Category: Aviation

What to Expect

What’s going to happen in 2026? Predictions are always more a matter for the ancient Greek Gods than mere mortals but here goes. For the world of civil aviation:

Global air traffic will continue to grow,

Large hub airports will continue to expand,

Commercial air travel safety improvement will stagnate,

Electric air taxis will become a reality,

Pontification about the next generation of single aisle aircraft will continue,

Impacts of climate change will increase,

Blows to climate action will be slowly reversed,

AI breakthroughs will continue but adoption will slow,

Drone technology will advance at pace,

More airspace will be subject to conflict warnings,

Volatility and instability will plague the commercial manufacturing sector,

Regulatory harmonisation will struggle to advance,

And for certain, the United States will formally mark its 250th birthday.

Some pluses and some minuses. It will not be a dull year.

Globally the future of civil aviation is a healthy one. Propensity to travel is deeply ingrained in our ideas of development and growth. The complexities of adopting innovations are not new to the aviation industry. What may be new is finding a workforce that is as captivated by aviation as past generations. To train, induct them and offer them the attractive careers paths that compete with other fields. Anticipation of potential technology transformations often lacks a vision for the people who will make them possible.

Visual Cues and Decision Making

Back to visual perception. Initially, it may not seem right to focus on one human sense and not discuss the others. We are multifaceted humans. The brain takes advantage of all its senses, when they are available. We’ve evolved with amazing capabilities.

The interesting notion that certain wines taste better when accompanies by certain music is a wonderful example of how interactive our systems can be. That’s without us having any conscious control over their immediate intimate workings. Parts maybe hardwired and others soft wired and adaptable.

Vision plays a dominant part in enabling us to move around. We haven’t yet evolved echo sounding, like bats and dolphins. This is not to say that those who loose vision can’t compensate to some extent, but they don’t fly aircraft or drive fast cars or become astronauts.

My thoughts arise from exposure to several aspects of our dependency on seeing the world around us. To begin, at the early part of my career, it was indeed the process of taking sound imaging and making it usable for recognising objects. Converting the information that come back from sending sound pluses through water into an image must deal with a dynamic environment. Interpretation of such electronic images can be the difference between hitting an object at sea and avoiding it.

Later, my design work concentrated on information presented to a pilot and what happens next. That whole arena of the aircraft cockpit is one big interface. The link between the senses and the decision maker. I’m not straying into the interminable debates about human factors.

Let’s stay with the trend that’s in front of us in every walk of life. That’s the dependence on recognising and acting on information that is presented to us on a nearby screen. In so far as I know, humans didn’t evolve with this need to relate acutely to closely presented information as much as reacting to distant stimulus. Afterall if a hostile animal or dangerously armed person was heading towards me at speed, I wouldn’t sit around debating the subject.

Aeronautics has experience in this shift of attention. At the start of my career aircraft cockpits where mostly knobs and dials. Mechanical indicators and filament bulbs. Sometime unreliable. Still the idea of flying by the “seat of the paints” prevailed. That centred around situation awareness, predominantly guided by looking out of the window. At the outside world. Distant vison equally, if not more, important as looking two feet ahead at a panel. Over the last five decades the above has changed radically. Instruments are large flat screens dotted with an array of colourful symbols offering every aspect of “situation awareness”.

Now, this is happening to cars. Most new cars have electronic screens. The expectation is that we humble humans have transitioned from simple mechanical dials to a fascinating world of colourful animated markers and whizzy logos. Despite the glorious technology the basic function remains the same. That is the link between the senses and the decision maker.

Adequate levels of visual perception being the number one attribute a pilot or driver is expected to maintain. This continues to be true as automation does more and more. What maybe a long-term trend in human evolution is that shift between the importance of what’s a couple of feet away and what’s in our surroundings. Will we become less sensitive to a personal experience of what’s more that two feet away? I wonder.

Navigating Aviation

Each profession has a way of speaking. This is not usual. Just try reading a long-winded contact on any subject. There are lots of references to a “third party” and more than one. Copious uses of the word “herein”. A good sprinkling of “hereby” and “foregoing”.

