accident investigation is just as fraught with unforeseen circumstances. For a start, the evidence base is shallow in the first weeks of an investigation. As the clock ticks so increasingly, new information either confuses or clarifies the situation.

Despite the uncertainty, aviation professionals do need to try to anticipate the findings of a formal investigation before they are published or communicated in confidence. It’s not acceptable to sit back and wait to be told what has been found.

In aviation, post-accident there is an elevation of operational risk. The trouble is that assessing that elevation is hindered by the paucity of reliable information. Equally, a proliferation of speculation can escalate risk assessments beyond what is needed. The reverse is true too.

Let’s look at the difference between commentary and speculation. One is based on evidence and the other may not be. One takes the best professional assessment and the other may be more to do with beliefs, prejudices or the latest fashionable thinking.

In reality, it’s not quite as binary. Since speculation in the financial sense may be based on a lot of calculation and risk assessment. Generally, though there is an element of a leap of faith. Opinions based upon past experiences commonly shape thinking.

Commentary on the other hand, like sports commentary is describing what’s happening based upon what’s known. Sometimes that includes one or two – what ifs. In football, that match deciding penalty that was only missed but for a small error.

Commentary includes analysis and study of past accidents and incidents. Trying to pick-up on any apparent trends or patterns is of paramount importance.

Those responsible for aircraft operations, whether they be airlines or safety regulators, need to have an immediate response. That maybe done in private. Their decision-makers need to have a theory or conjecture based on as much analysis and evidence as is available. Like it or not, the proliferation of commentary and speculation does have an impact.

In a past life, one of the actions that my team and I took was to compile a “red book” as quickly as possible post-accident. That document would contain as much reliable information as was available. Facts like aircraft registration details, a type description, people, places and organisation details that were verifiable. This was not a full explanation. It was an analysis, compilation and commentary on what had happened. The idea being that decision-makers had the best possible chance of acting in a consistent manner to reduce risk in the here and now.

[1] https://www.gloucestershirelive.co.uk/whats-on/whats-on-news/psychics-gloucester-show-cancelled-due-7250094

Shiny silver

Daily writing prompt
If you were forced to wear one outfit over and over again, what would it be?
View all responses

If I remember righty, it’s a Seinfeld routine: in the future everyone will be wearing the same outfit. That shiny silver clothing so beloved of pulp fiction comics and SiFi series. Alien races will only ever see humans as being wrapped in tight body suites.

Except for the static burns occurring when brushing swiftly across a nylon carpet, I’d go for the crew of Alpha. That’s Space 1999[1] for those who missed the plywood sets of 1980’s TV. They seemed to have a dress code that made best use of their limited resources on the Moon.

A light grey Commander John Koenig outfit would be future proof.

[1] https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0072564/

Impact of Speculation

The sadness of the loss of live and the suffering of air crash victims’ families, must be respected. On 12th June, Air India’s London Gatwick bound flight AI171 crashed after take-off from Ahmedabad airport. Only one passenger walked away from this catastrophe. Additionally, there were fatalities on the ground as the Boeing 787 aircraft came down in a built-up area.

My heartfelt condolences to those connected with this tragic fatal accident.

The technical accident investigation is well underway. In time, a probable cause for this accident will be determined. This will be published and available to all. As per the international arrangements of ICAO Annex 13 a report will be published. Organisations, with appropriate expertise, will carefully sift through the evidence to establish a sequence of events. This is not a matter of establishing blame. It’s a process of determining what happened with the aim of preventing it from happening again.

Meanwhile, the widespread reporting of the accident can only offer speculation as to the details of who, what, where, when and how and why. There are facts. The time, place and the people involved. Media interviews, with whatever pictures and video recording there are dominate the public domain. However, this is far from the volume of information the accident investigators will handle. They will have access to every nut and bolt, every document, every recording.

After another aircraft accident, back in August last year I wrote: Speculation is a natural human response. When faced with a paucity of information we often put together what we know and then make a best guess as to what happened or what might happen. However, wise or unwise it’s not possible to stop speculation.

In the case of flight AI171 the global media speculation has been, and is, of a new order of magnitude. Normally, the authorities caution against giving too much weight to early conjecture. This is prudent in that the obvious is often not as obvious as it might first seem. Accident investigation can be like putting the pieces of a complex jigsaw together. Deliberately and with great care.