I don’t speak those words. If I used them in everyday conversation, I’d get locked-up. Nevertheless, these English words are universally applied to common legal documentation. The hundreds of End User License Agreement (EULA) that we all sign up to, whether we know it or not, apply legalese language liberally [love the alliteration].

Aeronautical people are no different. I could have said aviation people or professional flying people. There’s the rub. Even to say the same thing, there are a myriad ways of saying it.

One major problem that we all encounter, now and then, is having to work with a community that uses language in a different way from ourselves. I’m not talking about language as per dictionary definitions of words and standard English grammar. For good or ill, English opens the door to a numerous of ways of saying basically the same thing.

Professional English users, as I have alluded to above, choose their own pathway through the possibilities. English is not alone in facilitating this variability of expression.

I once worked in Bristol. A Filton. A large aircraft factory with an immense heritage. That included the Concorde project. Here both British and French engineers had to work closely together on a huge joint venture. It succeeded. Supersonic flight was commercialised.

One of the delightful little books I picked up from that time was a handy English/French dictionary of aeronautical terms. Those in common usage at an aircraft factory of the 1970s. To communicate effectively it was recognised that technical words needed to be explained.

What I’m noting now is this reality hasn’t gone away. For all the imaginative language Apps that might grace my mobile phone, there’s still a need to explain. This gets even more important when it’s a specific aviation community that is being discussed.

How do people from other communities get what regulatory people are saying when it’s perfectly obvious to them what they are saying? Take a banker or financier that wants to invest in electric aviation because they believe the future points that way. They come across bundles of jargon and precise terms that are not found in everyday conversations. Not to say that the world of money doesn’t have its own langauage.

In aviation there’s not only particular words with detailed meanings but a raft of acronyms. Combinations of words that are easily expressed as a package of letters. Then the short, sweet acronym surpasses the original text.

SMS, POA, DOA, ODA, OEM, TSO, TC, ICA, CofA, SUP, FDM, FAR, CS, NPRM, NPA, AC, AMJ, ACJ, GM and I can go on and on.

Maybe we need a Sub Part – better understanding.

Safety Differences

Are the safety standards for all large aeroplanes the same? No, they are not. I’m never sure if the public naively expect this to be the case. I’m sure it’s not something that goes through the mind of every air traveller. Looking up at an aeroplane, flying overhead, this is not a thought that instantly comes to mind. Even watching them take-off and land at a busy airport.

A large aeroplane is a large aeroplane – surely. Well, not exactly. Several issue come into play when addressing the safety standards for large civil transport aeroplanes. For example, when did the type of aeroplane first go into service? What is it being used for? Where is it flying to? How many people are on-board?

One place to start with any discussion on this subject is with the basics. For a start an aeroplane is heavier than air and its power driven. Immediately, two important factors pop out of that definition. One: weight counts. Two: operating engine(s) are needed.

Almost lost in the mists of time are the reasons for dividing the world of transport aeroplanes into two categories. Simply called – large and small.

Underlying this basic categorisation is an historic assumption. This is an assumption upon which civil aviation safety regulation has been built. Namely, that efforts need to be made to ensure large aeroplanes are safer than small aeroplanes. One way of looking at this is to consider a spectrum of risk, and several parameters of concern.

Let’s start with the question above – what is it being used for? A transport aeroplane can be used to carry cargo or passengers, often both. The number of crew and passengers carried can range from 1 to 850[1]. In fact, for large aeroplanes, there’s no upper limit written into international standards. However, the term “very large aeroplane” is coined for the upper end of weight or passenger numbers carried. Sadly, the very largest of these very large aeroplanes (cargo), the Antonov An-225 Mriya, was destroyed by war.

Although, a matter of primary concern is the number of passengers carried, and therefore at risk in the event of an incident or accident, the main dividing line in the regulatory landscape between large and small aeroplanes is weight.

To some extent this has a foundation. It could be viewed that in the event of an incident or accident any resulting impact will be more severe the greater the weight of the aeroplane. This is where a parameter called the MTOW, or Maximum Take-off Weight, comes in. This number includes the total weight of an aeroplane, crew, fuel, passengers, and cargo.

Today, we divide the world of large and small aeroplanes based on MTOW. Yes, the maximum number of passengers that can be carried comes into the equation too. The question I have is, should that be the number one consideration?

[1] https://www.airwaysmag.com/legacy-posts/top-10-largest-passenger-aircraft

Exploring Airworthiness Knowledge

How many good books are there on aircraft airworthiness? I don’t suppose a lot of people are going to ask that question. General introductions to airworthiness are not necessarily bedtime reading. This thought came to my mind, this week, because I had some time to kill in a library. A particularly technical library in London[1]. It’s at the Institute of Engineering and Technology (IET).

Sited in a grand building on the banks of the River Thames. Savoy Place, as the name suggests, is next door to the famous hotel of the same name. What marks it out is a large statue, not of some long-forgotten stage actor or army general, but that of Michael Faraday[2]. His contribution to the modern world is enduring and undeniable.

I’ve been a member of this august engineering institute since my student days in the early 1980s. Then it was known as the IEE. One “E” being for Electrical. Our lectures encouraged us students to join and once done so they have us for life. Members worldwide have access to their books, databases and standards.

I could draw a thread between Faraday’s work and 21st century aviation. It’s a mighty wide thread and one that’s growing all the time. There are so many aspects of electromagnetism embedded in aviation. For example, without electric motors and servos, we’d still be controlling aircraft with strings and wires. Fine, hydraulics play their part too.

Technology has moved on. It continues to move. Electrification is displacing hydromechanical systems. The age of electric propulsion is getting closer as developers experiment with a myriad of different configurations of motors for different new aircraft types. More and more electrical power is needed to make modern aircraft tick.

In the IET’s library there are a few books with the word “airworthiness” on the cover. It’s a distinct niche. More often technical references contain huge amounts of material that concern or impact airworthiness, but the word itself is reserved for the more discerning.

One I picked off the shelf was “Airworthiness: An Introduction to Aircraft Certification and Operations” by Filippo De Florio[3]”. For me it’s full of familiar material. I was surprised at the level of detail and range of coverage. In its latest version, it’s reasonably up-to-date too.

One book that was not on the IET’s shelf is “Initial Airworthiness: Determining the Acceptability of New Airborne Systems” by Professor Guy Gratton. I believe he’s updating this book now.

There was a copy of “Aircraft System Safety: Assessments for Initial Airworthiness Certification” by Duane Kritzinger. Again, for me it’s full of familiar material.

Another book that was not on the IET’s shelf is “Aircraft Continuing Airworthiness Management: A Practical Guide for Continuing Airworthiness Engineers” by Daniel Olufisan.

What I’m wondering now is how many other contemporary books are there on this subject. That is up-to-date references. Yes, I know I could do a quick search to turn up an easy answer but that tells me nothing of the quality of the publications. All four above are worth a read.

Help me out with some suggestions – please.

[1] https://www.theiet.org/membership/library-and-archives

[2] https://www.faraday.cam.ac.uk/about/michael-faraday/

[3] https://www.amazon.co.uk/Airworthiness-Introduction-Aircraft-Certification-Operations/dp/0081008880

Why Timely Aviation Safety Reporting Matters

Waiting for accident reports can be frustrating. I’ve found this to be the case in past experiences. When a major fatal aviation accident happens the demand for information is exceptionally high. That means that every credible source of information will be drawn upon.

I don’t think anyone expects professional aviation accident investigators to come up with instant answers. Extensive and meticulous work is required to arrive at detailed findings. When it’s possible accident investigators publish interim reports to ensure that relevant information becomes generally available.

Countering this reality is the need to ensure that the aviation system is not operating at elevated risk during the period that investigation is being conducted. Information needs to flow to those who are empowered to take corrective action.

Given the nature of international civil aviation, accidents can occur anywhere at any time. There’s no rule, statistical or otherwise, that can stop these extremely rare events occurring. Much as it’s fine to promote an ambition for zero accidents, it’s not going to happen.