What has been surprising in this case is the intensity of the speculation related to this accident both through traditional and social media. The proliferation of experts offering opinions has reached a new high. Until conflict and war grabbed the headlines everyday a novel theory, or a variation of a theory has been offered. Each one chasing credibility and expanding on limited sources.

Let’s not be pious. I’m not immune from this need to fill a void. My own reasonably well-informed theories float around in my head, but I question my senses in sharing them with others. It’s not a fear of being wrong, as I might be, no, more a fear of cluttering up a confusing mass of information to an even greater extent. Piling theories on top of theories.

Can we have too much of “experts” offering their opinions? Some will be trustworthy and considered, and others will not. How far is it reasonable to stretch what little is known into detailed stories of possible cause and effect?

How is the average person going to tell the difference between sound reasoning and imaginative nonsense? This problem was brought home to me in a recent conversation. When a newspaper revelation is told to me as a “fact” when I know it isn’t, then I see the dangers in excessive speculation.

This may not matter so much to me. In so far as it affects me. However, to an air crash victims’ family this not considerate. To be led to thinking that the cause of an accident is generally known, when it isn’t, that’s disrespectful. It’s the downside of speculation. Not something that is ever going to stop, it’s true. What some keyboard warriors need to think about is the impact of their wild guesses or prejudices.

POST 1: Even reputable publishers latch on to theories that are at best well intentioned and at worse just flying a kite. Air India crash: Early speculation points to possible dual-engine failure | Engineering and Technology Magazine

POST 2: To be fair this YouTube commentator does a good job at making it clear what is fact and what is not https://youtu.be/dIgnR0zw3FU

Enhancing Transport Safety

There’re claims that Artificial Intelligence (AI) will make transport safer. It’s to put a positive spin on the introduction of AI. Implying that existing safety deficiencies can be addressed with the power of AI.

It’s difficult to disagree with this simple assertion. There’s a list of risks that continue to be troubling. With directed design effort there are functions that AI can perform that mean it can have an advantage over conventional systems. With good design, no doubt high performing systems can be constructed.

In aviation, for example, if I consider the top five fatality risks, there’s a persistence of specific categories. We never seem to get away from loss of control in-flight (LOC-I) being high on that grim list. Runway related issues persist, and the hardy perennial of mid-air collision remains. Over the years progress has been made addressing controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), but that category of destructive events never disappears.

It’s fascinating to see that the industry thinks that AI itself is a risk[1]. High probability but low impact. This is considering a broad description of risk rather than a safety focus. Here the concern is related to the difficulties of practical implementation of this new technology.

Marketing people will big up the possibilities brought about by AI. This is what’s going on in relation to the most recent mid-air collision fatal accident. With sound justification given how crude elements of air traffic management are in specific locations.

We will never entirely displace “see and avoid” as a means of collision avoidance. Scanning the horizon looking for other air users. In my opinion, relying on this technique in relatively busy traffic areas is unwise, to say the least. This is where airborne AI assistants have much operational safety potential. Sucking up multiple information sources and processing masses of information to give accurate and instant advice. Such systems can be designed to give real-time updates not only to improve situation awareness but give avoiding action guidance, or even automated responses.

Let’s get back to the general assertion that AI will make aviation safer. On this one I’d be more cautious. For example, looking at LOC-I incidents and accidents there’s a complex mix of causal factors, and circumstantial factors. In addition, there’s the complexity of potential recovery actions too. Solving problems in 4-dimentions whatever the weather, whatever any damage incurred and however pilots react. This is where the probability numbers start to stack up.

That catch all disciplines “human factors” makes outcomes particularly difficult to calculate. Accidents are known where pilots and automation fight each other to produce bad outcomes.

AI is a machine. It will speedily crunch numbers in a mechanical manner. An extremely advanced manner but without emotion or, yet, not matching the imaginative capabilities of the human brain. Or for that matter the sophistication of human senses.

Would exceptional capable AI have saved Swissair Flight 111[2], for example? Sadly, I think not. On the day, likely an automated airborne system would have made the same decisions as the pilots. Decision making without the sense of precisely how the aircraft fire was developing would still have been hamstrung. I could raise other cases too.

Will AI make transport safer. In part. Not as a universal cure all.

[1] https://www.iata.org/en/publications/economics/reports/risks-2025-brief/

[2] https://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1998/a98h0003/a98h0003.html