The frustration I’ve pointed to is shared by industry and authorities. As time goes by the level of speculation and misinformation always increases where there is an absence of verifiable facts. There’s always a need for industry, authorities and investigators to cooperate. As often each one will have a part of the jigsaw that when put together describes what happened.

For all sorts of reasons, this necessary cooperation does not always exist or exist as a smooth pathway to resolving a situation and initiating corrective action. Where barriers exist and delays accumulate the collective aim of assuring aviation safety is harmed.

The International Air Transport Association (IATA), at their recent conference, highlighted this as being a significant issue[1]. There are international standards, but these standards are not always applied in the manner with which they were intended. It seems obvious to say. It’s essential to learn safety lessons and take corrective action as soon as it’s humanly possible.

Where sufficient resources are an issue then there must be cooperative arrangement to allow others to help. It’s by sharing expertise and equipment that the time between occurrence of an event and the implementation of risk reduction measures can be reduced.

Risk reduction measures do not always need to be the final measure. There are the conventional strategies for addressing aviation safety risk – reduce, eliminate or mitigate. Even if publication of a final accident report is a year or more away, there’s often much that can be done in the interim.

Bureaucratic protocols, political sensitivities and commercial interests are real. However, most governments have signed up to obligations within the ICAO convention and its standards. It’s recognised that timeliness is vital.

[1] https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/2025-releases/2025-10-14-02/

Recent Aviation Accidents: Lessons Learned, or not

I start from a position of apprehension. Making aviation accidents, documentary style, the subject of a television series does give me some concern. Obviously, there’s the importance of being respectful to those involved. To reveal something that is of genuine public interest.

Accident investigation and journalism seek to answer the six questions – Who, what, where, when, why and how. When it comes to addressing aviation accidents that have occurred in the last 18-months some of the process of investigation may still be ongoing.

My apprehension starts with – what is the purpose of the series? Does it go some way to answering the question – why? That’s especially the case given that word is in the title[1]. Practically the “why” is turned into a probable cause because the “why” can include multiple factors. It’s rare for there to be a lone factor that results in a tragic outcome.

Broadcast last night by the BBC, this series took a selection of the accidents that recently commanded international headlines. The fatal events have been much discussed within informed professional communities and across social media. I’ve written on them too.

[Fatal Boeing 737 Crash in South Korea, Investigating the Black Hawk and American Eagle Collision, Aircraft Safety and Fuel Starvation, Understanding Boeing 787 Avionics.]

We do this to seek to understand. If there are always lessons to be learned, it’s imperative that those lessons be learned without delay. Lack of an informed and timely response exposes the flying public to further risks.

Sadly, a few of the lessons learned in the past have not been translated into change. The fatal accident at Muan International Airport in South Korea is a case in point. Brid strikes are not new. The dangers of flocking birds have been highlighted time and time again. Whilst airports are built near large bodies of water this will continue be a risk. However, it wouldn’t be right to say this is the only cause of the accident outcome at Muan.

Truly tragic are what may be called: avoidable accidents. This is where the event is purely made up of human actions that need not have take the course they took. Processes and procedures were inadequate, and known to be inadequate, for the situation. To me, this is the case of the military helicopter that collided at low altitude with a passenger flight in Washington DC. It’s mystifying as to why past occurrences of near misses didn’t prompt a change to operations.

I’ll say this because it’s not often given credit. A testament to the good design of an aircraft, and the extensive certification work done and the rigorous training of crews, an accident in the Canadian snow did not become fatal. Upon a spectacular heavy landing in Toronto everyone escaped.

On take-off, a London bound, fully loaded Air India Boeing 787 failed to climb. The results were catastrophic in every sense. Not only were all on-board killed but there were multiple fatalities on the ground.  This tragic fatal accident remains mysterious. The published preliminary report is a source of more questions than answers. Facts so far published do not explain the sequence of events.

What connects this spate of aviation disasters? Nothing, that I can determine. Although, there is the importance of lessons learned. They are not that compilation of dusty past accident reports that sit on a shelf. They are a source of everyday learning. That is learning that needs to be put into action. Timely action. Not waiting for a final publication.

[1] https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m002kw1n/why-why-planes-crash

Trust in Voluntary Reporting

Hard data is immensely useful. Now there’s a surprise. That’s facts and figures. That’s accurate descriptions of occurrences. That’s measurements and readings of important factors. From this kind of data, a picture can be painted of events good and bad. However, this picture is not complete. It’s certainly not complete for any system that involves the interactions of humans and machines.

What’s often less visible is the need for what I might call – soft data. As such it’s not “soft”. I’m just using that loose term to distinguish it. Fine, you could say that social media is littered with the stuff. Vast qualities of instant judgements and colourful opinions. An array of off-the-shelf solutions to life’s ills. That’s all well and good for entertainment. It’s not so useful as a means of getting to the truth.

In civil aviation voluntary reporting systems have been around for several decades. They are not always successful, mainly because there’s a fair amount of trust required to use them when something major happens. When volunteering information there needs to be a level of assurance that the information will not be misused.

The human inclination to seek to blame is intrinsic. We wake-up in the morning, look out the window, and if it’s rainy and windy then someone is to blame. Probably a weather reporter for not warning us of a coming storm. Blame is a way of making sense of negative events without having to do lot of tedious investigation and analysis.

Don’t get me wrong. Accountability is vital. If someone does something unspeakably bad, they must be held accountable. That is a form of blame. Tracing the bad event back to the root cause. If that cause is found to be negligence or malicious intent, then blame can be assigned.

Where a good safety culture exists, as it often the case in civil aviation, then it is wrong to assume that undesirable outcomes can always be linked to a bad actor of some kind.

Human error is forever with us. Even with the absolute best of intent no one is immune from this pervasive creature. It can be illusive. There are environments where owning up to making mistakes is fine. Sadly, I’m sure it’s not uncommon to have worked in environments where such openness is punished. The difference between a good culture and a bad one.

One of my past jobs involved negotiation with a contactor. Every change that we made to a complex contact had a cost attracted to it. So, there was an understandable sensitivity to making changes. At the same time our customer for the product kept asking for changes. There’s nothing worse than being in a tense meeting with a contactor and having my boss pull the rug from under my feet. Seeking to blame a change on my error rather than a customer request. Introducing a voluntary reporting system in such an environment is pointless.

My message here is clear. Voluntary reporting in aviation is a powerful tool. Reports submitted by employees can offer insights that are not available by just looking at hard data. These reporting systems maybe required by regulation or company policy. However, without a good sound safety culture they can be all but useless. A safety culture that is defended and supported by employees and the senior management of an organisation.

Global Ambitions to National Introspection

When did it start? At least in recent times. When did we start looking inward rather than outward? That introverted xenophobia that’s infected about a third of the country. If the polls are to be believed (and that’s a leap).

It’s strange, isn’t it? Britain, a country that spanned the globe with its trading accomplishments went from imagining a transformed world to sitting in front of an iPad complaining about either putting up Union flags on lampposts to taking them down. Painting roundabouts with red crosses or decrying the idiocy of it. Dressing up as crusader knights and thundering on about some lost imaginary England.

Pictures tell a story. Being in the aviation business, a global business, one picture that sticks in my mind involves a handkerchief and a British Prime Minister (PM). It seems a long time ago, now. Nearly 30-years ago. Back in 1997 British Airways (BA) took to celebrating their global coverage by getting international artists to produce new artworks for their aircraft fleet[1]. This was not to the liking of a former PM at the time.

For me this slippery slope was particularly evident. Living in the Surrey town of Reigate. An affluent former Conservative Party supporter, James Goldsmith set-up a new political party dedicated to one issue. The name gives it away. The Referendum Party took to the stage in 1994. Initially, seen as a joke and merely a plaything of a wealthy man, it captured the Member of Parliament for my town. For all the good it did (not), for a couple of weeks in 1997, George Gardiner, the MP for Reigate, joined the new party.

So, the British political mood in 1997 was evident, or so it may have been thought. Nothing of the sort. Of course that was the year of Tony Blair’s Labour landslide victory.

It’s possible to trace a lot of strangeness back to Margaret Thatcher. Although initially internationalist in outlook, she broke a domestic consensus and crushed a lot of hopes. Yes, the country needed radical change. It was the brutality of that change that people reacted against.

In 2001, BA succumbed and returned the Union flag to its tailplanes. Lots of poor excuses were made as to the reason for reverting. A Boeing 747 model and the handkerchief bit back.

Can I construct a thread of events from that moment to the European referendum in 2016? Certainly, there are connections as the country shook off the Blair and Brown years and plunged into a messy 14-years of incoherence. The financial crisis of 2008 didn’t help in the slide to introspection. A government that bailed out the bankers whilst making the population pay did nothing to earn a moral reputation. It further encouraged a growth of a blame culture.

So, if you supported the Referendum Party, the UKIP Party and the Brexit Party that followed, and now the Reform Party surely, it’s possible to see that you are barking up the wrong tree. It’s an empty cul-de-sac. It’s a fruitless orchard. It’s a road to decline.

These are not the heirs to Margaret Thatcher. They are bandwagon hopping con men. Money men who like their pockets lined. They will not help those who have missed out on their share of the country’s prosperity – past, present or future.

[1] https://www.flickr.com/photos/linda_chen/albums/72157625997434719/

Shifting Perspectives

Daily writing prompt
What’s a topic or issue about which you’ve changed your mind?
View all responses

If you write the perfect rule, you will get the desired outcome. Authoring a specification that is robust and watertight will assure success. Having the best possible plan will deliver the best possible results. All sounds reasonable – doesn’t it? It’s not surprising that someone like me, having been schooled in project management, and working in engineering, would have a rational and systematic approach to problem solving. A proven highly successful way of implementing complex technical projects and delivering successful outcomes.

As an analogy I’ll start with mathematics. Nature is a curious beast. What we lean about complex systems is that what happens is highly dependent upon a start point. The initial conditions. Graduate level mathematics about control systems with feedback show that their behaviour changes a lot with a change of initial conditions. So, it’s reasonable to extend that to a systematic approach to just about anything. It’s often true.

Fail to plan – plan to fail. That idiom is a simple few words to sum up this cause and effect. Used by famous names and often quoted. Management training books are littered with this notion.

20-years ago, my team introduced the first European Aviation Safety Plan[1]. This initiative was built around the idea that to achieve a common objective a plan is the best and quickest way to get there. A roadmap, a pathway, a strategy, call it what you will.

Start by identifying problems and then propose a fix for each one. Not all problems but the ones that fit that awkward Americanism – the low hanging fruit. Namely, the biggest problems (fruit) that can be solved with the least effort (easily picked).

Here’s where I’ve changed your mind. Maybe not changed in a dramatic sense but shifted perspective. It’s essential to have a plan, even if it’s just in my head, but it can be overstated as the most important part of a process of change.

The Plan, Do, Check, and Act (PDCA) cycle, starts with a plan. It must start that way. However, each of the four steps is equally important. Seems obvious to say. Even so, it’s often the case that a press release, or alike, will state – we have a plan, roadmap, pathway, strategy, as if that’s the job done.

Management teams will smile with a sense of achievement and show off their plans. A decade down the line that celebration might seem less momentous as the “do” part of the process turns out to be harder than anticipated.

This basic model for systematic change is a good one. Where I’ve changed my emphasis is in the distribution of effort. Don’t put all available energies into constructing the perfect plan. Yes, the initial conditions are important but they are not everything. The key part of the process is the cycle. Going around it with regularity is a way of delivering continuous improvement. Afterall, when it comes to a subject like aviation safety, that’s what’s needed.

[1] 2005 – DECISION OF THE MANAGEMENT BOARD ADOPTING THE 2006 WORK PROGRAMME OF THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY